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This dissertation investigates fourteenth-century Middle English romances’ 
questioning of medieval definitions of the human and nonhuman animal. While the field 
of animal studies conceptually understands the redundancy in the phrase human animal, 
medieval thought focused less on a model of human and nonhuman animal and more often 
depicted a binary opposition of human against and above the animal. Largely set by the 
works of Thomas Aquinas, this prevailing medieval definition of the human defined the 
human as rational other animals as irrational and object-like. Yet certain romances revise 
the paradigm of the human as the rational animal in such a way as to undermine its 
presumption of human exceptionalism and reinscribe the human into the category of 
animal. The Middle English chivalric romance of the fourteenth century plays on and 
reinterprets its French and Anglo-Norman predecessors to emphasize a full reimagining of 
animal definitions. In demonstrating this phenomenon, this project first demonstrates the 
break down the definition of human as exceptional animal via rationality in Bevis of 
Hampton: chapter one examines the rational and affective portrayal of the horse Arondel 
and suggests said horse enters a state of becoming-hero. This dissertation then builds upon 
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that fracture to exhibit a reversal of the hunter/hunted roles that further displace the human 
from its place in the species hierarchy in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight: the second 
chapter explores the depiction of Sir Gawain’s courtly test as a hunting sequence all its 
own in which Gawain ultimately skins himself of his hide. The project then concludes by 
illustrating human and nonhuman animal definitions as based in performance more than 
divinely-granted exceptionalism in William of Palerne: chapter three considers how 
representations of transformed and disguised characters invite confusion between species 
categories through comedic playacting. This research implies that, at least safely within the 
fantasy of romance, fourteenth-century England exhibited a fascination with questioning 
contemporary paradigms and an unexpected freedom to imagine an alternative definition 
of human and nonhuman identity. 
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Plato defined man thus: ‘Man is a two-footed, featherless 
animal,’ and was much praised for the definition; so 
Diogenes plucked a cock and brought it into his school, and 
said, ‘This is Plato’s man.’  






In the fourteenth-century Middle English romance, Ywain and Gawain, Sir Ywain passes 
out in a deep swoon after accidentally falling on his own sword (2059ff).2 Believing the knight to 
be dead, Ywain’s lion companion thrashes violently about as though mad with grief (2072). In 
his great “sorow” (2078), the lion “stirt” (2079) or ‘hastened’ to commit suicide: “[he] toke þe 
swerde bytwix his fete; / Up he set it by a stane, / And þare he wald himself have slane” (2080-
2082) — he took the sword between his feet, set it up by a stone, and there he would have slain 
himself. Ywain’s lion not only seeks to kill himself in his overwhelming grief but also attempts 
to do so in a most unusual and dramatic way: by throwing himself upon a blade. While the lion’s 
behavior may be an attempt to mime Ywain’s accident, the manner in which he does so is 
unquestionably unnatural for the big cat.3 Anatomically speaking, the lion’s action makes little 
sense considering his lack of opposable thumbs: he grabs the sword not with his mouth but 
“bytwix his fete” (2080), or between his feet, as a cat might try to catch a fly. The image the text 
paints is awkward and unwieldy as the lion must stand on his hind-legs in order to grab the 
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sword between his forepaws and, holding the blade in that manner, maneuver the sword and 
himself to prop it against the stone as he requires. Even setting aside the debate of whether 
nonhuman animals are self-aware enough to deliberately commit suicide,4 the lion’s methods 
imply a level of intelligent reasoning: knowing that the sword can kill him, the lion logically 
reasons that he must arrange the blade in such a way that he can throw himself upon it in order to 
complete his objective. He uses simple tools — an ability exclusively attributed to humans until 
as recently as the mid-twentieth century5 — to create a mechanism for his suicide. 
Fortunately, Ywain rouses before the lion can dramatically throw himself onto the sword, 
and Ywain is aghast when he sees what his companion meant to do: the knight laments that his 
companion was so eager to commit suicide for love of him (2097-2098) and proclaims that 
should the lion have killed himself, “‘Þan sold I, sertes, by more right / Sla my self for swilk a 
wyght / Þat I have for my foly lorn”’ (2097-2101), or ‘then should I, certainly, more rightly slay 
myself for such a creature (man or nonhuman animal) that I have lost for my folly.’6 Ywain’s 
despairing speech creates an equivalence between his and the lion’s lives: if one is lost then the 
other is understood as forfeit. Ywain perceives intrinsic and symbiotic values in the lion’s life, 
such that if his companion dies he should “by more right” — a phrase that evokes both moral and 
legal justice7 — kill himself to balance the loss with an equal exchange as though this “wyght” 
were more ‘man’ than nonhuman ‘animal.’ Yet the lion remains a lion, and the poem in no way 
indicates that he changes his shape. The romance only suggests, through the lion’s behavior and 
Ywain’s perception of him, that the nonhuman animal can be a rational animal. 
However, such a portrayal is counter to the prevailing medieval paradigm of human and 
nonhuman animal definitions — namely, that of the Great Chain of Being.8 The Chain defines 
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each individual thing on its hierarchy as “differing from that immediately above and that 
immediately below it by the ‘least possible’ degree of difference” in an infinite graduation that 
encompasses all things in existence.9 For Thomas Aquinas in particular, that sliver of difference 
constituted one single distinction of mind and body: man surpasses the other animals via his 
mental capacity. Just as man shares in the animality of the body below, he shares equally in the 
intellectual capacity of the divine category above. In short, Aquinas defines man as having an 
immortal soul and rational mind and therefore as a person with intrinsic value, while the 
nonhuman animal, being irrational and defined by instrumental value, as merely a thing. While 
Aquinas categorizes humans as the “highest of the ‘complete animals,’” he nonetheless places 
man as separate from and above other animals.10 Humans are exceptional, Aquinas insists, 
because humans have reason. Nonhuman animals, instead, possess merely instinct, which 
Aquinas likens to the “inevitable upward motion of fire” or to “the action of inanimate objects” 
in its simplicity.11 And yet, we see that Ywain’s lion does not behave according to a simple, 
inevitable motion. Quite the contrary, this animal behaves in direct contradiction to the self-
preservative reactions that should govern it and moreover displays some level of rational 
cogitation. That Ywain’s lion attempts to commit suicide, and that Ywain himself reacts with 
such powerful remorse, implies that the lion’s life holds some intrinsic value to itself and others 
beyond its instrumental use. 
My dissertation focuses on that sticking point: the tension between romance portrayals of 
nonhuman, rational animals and the context of the opposing paradigm in medieval thought. If we 
rely on Aquinas’s distinction — that reason is the marker of humanity alone — then nonhuman 
animals like the intelligent lion in Ywain and Gawain complicates contemporary distinctions of 
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what it means to be human. Do these behaviors indicate, by Aquinas’s definition, that the lion is 
human? That question serves as my project’s overarching concern: how do these definitions, and 
by extension their presupposed human exceptionalism, begin to break down in Middle English 
romances of the fourteenth century? 
Scholars of medieval studies have not much pursued this line of inquiry, though it 
abounds in modern animal studies. The field of animal studies itself aims to examine non-
anthropocentric perspectives, or as is the case with some scholars of animal studies, to reevaluate 
the human perspective as an animal one. In this latter school of thought, the human is not a 
separate entity from the animal but is itself an animal. Just as a dog animal is an animal, so is the 
human animal. The difference, of course, is that we view the “animal” in dog animal as 
redundant, but do not assume that same tautological qualifier after “human” — do not, 
implicitly, deem humans to be animals at all.12 Yet, at the time of my writing this, a perfunctory 
search in the International Medieval Bibliography (IMB) shows that roughly 90% of scholarly 
work concerning the human and nonhuman animal in medieval studies has occurred in the past 
twenty-five years. Only two articles include the phrase “nonhuman animal,”13 and only three 
works employ the exact phrase “human animal.”14 In all of these studies, the terms are largely 
descriptive and not employed in the manner that the field of animal studies uses them — i.e.: 
depicting and emphasizing that the human is an animal creature. For the most part, scholars of 
the medieval have focused on the ethics of nonhuman animal rights and the boundary between 
human and other animals — concentrations that imply an anthropocentric perspective that 
categorizes the animal as a whole as nonhuman or as other.15 In fact, even as scholars question 
the definitions of human and nonhuman animals, they often still frame their arguments around 
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the “human” as separate from the “animal” in general. The lack of attention to the medieval 
(re)definitions of human and nonhuman animals represents a lacuna in scholarship, a surprisingly 
untapped spring for potential insight that appears to have been largely overlooked.  
My dissertation aims to do more than merely examine the boundaries between human and 
nonhuman animals rendered in medieval texts: it also investigates how these texts question and 
break down those definitional boundaries. That is not to say my project seeks to 
anthropomorphize or ahistorically read nonhuman animals as somehow ‘more than’ their animal 
category. Nor does my project center on nonhuman animal rights, per se, as nonhuman animals 
had no rights in the medieval period outside their status as property or their instrumental value to 
humans.16 What my project examines is how fourteenth-century Middle English romances 
undermine Thomas Aquinas’s definition of the human as rational and deploy a broader category 
that encompasses both human and nonhuman animal species. In doing so, the romances 
undermine the implicit human exceptionalism in Aquinas’s definitions of human and other 
animals by depicting nonhuman animals as rational and exposing the human as a species of 
animal. In this process, my dissertation also focuses on framing. I use the constructions ‘human 
and nonhuman animal’ or ‘human and other animals’ to allay issues of implied bias in my — and 
my field’s — terminology.17 
My project focuses specifically on Middle English romances of the fourteenth century — 
i.e.: Bevis of Hampton, Gawain and the Green Knight, and William of Palerne — for cultural, 
literary, and historical reasons. The texts examined here continue and expand a phenomenon that 
we first see developing in twelfth-century saints’ lives. The saints’ lives depict arguably rational 
nonhuman animals, whose lives possess intrinsic value and emotional depth: “[t]he saints needed 
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only to recognize the presence of human reason,” Joyce Salisbury argues, “not create it in an 
irrational beast.”18 The concept that nonhuman animals have intrinsic value and rational 
capacities counters the prevailing conception of the nonhuman-animal-as-object, much as it does 
later in such romances as Ywain and Gawain. Saints’ lives’ depictions of nonhuman animals in 
the twelfth century erode the perceived separation of human and other animals and urge a 
reconsideration of nonhuman animal definitions. By the fourteenth century, as this dissertation 
shows, that suggestion of redefinition develops into a fuller reimagining of human and 
nonhuman animal categories — one that implicates the human as animal and, ultimately, 
undermines definitions of the human as exceptional and superior to other animals.  
Moreover, this reimagining seems uniquely amplified in Middle English romances. The 
Anglo-Norman and French — and, predominantly, twelfth-century19 — predecessors of the 
romances examined here largely adhere to the separate, hierarchized paradigm of human and 
nonhuman animal definitions. Yet the fourteenth-century Middle English versions modify their 
source texts — or, in the case of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, the French tradition in 
general — in such a way as to emphasize and expand the questioning of medieval categories of 
human and nonhuman animal. The fourteenth century seems historically ripe for these questions 
of identity: Alan Harding postulates a “crisis of the knightly class” growing from the thirteenth 
century, largely due to the increasing costs of chivalric equipment and the dubbing ceremony as 
well as the growing managerial burdens of administrative duties. Monarchs like Edward I and 
Henry III even issued distraints to knighthood — writs that required qualified men to become 
knights regardless of any desire or lack thereof to do so.20 The concurrent rise in the fourteenth 
century of undubbed but chivalric esquires who could possess and display heraldic arms further 
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muddied the once clear distinctions that elevated knights above lower aristocratic classes. 
Squires became nearly indistinguishable from knights, as Maurice Keen elaborates: both came 
from landowning families, fought in military campaigns, and served in some regional 
administrative capacity.21 The fourteenth century’s increasing ambiguity of intraclass distinctions 
renders its texts as sites of projection: a building anxiety in chivalric identity’s underpinnings 
creates a twin rise in the ambiguity of animal categories in the ensuing anxiety over human 
identity. A socially significant category crisis in fourteenth-century culture, thus, helps to prompt 
a reconsideration of animal categories in Middle English romance, a narrational mode that 
invites such speculative and conceptual freedom. 
My dissertation focuses on three particular chivalric romances because they legibly pick 
up the embedded threads of these category investigations and reweave them to produce a unique, 
Middle-English construction of identity — especially of human and nonhuman animal identities. 
The freedom to reimagine these species definitions may be rooted in the romance mode’s 
magical and fantastical features, which allows for a space of play that can be exercised to 
trespass and transcend typical category boundaries.22 In romance, the boundaries that are so 
concretely defined in reality become flexible and imaginative. In this mode, one can redefine 
how to conceive of the human or even what it means to be human at all.  
In demonstrating the peculiar qualities of medieval romance, my project first 
demonstrates how the definition of the human as the exceptional animal is broken down via 
rationality in Bevis of Hampton.23 Entitled “Horsing around with Knights: Equine Rationality, 
Affective Reciprocation, and Becoming-Hero in Bevis of Hampton,” my first chapter examines 
the rational and affective portrayal of the horse Arondel as depicting a horse whose relationship 
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with his knight is more one of equal partnership than of master/servant. Relying on Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s conception of ‘becoming,’24 I explore how the text’s portrayal of 
Arondel’s rationality and affective bond with Bevis suggests the horse enters a state of 
becoming-hero. The romance’s portrayal of Arondel implicates the nonhuman animal as a 
romance hero on par with its human knight and, even suggests that a nonhuman animal possesses 
a soul for which we should pray.  
My dissertation then builds upon that fracture of human and nonhuman animal definitions 
to examine a reversal of the hunter/hunted roles that further displaces the human from its place in 
the species hierarchy in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight.25 My second chapter, “‘The Most 
Dangerous Game’: Hunting Humans and Traumatic Self-Skinning in Sir Gawain and the Green 
Knight,”26 reads the poem’s hunting sequences not as a metaphor for — and so, subordinate to — 
the bedroom scenes but as the primary interpretive frame of the romance: I reimagine Gawain’s 
courtly test as a hunting sequence all its own in which Gawain ultimately skins himself of his 
own hide. Relying on trauma theory’s concept of traumatic echoes — specifically how the 
unknowable and inexpressible nature of trauma is only finally experienced through its 
forgetting27 — I explore how Gawain redefines his trauma at the Green Chapel to fit into the 
context of a chivalric trial and, as a result, realigns his experiences with the Aquinian precept of 
human exceptionalism.  
My project then concludes by illustrating human and nonhuman animal definitions as 
based more on performance than divinely-granted exceptionalism in William of Palerne.28 
Chapter three, “Hiding Skin and Skinning Hides: Transformation and the Vulnerability of 
Species Categories in William of Palerne,” considers how representations of transformed and 
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disguised characters invite confusion between species categories through comedic playacting. 
Through its depiction of the ambiguous and fluid identities of the human and nonhuman animal, 
the romance simultaneously undercuts Aquinas’s definition of the rational human and 
reformulates the Great Chain’s hierarchy of differences as a lateral spectrum. The romance relies 
on humor, in fact, to defer and even normalize an embraced ambiguity and its undermining of 
divinely-granted human exceptionalism.29 
My research thus implies that, at least within the safety of medieval romance, fourteenth-
century England exhibited a fascination with questioning medieval paradigms of species 
hierarchy and sought an unexpected freedom to imagine an alternative definition of human and 
nonhuman identity. This literary reimagining suggests, in part, that romance conceived of the 
increasing ambiguity in aristocratic class distinctions as a matter of human identity.30 At the very 
least, my project indicates — as I explore in my conclusion — a reconstruction of human and 
nonhuman animal definitions that is strangely unique to the Middle English translations of 
French traditions. But beyond this, my dissertation intimates that animal studies and ecocriticism 
can gain new contexts for analysis and debate from medieval literature. Even fields that seem 
exclusively forward-looking, such as transhumanism,31 can benefit from this project’s prompting 
of more research. After all, ‘what is human’ is one of the most basic existential questions we can 
ask ourselves, and the long debate over that definition and its finer points attests to our anxiety of 
identity. What we find here, then, is simply that people are concerned about what it means to be 
a human — and an animal. 
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Chapter 1. Horsing Around with Knights: Equine Rationality, Affective 
Reciprocation, and Becoming-Hero in Bevis of Hampton  
 
 
KIRK: Spock, what do you make of that? 
SPOCK: Most unusual. An unknown form of energy 
of great power and intelligence, evidently 
unaware that its transmissions are disruptive. 
I find it illogical that its intentions should be 
hostile. 
McCOY: Really? You think this is its way of saying 
‘Hi there’ to the people of the Earth? 
SPOCK: There are other forms of intelligence on 
Earth, Doctor. Only human arrogance would 
assume the message must be meant for man. 




“And Beues rod on Arondel, / Þat was a stede gode and lel” (589-590)2: Bevis rode 
on Arondel, that was a good and loyal steed. In the fourteenth-century romance Bevis of 
Hampton, the term “lel,” meaning ‘loyal, true, faithful,’ appears only three times (590, 
2033, 4448).3 All of these instances refer exclusively to titular knight Bevis’s horse, 
Arondel. Arondel is not the only named or capable warhorse in the romance, yet only he 
earns the designation of lel. While there is no doubt that Arondel is a well-trained destrier, 
this appellation indicates that Arondel is something more than a regular warhorse.  
Horses were very important to medieval knights, as symbols of their chivalric 
identity, signifiers of wealth and status, and practical mechanisms of warfare — after all, 
the term chivalry or chevalerie itself originates in the Latin term caballārius, meaning 
‘rider, horseman.’4 Of special importance to knights, destriers were expensive war-horses 
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bred for combat: large, heavy horses with specific training, capable of great bursts of speed, 
and aggressive enough to bite and kick at enemies in battle. Knights rarely rode their 
warhorses for common transit, saving the steed for battle. Instead, they rode coursers: a 
lighter breed, less carefully trained than the warhorse but still rather aggressive, coursers 
were useful for regular transportation between battles.5 However, horses were more than 
mere vehicles to carry a knight through a melee: horses were essential in the chivalric unit 
and functioned as an irreplaceable member of the knightly unit in a warrior partnership. 
Horses also served as knights’ companions, as Arondel does in Bevis of Hampton.6  
This Middle English romance follows the adventures of the titular Bevis as he seeks 
vengeance against his mother and stepfather. Along the way, he wins the admiration of 
King Ermin and the love of King Ermin’s daughter Josian, who bestows upon him his 
faithful companion Arondel. However, a jealous king named Brademond orchestrates 
Bevis’s downfall, and King Ermin orders Bevis to leave Arondel behind and travel to 
Brademond, who imprisons him. Meanwhile, King Ermin marries Josian to King Yvor of 
Mombraunt and grants him Arondel as a groom-gift, but when Arondel nearly kills King 
Yvor, Yvor chains the horse in the stables. When Bevis finally escapes his own prison 
years later, he seeks out Arondel and Josian, and they flee Mombraunt pursued by a giant, 
Ascopard, whom they eventually convince to join them. After a few more misadventures, 
Bevis finally wins back his earldom, only to be exiled when Arondel kills the English King 
Edgar’s son. King Yvor kidnaps Josian and, later, Arondel, whereupon Bevis finally 
defeats him and is crowned king of Mombraunt in his place. Several chivalric deeds later, 
after restoring Hampton for a second time, Bevis and Josian retire to Mombraunt, where 
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they live happily and die together in an embrace. Through all these feats and 
misadventures, only Arondel is “lel” to Bevis and no one else, human or other animal,7 
earns that title. 
To better explore the implications of the exclusivity of this loyalty, we turn to 
contemporary definitions of the human and nonhuman animal. In medieval thought, human 
and nonhuman animals resided in a hierarchy called the Great Chain of Being. Humans, as 
Thomas Aquinas notes, were defined by their capacity for reason and their possession of a 
divine soul that ensured resurrection into heaven.8 Nonhuman animals, on the other hand, 
possessed neither reason nor soul, and so had no intrinsic value of their own: nonhuman 
animals were only valuable for their instrumental use to humanity.9 In place of rationality, 
instinct governed nonhuman animal behaviors, but this instinct was itself a simple process, 
akin to “the action of inanimate object.”10 However, Bevis of Hampton’s portrayal of the 
horse Arondel works to undermine the distinction made by Aquinas: Arondel behaves 
rationally and not only by instinct. Still, while Arondel is intelligent, his intelligence does 
not supersede or replace his animality. The two are not mutually exclusive in this text, and 
to label Arondel’s intelligence as merely replicating human cogitation is to fall victim to 
human exceptionalism and perpetuate the definition of human as the “rational animal.”  
In this chapter, I explore how the concept of the rational animal in Bevis of Hampton 
resists the limitation of rationality to humanity alone — the romance, in fact, insists on 
deconstructing a definition in which only humans are rational animals.  
Instead, the text presents Arondel as a rational horse, one who forms a powerful 
affective bond with his companionate knight, Bevis. Affect, as defined by Gilles Deleuze 
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and Félix Guattari, is not emotion but the “becoming” or “passage from one experiential 
state of the body to another.”11 Research in neurobiology and neuropsychology has 
connected affect and cogitation, as Karen Simecek suggests: the two functions operate “in 
tandem, responding to and shaping one another.”12 These connected functions can extend 
to what cognitive scientists have called “shared emotions”: an intersubjective phenomenon, 
shared emotions occur when two or more people in similar affective states focus on the 
same cause of their emotional response while aware of the other’s matching response.13 
Yet shared emotions need not occur between two flesh-and-blood people: literature can 
depict the pain or trauma of fictional characters in such ways that not only recreate but also 
deepen the experience of shared emotions through readers’ affective responses.14 A reader, 
as a witness, can share the emotions of a fictional figure. Deleuze and Guattari also suggest, 
as Laura Cull elaborates, that encountering another’s suffering, even nonhuman suffering, 
shifts the witness into a similar affective state of becoming.15 Shared emotions and affective 
reciprocation, then, encompasses both human and nonhuman consciousness(es) and both 
living and literary figures. And despite its grounding in modern scientific research, affect 
theory can apply — and has been applied — to medieval studies.16 In this chapter, I use 
affect theory as a lens to articulate the implications of Arondel’s portrayal as a rational 
being and his affective relationship with Bevis and the text’s insistence on their reciprocal 
partnership.  
The extensive training both a knight and his horse endured undoubtedly helped to 
create a strong bond between them, and for a knight, there was no nonhuman animal more 
important than his horse. However, to properly handle their strong and highly aggressive 
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stallions, as Maud Burnett McInerney notes, knights needed to master a “complex set of 
competencies and communications.”17 A knight communicated with his steed through 
voice, but his primary methods utilized touch and equipment, such as the bridle and spurs.18 
Destriers in particular received specialized training, from acclimation to the weight and 
sounds of their knights’ and their own armor to running straight ahead without shying away 
from enemies. Trainers carefully selected horses for both temperament and aggression to 
facilitate the needs of a knight. Muslim treatises, such as Abou Bekr’s Le Naceri, comment 
on European training techniques and, primarily, the lack of skill therein. Arab horses, 
smarter and lighter than most Western breeds, required more deliberate, considered 
handling, and after the twelfth-century Crusades, Western knights were exposed to these 
alternate training methods which worked better with the new Arabian breeds they 
encountered.19  
Considering the cross-cultural contact instantiated by the Crusades, we should 
examine the “long-standing” training traditions outlined by Abou Bekr. For example, 
trainers conditioned a horse not to toss its head back or tuck it to its chest, as both stances 
posed a danger to the rider: a tossed head could land a blow to the rider’s face, 
incapacitating him, while a tucked-in jaw pulls the bridle and makes the horse nearly 
impossible to control. Instead, the horse must be “responsive” to its rider and, when the 
rider is disadvantaged, react immediately to assist him in recovering his balance and not 
throw him off. A warhorse needed also to wait to be mounted and stand still even in combat 
until its rider had regained the saddle. To better achieve this responsive relationship, Abou 
Bekr emphasizes the importance of knights’ involvement in their own horse’s training and 
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even states that one who “did not personally train his charger [...] courted death.”20 The 
careful, and likely personal, training a warhorse received would have greatly contributed 
to the development of a companionate bond between knight and mount. Even without such 
personal training, however, a knight must rely on his steed, and a horse must equally rely 
on the knight. Such interdependence was literally trained into both parties.  
And while Arondel is a proper warhorse, we can also see him exhibiting qualities 
that seem to elevate him above the standard destrier. Moreover, the text renders Arondel’s 
behavior not as exceptional for his species but as expected of a horse like him. Arondel’s 
rationality enables him to reciprocate an affective bond with Bevis, but in portraying that 
bond, the romance also sets Arondel as a mirror to Bevis. In reflecting the titular hero, 
Arondel imitates his heroic endeavors and, as a consequence, enters into his own state of 
‘becoming.’ 
 
Rational Behavior and Chivalric Companionship 
Despite his intriguing characterization, Arondel is not frequently the main subject 
of scholarly scrutiny. One of the most thorough of scholars to focus on Arondel, Susan 
Crane examines the interrelationship of horse and knight as a love-bond built through a 
knight’s intensive training. She insists on Arondel’s animality, but her reading of Arondel’s 
affective response to Bevis neglects the horse’s rational response. While Arondel is an 
affective figure, reciprocating an emotional bond with Bevis, I argue that the very ability 
to recognize and return the knight’s investment lends Arondel some level of rational 
capacity. The romance draws attention to both aspects of Arondel’s nature, the animal and 
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the rational, and presents them not as a contradiction but as a matter of fact: Arondel 
behaves both as an animal and as a rational creature. Part of Crane’s focus on Arondel’s 
animality rests in her resistance to an anthropomorphic reading of the horse. Instead, she 
asserts that to categorize his traits — his loyalty, love, and intelligence — as 
anthropomorphized and, by extension, as “exclusively human capacities” neglects 
Arondel’s “equine consciousness.”21 While dismissing Arondel as anthropomorphized 
does injustice to his charming animal character, Crane’s focus on ‘animalizing’ his 
intelligence likewise dismisses a vital aspect of Arondel’s personality — his capacity for 
reason. The implicit definition of intelligence as “exclusively human” falls apart in Bevis 
of Hampton, as the text frequently highlights Arondel’s rational capacities and undermines 
rationality as a defining feature of the human animal. 
We should pause to note that Bevis of Hampton’s contemporary, Boeve de 
Haumtone,22 similarly presents the Anglo-Norman Arundel as a proper warhorse, complete 
with glimpses of the animal’s rational behaviors.23 However, Boeve de Haumtone focuses 
more on horses in general as chivalric accessories than its Middle English sister text: when 
the former text references a horse, it most typically does so in relation to pricking or 
spurring, an action that serves to emphasize the knightliness of the riders. The poem does 
not allow the audience to forget that the horse (and the spurs utilized) are knightly 
signifiers: the horse serves as a sign of rank more than as a fellow warrior. Beyond Arundel, 
the Anglo-Norman text most closely approaches the concept of horses as trusted or 
intelligent partners in the occasional moments wherein a knight “let coure” his steed, which 
Judith Weiss translates as “gives free rein.”24 While hardly a declarative endorsement of 
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nonhuman animal rationality, this implication of trust in the horse, and in its training, at 
least implies some level of intelligence in the horse to be taken for granted. Yet 
overwhelmingly, the Anglo-Norman romance’s equine references focus on the speed or 
appearance of the horse: the text describes steeds as “chivals kernu” [‘long-maned horses’] 
multiple times throughout the text, highlighting physical attributes over intelligence.25 
Boeve de Haumtone values Arundel more for the hereditary traits he can pass on to his 
offspring than for his companionate value, for instance focusing attention on “le fiz 
Arundel el bruant” (3477) [“the son of the mettlesome Arundel” (89)]. While the text 
describes Arundel as “el bruant” [‘burning or blustery’],26 the focus here remains on 
lineage: Arundel’s mettle is only valued as a trait that has been passed to his colt. Through 
much of Boeve de Haumtone, the text circumscribes Arundel’s qualities to his chivalric 
value or his usefulness in serving Boeve. The text thus keeps the focus trained on a horse’s 
function: horses were incredibly expensive to obtain and maintain, and so gesturing at the 
physical aspects of a steed (in particular qualities that were evaluated during the purchasing 
process) pushes the horse into the realm of treasured object, not treasured companion.  
In contrast, the Middle English romance displays Arondel’s rationality throughout 
Bevis of Hampton and foregrounds it early in the romance when Bevis rides Arondel into 
battle: “He smot Arondel wiþ spures of golde; / Þanne þouȝte þat hors, þat he scholde, / 
Aȝen Redefoun Beves gan ride / And smot him þourȝ out boþe side” (1000-1002). Here, 
the line “Þanne þouȝte þat hors, þat he scholde” (then thought that horse, that he should) 
leaves its primary subject to be filled by context — presumably Bevis, who spurred his 
steed and struck Redefoun through both his sides in the preceding and following lines, 
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respectively. And yet the ambiguity of subject and direct object — “þat hors” (1000) or 
“Beves” (1001) — creates a space of play in the text to reimagine who commands whom 
and by how much, play that does not appear in Boeve de Haumtone (2564-2566). The text 
leaves the line in question tantalizingly open, such that one can imagine Arondel’s 
responding to Bevis with a level of rational consideration: urged forward, Arondel reasons 
that he ought to carry Bevis toward Redefoun, modifying a general command (“go”) to a 
specific target (“Redefoun”). Deconstructing the connotations of “þouȝte” only furthers 
this reading: the verb means ‘to exercise the faculty of reason,’ specifically in such ways 
as ‘to form an opinion, come to a conclusion’ or even ‘to form a purpose, have an 
intention.’27 Arondel’s “þouȝte” brings with it rational connotations of careful 
consideration and choice. The absence of punctuation in the manuscript grants quite a lot 
of freedom of interpretation here as well, particularly as the text is written on the 
manuscript in two columns of rhyming-couplet verse, rendering this line visually 
independent from those above and below. Therefore, the page bears a visual pause after 
“spures of golde” that potentially leaves “Þanne þouȝte þat hors þat he scholde” as its own 
clause, even as the rhyme scheme metrically connects it to the previous line.  
While contemporary treatises on horse training highlight the chivalric unit’s mutual 
response toward a goal, they often do so in a one-sided fashion: the horse reacts “without 
understanding” even while the steed and knight enter a sort of symbiotic unity.28 Yet Bevis 
of Hampton seems to resist disregarding Arondel’s responses to Bevis as mere reactions. 
Instead, the text paints the steed as behaving and thinking rationally. Even if one hesitates 
to read the line I discuss above as depicting Arondel’s agency to choose, the text at the 
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very least shows the horse as consenting to Bevis’s decision: the knight urges him forward 
and “þouȝte þat hors þat he scholde” charge ahead, as the horse considers and agrees with 
his human partner. In either reading, Arondel accepts Bevis’s orders: spurred onward, he 
considers the command and either agrees to or decides that he should go forward against 
Redefoun. This response can be read as part of Arondel’s affective bond with Bevis — 
both understand each other’s affective states in battle and keep their focus on the same 
object, in this case Redefoun. Their bond is reciprocative and symbiotic as both rely on and 
share affect with each other to work as a single unit. 
However, Arondel does not rely on Bevis or their bond for his ability to think, as 
even when separated from Bevis, Arondel exhibits traits of rationality. When King Ermin 
betrays Bevis and marries Josian to King Yvor, Ermin offers Arondel to Yvor as a groom-
gift. But when Yvor attempts to ride Arondel, the horse will have none of it: the moment 
Yvor mounts Arondel, “Þat hors wel sone vnder-ȝit / Þat Beues nas nouȝt vpon is rigge” 
(1514-1515), or that horse soon well understood that Bevis was not upon his back. The text 
specifically gives Arondel the capacity to identify a strange rider and ‘comprehend’ that 
this man is not Bevis, or even ‘understand the purport (of a threat)’ in Yvor’s mounting 
him.29 Only once does Arondel passively allow another rider to mount him, when a Saracen 
thief uses magic to ensorcell the horse.30 But with Yvor, Arondel reacts quite strongly: the 
steed immediately takes Yvor on a long, violent ride across the country before he throws 
him off and nearly kills him. The text even playfully puns that Arondel nearly “al to-brak 
þe kinges kroun” (1522) or broke to pieces the king’s crown — meaning both the crown 
of his skull and, with his death, the crown symbolic of his rule over his kingdom. Many 
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scholars, like Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, read this sequence as illustrative of Arondel’s loyalty 
to Bevis, and that is true: Arondel’s behaves as expected of a chivalric companion.31 
Nonetheless, the phrasing employed, that he “vnder-ȝit,” plays an important role in 
Arondel’s portrayal. The text embeds underpinnings of rational thought in Arondel’s 
behavior even while he reacts as a loyal steed of romance would in the absence of his 
human companion. 
After Arondel throws him, Yvor must chain him up in the stable in a rather elaborate 
array of restraints (1525-1534), but even those measures eventually prove insufficient. 
When Bevis reunites with Arondel, the horse breaks his bonds to rejoin his knightly 
partner:  
Whan þat hors herde neuene 
His kende lordes steuene, 
His rakenteis he al te-rof 
And wente in to þe kourt wel kof 
And neide & made miche pride 
Wiþ gret ioie be ech a side. (2157-2162) 
 
Arondel hears Bevis speaking — or perhaps hears his name, as we will consider shortly — 
and tears off all his restraints, leaping into the court with neighs and prancing all around 
with great joy. What I want to focus on here is how Arondel recognizes Bevis — 
specifically when the horse “herde neuene / His kende lordes steuene” (2157-2158). Most 
scholars focus on “steuene,” meaning ‘the voice of a human being,’ or even ‘the sound or 
tonal pattern characteristic of and distinctive to an individual’s voice,’ and assert that 
Arondel merely reacts to the sound of his “kende” or ‘legitimate’ master’s voice.32 This 
reading certainly holds validity: Arondel recognizes Bevis’s “steuene,” and even that 
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recognition indicates some rational capacity for all that scholars disregard it as merely 
‘animal.’ Yet still, we have more to examine here — one cannot overlook another key word 
used in this passage: “neuene.” We can gloss this word in two ways, depending on which 
meaning of the verb nevenen we utilize. The most common reading of this passage cites 
the verb’s secondary meaning, ‘to say.’33 This reading fits well with the use of “steuene” 
in the subsequent line, and so editors often gloss the passage as “þat hors herde [speak]/His 
kende lordes [voice]” (2157-2158). However, nevenen has a primary definition of ‘to 
mention, [....] speak of, refer to, esp. by name.’34 Using this definition, the word indicates 
that Arondel recognizes not so much Bevis’s speech as he does Bevis’s name. While 
grammatically tenuous, this gloss gains ground when put into the narrative context, as the 
last person to speak was not Bevis, but Josian: “Me wolde þenke be his fasoun / Þat hit 
were Beues of Hamtoun!” (2155-2156), or ‘I would think, by his appearance, that it was 
Bevis of Hampton.’ Immediately after Josian refers to Bevis by name, Arondel reacts — 
“Whan þat hors herde neuene” (2157). Again, the manuscript format plays a visual role in 
this interpretation: its columns of text break between these lines and place “neuene” on top 
of the right-hand column and “Beues of Hamtoun” on the bottom of the left-hand, such that 
the latter acts as a sort of pseudo-catchword to join with and evoke the naming definition 
of the former. Of course, we could also say that according to the manuscript format, 
“neuene” and “steuene” share a stronger linking: placed atop each other on the manuscript 
page and paired in the rhyming scheme, they connect with each other both visually and 
metrically. Still, the reader encounters the first pairing (“Beues of Hamtoun” and “neuene”) 
before the rhyming pair to follow (“neuene” and “steuene”), and so we may interpret some 
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primacy in the first connection. In conjunction with the narrative details of this scene — 
i.e. Josian speaks immediately before Arondel reacts — and the text’s overall favoring of 
Arondel’s intelligence, we can read the first meaning of “neuene” as present in the passage, 
even if grammatically ill-fitted to the line. And so, the audience can understand that 
Arondel is capable of recognizing not only Bevis’s voice, but also his name.  
In one of only a few clear examples of Arundel’s rational capacities in Boeve de 
Haumtone, the Anglo-Norman text’s rendition of this scene only reinforces my 
interpretation: “Le destrer, kef u fet a deuz cheynis lier, / kant hoy Boun de Hampton 
nomer,/solum son sen grant joie en ad al qer” (1440-1442) [“When the horse, which was 
bound by two chains, heard the name of Boeve of Hampton, his heart was filled with joy 
from what he understood” (53)]. Here, the horse explicitly recognizes Boeve’s “nomer” 
[‘name’], a term exclusively defined as naming, through Arundel’s “sen” (meaning 
‘knowledge’ or ‘sense’ as well as ‘thoughts, mind’).35 When Arundel celebrates wildly and 
a bit destructively (1443-1444), Josian confirms that his response stems from hearing 
Boeve’s name: “‘ore oyez, sire palmer, / come grant fereté demeyne le desrer, / pur ceo ke 
il oyt Boun une fez nomer” (1445-1447) [“‘Now, sir palmer, you can hear how excited the 
horse becomes as soon as he once hears Boeve named’” (53)]). In this scene, both the text 
and the characters acknowledge Arundel’s ability to recognize Boeve’s name and so draw 
attention to the horse’s understanding.  
 In response to identifying Bevis, the Middle English Arondel tears off his chains 
and speeds into the courtyard to meet him, where the horse also “neide & made miche pride 
/ Wiþ gret ioie” (2161-2162) or neighed and made a big show of pride/spirit, with great 
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joy. The steed’s response seems nothing short of a celebration — even the word “pride,” 
in addition to its meaning of ‘prideful display, ostentation,’ also contains here the specific 
meaning ‘of a horse: to show spirit.’36 Arondel puts on quite a spirited display in his joyful 
reunion with Bevis. But then, when Bevis approaches Arondel, “þe hors him knew and 
seȝ” (2176), the horse saw and knew him. The Middle English text further emphasizes 
Arondel’s understanding in this scene with Josian’s interjection: while Arondel celebrates 
his reunion with Bevis in the courtyard, the maid interrupts to lament that “‘Wel mani a 
man is bane / To dai he worþ i-lauȝt, / Er þan þis stede ben icauȝt!’” (2164-2166) — many 
a man is doomed to be laughed at/struck today before this steed is caught. While some 
editors gloss “i-lauȝt” as ‘to be laughed at,’37 the word’s structure appears more commonly 
as the verb lacchen, meaning ‘to be seized, struck, or taken,’ than it does the former verb 
laughen, ‘to laugh.’38 The narrative context, as well, better matches the lacchen meaning 
than the laughen one, as Josian perceives Arondel’s escape to be a disaster, crying “Allas!” 
(2163): without Bevis to tame him, Josian anticipates that many men will attempt and fail 
to recapture the steed, and in doing so, they will be struck or violently seized, like in Yvor’s 
near-fatal encounter with Arondel. The text here reminds the reader of that past attempt to 
ride the horse and Arondel’s immediate understanding of and ensuing violent retribution 
toward the strange rider. And yet this wild, nigh-uncatchable horse stays perfectly still 
while Bevis mounts him: “Hit ne wawede no fot, / Til Beues hadde þe stirop” (2177-2178), 
or he moved no foot until Bevis had the stirrup. The narrative juxtaposes Josian’s reaction 
with Arondel’s happiness and then sudden docility toward Bevis, as if to further emphasize 
the horse’s understanding of the situation: recognizing Bevis, Arondel performs as he was 
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trained to and remains perfectly still for his rider to mount. While Josian does not yet realize 
she stands beside Bevis, Arondel does recognize the knight, by voice, name, and sight, in 
a moment of animal rational understanding. Crane extols this scene as representative of 
Arondel and Bevis’s affective bond, as the text animates Arondel in ways that elevate him 
above chivalric equipment.39 This scene also renders Arondel not as anthropomorphized or 
human-like per se, but rather as a chivalric horse with reasoning: in conjunction with other 
moments of his intelligence, Arondel’s recognition of Bevis on a cognitive level 
intertwines with his equine training and nature to suggest his capacities as a rational animal. 
Of course, we know nonhuman animals are capable of recognizing and responding 
to names, and anyone who has ever owned a pet can attest to its personality and decision-
making capabilities, whether it be a clever, escape-artist dog opening a door on his own or 
a cat willfully knocking a glass off the table while maintaining eye-contact. Ravens are 
notorious in scientific communities for not only solving complex puzzles with simple tools 
but also holding grudges and recognizing human faces.40 Horses in particular are incredibly 
intelligent and, as one Norwegian study shows, can be taught to communicate their 
personal comfort preferences via visuals symbols.41 However, the point here is that the 
fourteenth-century Bevis of Hampton acknowledges and even celebrates the horse as an 
intelligent creature independently of anthropomorphic attributions. Arondel displays 
rational behavior and cogitation as a nonhuman animal.  
 Arondel’s rationality plays an integral part in his affective bond with Bevis. To 
demonstrate the features of Arondel and Bevis’s bond, we will examine the poem’s horse-
race sequence. Racing horses for wealthy prizes was a common medieval practice, though 
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it rarely occurs in romances. The text’s inclusion of this scene, then, is unusual in the genre. 
While some editors dismiss the sequence as a variation on the trope of demonstrating a 
horse’s physical prowess,42 such dismissal ignores a secondary function: not only does 
horse racing showcase Arondel’s equine abilities, but it also depicts the rational aspects of 
his affective bond with Bevis. 
The text, as many medieval romances tend to do, first assures the reader before the 
action begins that this undertaking will end favorably: “þar wiþ was Beues paied wel” 
(3519), or therewith Bevis was well pleased. Arondel is a high-quality steed, and the text 
does not allow its audience to doubt his abilities for a moment. Nor does Bevis himself 
betray any second thoughts: “Meche a treste to Arondel” (3520), he had much 
confidence/trust in Arondel. The two lines, tied as they are by the rhyme scheme as well 
as their sequential order, almost read as causal: Bevis is well pleased in this pursuit because 
he trusts Arondel so much. Both the EETS and the TEAMS editions of Bevis of Hampton 
include a colon punctuation that furthers this causal relationship — “þar wiþ was Beues 
paied wel: / Meche a treste to Arondel” (3519-20). This consistent editorial decision seems 
to imply that audiences want to interpret the line as causally connected. The syntactic 
structure also implies a correlation: when the verb trusten takes the preposition “to,” as it 
does in the above line, it carries the connotations of not only having confidence in the direct 
object (here, Arondel) but also relying on it ‘for guidance, support, discretion’ as well as 
‘entrust[ing] one’s safety or well-being’ to it.43 Bevis’s confidence in Arondel exceeds the 
horse’s physical prowess and encompasses a reliance on the horse’s more companionate 
support: Bevis trusts that Arondel will succeed here, and also that the horse will serve his 
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interests in and outside of battle. The connotations of relying on one’s ‘guidance, support, 
discretion’ implies a more mental or social trust than a purely physical one and suggests 
that Bevis trusts Arondel not only with his physical safety but also his general well-being. 
In fact, the prepositional construction “treste to” displaces agency from Bevis to Arondel: 
Bevis entrusts the matter to Arondel, implying that the horse has become the primary actor 
here. If one reads the lines as causal, then one can read Bevis’s pleasure as a consequence 
of trusting Arondel to control the endeavor. The success of the race, then, is a result of their 
intimate, mutually affective bond and Arondel’s rational agency therein.  
However, Arondel does not easily win the race. During the event, two knights 
attempt to cheat in the competition and manage to gain a lead. To beat them Bevis 
encourages Arondel to run all the faster by promising the horse that he will erect a castle 
for him if they win: “‘Arondel [...] / For me loue go bet, go, / And I schel do faire and wel 
/ For þe loue reren a castel!’” (3531-3534), or ‘Arondel, I bid you for my love go, go, and 
I shall fairly and well build a castle for your love.’ The Anglo-Norman Boeve de Haumtone 
does not include this promise (2491-2493), but the Middle English Bevis seems to possess 
a different, more intimate bond with his Arondel. And the incentive works: 
Whan Arondel herde, what he spak, 
Before þe twei kniȝtes he rak, 
Þat he com raþer to þe tresore, 
Þan hii be half and more (3535-3538). 
 
Arondel hears Bevis’s words and “rak” (3536) or ‘hastened’ in front of the two knights so 
that he came to the treasure sooner than them by “half and more” (3538). But Arondel 
responds to Bevis’s orders as much as to his encouragement: as a highly-trained warhorse, 
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Arondel would recognize his rider’s cues. Indeed, Crane observes how this interaction 
highlights the level of nontraditional communication cultivated by the intensive training 
that produces a medieval knight: she asserts that Bevis transmits his desires to Arondel 
through the knight’s body language more than his words, using physical signals that alert 
the horse to his rider’s desires.44 Crane ties this communication, which “surpasses the aids 
of spur, rein, and the verbal signal ‘go,’” to Arondel and Bevis’s (admittedly asymmetrical) 
interrelationship embedded in a love-bond.45 This reading, though, assumes that the saddle 
employed in the race is not the high saddle favored in the medieval era. These early 
European saddles were raised, with progressively higher cantles and pommels to bear the 
increasing weight of lances through the medieval period. Even the simpler leisure saddles, 
such as for riding — or perhaps, as here, racing — typically still utilized the solid-tree 
construction which raised it off the horse’s back such that “no muscle or back movement 
of the horse could have been felt.”46 While the horse likely still felt shifts in weight on his 
back or perhaps a change of knee-pressure, much of the body language Crane implies 
would be as insensate for the horse as the horse’s musculature movement would be to his 
rider.47 Bevis’s voice, then, acts as his primary mode of communication here.  
Considering Crane’s justified resistance to anthropomorphizing Arondel, she 
expresses reluctance to deem this particular scene as bestowing a “human” intelligence 
onto Arondel so as to not shut out his equine animalness. However, “human” intelligence 
as it has been classified is precisely the point at issue here. While Arondel’s intensive 
training as a warhorse constitutes an important part of his character, as Crane argues, it 
does not automatically exclude his rational portrayal in the romance. The text itself 
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practically insists on two possible readings: Bevis urges the steed forward with a simple 
command of “‘go bet, go,”’ but the text immediately follows the command with an 
incentive, one that it then emphasizes in the horse’s response. Arondel hears and, the 
audience presumes, understands Bevis’s encouragement: “Whan Arondel herde, what he 
spak” (3535), he launches forward and gains a substantial lead, winning the competition 
by a large margin. The text presents Arondel as not merely responding to a recognizable 
command (“‘go bet, go”’) but also to Bevis’s subsequent promise. The text highlights not 
how or that Bevis speaks to Arondel, but what he speaks. Thus rises the implication of 
Arondel’s comprehension, that the horse possesses some level of understanding that spurs 
him onward as surely as Bevis’s commands. Arondel acts both as the thoroughly trained 
warhorse and the agent with comprehension that the romance insists upon, and through this 
combination, horse and knight constitute an equal partnership. During this race, the two 
share in affective conditions and in the object of their focus, and they communicate and 
respond to each other in similar ways. They understand and respond to each other’s needs 
and desires, and their bond here embodies the affective phenomenon of shared emotions.48 
As part of that equal, affective exchange, Bevis fulfills his promise: “Beves of his 
palfrai aliȝte / & tok þe tresore anon riȝte: / Wiþ þat and wiþ mor catel / He made þe castel 
of Arondel” (3539-42) — Bevis dismounts and takes the race’s prize, using it and “more 
catel” or ‘more income/goods’ to build Castle Arondel. For Arondel, Bevis immediately 
undertakes the lengthy and costly endeavor of constructing a castle. He does not hesitate 
and neither does the narrative: Bevis dismounts, accepts the winnings, and then uses them 
to construct the castle all in the span of several lines. The castle does not benefit Bevis 
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overmuch: Arondel’s victory ensures his prestigious reputation (3543-3544), and Bevis 
never dwells there, instead settling with Josian in Mombraunt at the romance’s end (4410). 
The poem, in fact, makes no further mention of Castle Arondel beyond its construction, 
during which the text further notes that Bevis spends more on the project than he wins in 
the race: “Wiþ þat and wiþ mor catel” (3541). The castle does not constitute an even 
exchange of prize:promise or race:castle but rather an investment made on Arondel’s 
behalf. Bevis does not hesitate to pour his funds into keeping his word to his horse. 
By contrast, the Anglo-Norman Boeve de Haumtone paints Arundel as nothing 
more than a chivalric accessory. When the two cheating knights gain an impressive four-
mile lead in the race (2489-2492) and Arundel overtakes them but fails to pass them for 
three leagues (2500), Boeve does not encourage his steed with promises or incentives but 
instead chides him for his poor performance against inferior opponents (2501-2506). Boeve 
calls him “[c]hival” [‘horse’] (2501) and spurs him onward “par maltalent” [‘in anger’] 
(2493).49 In response, Arundel strives harder than a “cerf” (‘slave’ or ‘serf’) before 
obtaining his victory (2507-2509).50 Boeve’s use of aggression and insults as motivators 
and Arundel’s servile response depict their relationship more as that of master/servant than 
that of partners. After the race, Boeve builds a castle not for Arundel but for his own 
patrilineal heritage, naming it for the horse more as an afterthought (2520-2522), and 
Boeve paints himself as the primary subject, telling others that “ai hui conquis” (2527) 
[“today I’ve won” (72)]. Here, Arundel merely “accompanies” the knight during an 
endeavor.51 Boeve de Haumtone seems more concerned with Arundel’s status as a chivalric 
accessory for Boeve in his identity as a knight. The Middle English version, by contrast, 
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concerns itself more with the affective bonds between knight and steed: Bevis acts to 
highlight Arondel’s rational capacities, their bond as a chivalric unit and also as an intimate 
companionship. 
 
A Horse is a Horse: Trenchefis’s Rational and Affective Capacities 
One may still argue that Arondel is exceptional as a rational horse in Bevis of 
Hampton, and that his affective bond with Bevis anthropomorphizes him. However, 
Arondel is not the only horse in Bevis of Hampton who exhibits both rational capacity and 
an affective bond with Bevis: a steed called Trenchefis displays similar capabilities. Bevis 
acquires this horse after he escapes his imprisonment by Brademund and is pursued by a 
band of knights. In this posse is a knight named Grander, whose backstory is this: 
A king þar was swiþe fer, 
His nam was hote Grander. 
An hors he hadde of gret pris, 
Þat was icleped Trinchefis: 
For him a ȝaf seluer wiȝt, 
Er he þat hors haue miȝt. (1721-1726) 
 
The text introduces Grander in two lines, stating there was a “swiþe fer” (1721) or ‘very 
fierce’ king whose name was Grander. After that, Grander’s acquisition of Trenchefis 
dominates the description of his entire background: he had a horse of “gret pris” (1723) or 
‘great value/worth’ named Trenchefis, for whom he gave “seluer wiȝt” (1725), or his 
weight in silver, before he could have that horse. While not an atypical entrance — 
romances often make short introductions of enemy knights, and Grander’s very brief role 
in the narrative hardly justifies more — the extended focus on Trenchefis is a bit more 
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unusual. The text expends twice as many lines discussing Trenchefis as it does Grander. In 
fact, Grander acts merely as a reference: his character and history are only relevant as a 
vehicle for Trenchefis to enter the narrative, whose backstory supplants Grander’s. It is 
hardly justifiable, then, to even call this a description of Grander’s background — the poem 
provides Trenchefis with a backstory most narratives give only their human actors. 
Whereas Boeve de Haumtone does not name Trenchefis at all, Bevis of Hampton treats the 
horse like a character all his own. 
Nonetheless, Bevis of Hampton relies primarily on implication when depicting 
Trenchefis’s rationality. Cornered again in his continued flight from Brademund, Bevis 
finds himself on “þe cliue, / Þer þe wilde se was” (1790-91), or the cliff where the wild sea 
was. To avoid capture, Bevis rides into the waters on Trenchefis, who swims “dai and […] 
niȝt” (1815) over the sea until he “bar ouer þat gentil kniȝt” (1816) or bore that gentle 
knight over (the sea). When urged to dive off the cliff, Trenchefis does not exhibit the same 
level of agency that allowed Arondel to exhibit his capacity for decision-making: “Beues 
smot is hors, þat it lep / In to þe se, þat was wel dep” (1811-12) — Bevis struck his horse 
so that it leaped into the sea that was very deep. Bevis clearly acts as the leader in this 
action as he spurs Trenchefis onwards so that he leaps into the deep sea.  
Yet this maneuver was not part of a medieval warhorse’s typical training. The 
precedent for horse-diving rests in late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century popular 
attractions in which a ridden horse sprinted up a wooden ramp to leap 40 feet into a 12-
foot depth of water.52 Warhorses, on the other hand, were typically trained for combat with 
a corresponding emphasis on short bursts of speed and explosive charges. It is unlikely that 
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destriers’ typical training included jumping from progressively taller platforms into pools 
of water to condition them for high aquatic leaps, though both practices taught horses not 
to throw their head lest they strike their rider’s face and incapacitate them.53 Nevertheless, 
Trenchefis is surely trained to be responsive to his rider, and so when Bevis urges him to 
jump into a raging sea, the horse does so. Here again one may overlook the partnership 
inherent in horse-riding and assume the relationship to be one of master/servant or even 
user/tool. Yet a horse obeys with its implicit consent: as horse-diver Arnette French 
comments, “‘Once you were on the horse, there really wasn’t much to do but hold on. The 
horse was in charge.’”54 Not even a magnificently trained destrier would willingly make 
such a leap as the one Bevis asks of Trenchefis — from “þe cliue” into “þe wilde se,” or 
from the cliff into the wild sea — without some prior conditioning that Trenchefis likely 
did not possess. Therefore, even in this moment of spur-and-leap, the text still implies that 
Trenchefis willingly takes this precarious jump. While the details of high “cliue” and 
“wilde se” can be read as dramatizers for the narrative, they also double as emphasis for 
Trenchefis’s implicit consent. Despite these dangers and his instincts, the horse obeys 
Bevis and launches himself into the waters, swimming for a day and a night to carry his 
knight to safety. The text, it seems, invites the audience to see the horse as receptive to 
affective responses and capable of shared emotions.  
The poem also portrays Trenchefis as an affective figure, as he recognizes and 
reciprocates Bevis’s need to escape even at the risk of drowning. After the dangerous leap 
into the sea and Trenchefis’s long swim to bear Bevis to safety, the horse climbs out of the 
water and shakes himself dry: 
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Whan he com of þat wilde brok, 
His gode stede him resede & schok, 
And Beues, for honger in þat stounde 
Þe hors þrew him doun to grounde. (1817-1820) 
 
When Trenchefis rises out of the “wilde” (1817) or ‘wild’ waters and “resede & schok” 
(1818)—both verbs meaning he shook himself dry—he dislodges the hunger-weak Bevis 
and throws him “doun to grounde” (1820). However, the text emphasizes that it is Bevis’s 
own hunger that causes him to lose his grip on the horse — “for honger in þat stounde” 
(1819, emphasis added), or for hunger in that moment — and not any aggression on the 
horse’s part. We can easily recognize Trenchefis’s shake, ostensibly to dislodge the water 
in his coat, as an automatic, instinctive reaction. The scene is almost comedic in its charm, 
rendering Trenchefis as distinctly animal, but nonetheless faithful and almost endearing, 
much like Arondel. Unlike in Boeve de Haumtone, wherein Boeve immediately leaps back 
onto the horse (1268), the Middle English Bevis remains on the ground and laments his 
current condition with a great “Allas!”: “‘Whilom ichadde an erl-dam / And an hors gode 
and snel, / Þat men clepede Arondel’” (1821-24), or ‘I formerly had an earldom and a good 
and bold horse that men called Arondel.’ The tumble from his steed reminds Bevis of his 
beloved Arondel and subsequently reminds the audience of not only Arondel’s importance 
to the knight as a socio-economic and chivalric signifier — as Bevis places the horse and 
his earldom on the same plane — but also highlights Bevis’s emotional investment in the 
horse. Here, Trenchefis acts as an affective conduit, allowing Bevis to express his great 
grief and frustration. The horse fills the role of Bevis’s companion, an emotional 
investment in potentia, and his role as such underscores Bevis’s affective relationship with 
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Arondel even as it gestures at the possibility for a similar reciprocated bond with 
Trenchefis.  
Nor does that bond stay in potentia: Bevis develops a sufficient investment in 
Trenchefis to mourn the horse’s death. Soon after crossing the sea, Bevis encounters a giant 
and, in the ensuing confrontation, the giant accidentally kills Trenchefis:  
To Sire Beues a smot þer wiþ 
A sterne strok wiþ outen griþ, 
Ac a failede of his diuis 
And in the heued smot Trenchefis, 
Þat ded to grounde fel þe stede. 
‘O,’ queþ Beues, ‘so god me spede, 
Þow hauest don gret vileinie, 
Whan þow sparde me bodi 
And for me gilt min hors aqueld, 
Þow witest him, þat mai nouȝt weld.’ (1885-94) 
 
The giant swings a “sterne stroke” (1886), or severe blow, at Bevis but misses his target 
and instead hits Trenchefis in the head, who falls “ded to grounde” (1889). Immediately, 
Bevis stops the battle entirely to lament his loss from such “gret vileinie” (1891) or great 
wickedness/wrongdoing.55 While knights certainly aimed to preserve their own horses, 
they also often targeted their opponents’ steeds to gain the upper hand in battle, so 
Trenchefis’s death should not be an unusual or wholly unexpected risk in this fight.56 The 
giant even struck Trenchefis by accident and slew the horse without the explicit objective 
of removing Bevis’s martial advantage. Yet despite the accidental nature of the killing blow 
and the reality of losing horses in battle, Bevis goes so far as to condemn the giant for the 
deed: he claims the giant “aqueld” or ‘killed’ the horse for Bevis’s own “gilt” or ‘offense,’ 
and he states the giant “witest him, þat mai nouȝt weld” (1894), or punished him that could 
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not control (presumably, his circumstances).57 Trenchefis, the endearing creature who bore 
Bevis across the sea, is not merely a broken tool in this scene, but also a lost companion. 
Crane notes that this passage implies Trenchefis’s life “was of value to the horse himself.”58 
While medieval thought did not ascribe nonhuman animals with intrinsic value, Bevis of 
Hampton presents this horse as more than defined by his instrumental value.59 While one 
may interpret this line from a pragmatic perspective of lamenting a lost advantage, as 
Jeffrey Jerome Cohen does, such a reading would better fit with the Anglo-Norman Boeve 
de Haumtone60: immediately after the giant kills his unnamed horse, Boeve continues to 
fight without pausing to lament (1313-1314), and when he strikes the deathblow upon the 
giant, he does so not to avenge his horse but because the giant had refused to offer 
hospitality and so had slighted Boeve’s honor (1315). The Middle English Bevis of 
Hampton instead suggests the horse may possess rationality — so that Trenchefis can 
understand his life sufficiently to value it. The text depicts Trenchefis not as damaged 
equipment but as a victim: he is an innocent, wrongfully blamed and subsequently 
murdered.  
Bevis’s response portrays the horse’s death as a grievous crime: his emotional 
investment in the steed supersedes the martial and economic disadvantages of losing the 
horse, and so the knight’s reaction overflows with affective editorializing. The knight 
claims that his own “gilt” caused Trenchefis’s death and his own ‘offense’ or ‘misdeed’ 
brought the blow.61 But Bevis latches onto the “gret vileinie” in the giant’s action: not only 
had he killed Trenchefis but he “sparde me bodi” (1893). Bevis renders the horse’s death 
in terms of his own person: sparing Bevis physically necessitated striking the horse, as 
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though the two constituted an equal exchange. Bevis thus affectively conflates his own 
body with that of Trenchefis, mapping onto this horse’s gruesome demise the ghost of his 
own potential wounds and death. Trenchefis, by his end, has developed a sufficient 
affective bond with Bevis that the knight equates their physical wellbeing. Trenchefis is 
more than a horse to Bevis, much like Arondel, and the text presents both horses as capable 
of participating in shared emotions and reciprocating affective bonds with their knight. 
Arondel, then, is not an exception but part of the norm: knights and horses in general, the 
romance implies, are capable of — and, indeed, benefit from — developing powerful, 
affective bonds.  
 
Affective Conflation and Becoming-Hero 
While Arondel exhibits rationality and a strong affective bond with Bevis, the 
romance also seems to conflate the human and the equine characters at various points. The 
text itself depicts the pair as very closely linked and presents them as parallel or reflective 
figures. As I will show, this conflation creates a version of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s 
“becoming-animal.” While Deleuze defines affect itself as “becomings that spill over 
beyond whoever lives through them (thereby becoming someone else),” he and Guattari 
define becoming-animal specifically as a shift from stability to anomaly, as a move away 
from the definable and identifiable to the undefinable and unidentifiable.62 While 
becoming-animal may start with some imitation, it entails less repetition or reproduction 
and more creating the new. That is not to say that becomings-animal have an objective or 
goal — they do not: becoming produces only itself and “there is nothing outside of 
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becoming to become.”63 But becomings-animal are not dreams or imaginations, as Deleuze 
and Guattari clarify: “[w]hat is real is the becoming itself,” even in the absence or unreality 
of what the becomings become, and this reality of becoming-animal persists “even though 
one does not in reality become animal.”64 The example they offer is that of imitating a dog: 
if you bark like a dog, you do not transform into a dog. Rather, if you bark “with enough 
feeling, with necessity and composition,” you project a dog.65 The “gestural relation” of 
this dog, as Laura Cull observes, creates something new that is neither you nor the dog.66 
You are becoming-dog, but you do not become-dog. Nor is there an oppositional binary of 
imitator and imitated, as the imitator cannot remain unaffected by the imitation: in 
becoming-dog, you are no longer you any more than you are now dog. With this 
framework, I examine key moments in Bevis of Hampton wherein the text, Josian, and even 
Bevis himself conflate Arondel with Bevis. However, this equation of knight and horse 
renders a textual imitation of Arondel to the titular knight such that Arondel shifts from 
horse to a state of becoming-hero. 
When Arondel nearly kills Yvor, as we saw earlier, Yvor’s men “lauȝte him wiþ 
queinte ginne” (1526) or caught him with a cunning ruse or an ‘ingenious device or 
contrivance.’67 They must employ an elaborate machination to keep Arondel detained:  
To rakenteis a stod iteide, 
Nas mete ne drinke be-fore him leid, 
Hey ne oten ne water clere, 
Boute be a kord of a solere. 
Noman dorste come him hende, 
Þar þat hors stod in bende. (1529-1534) 
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They tie Arondel with chains and feed him from “a solere” (1532), or a loft above, all while 
his captors keep as much distance from him as possible as no one “dorest come him hende” 
(1533) or dared come close to him. The text repeats how thoroughly they bind Arondel: 
“To rakenteis a stode iteide / [...] / Þar þat hors stod in bende” (1528-34), or he stood tied 
in chains...there that horse stood in fetters. As though holding him in his stall is not secure 
enough an imprisonment, they have tied Arondel in multiple chains — “rakenteis” and 
“bende” both indicate ‘fetters’ or ‘chains.’68 Arondel’s captors must create a complex 
detainment structure, including a rope to lower minimal food and water to Arondel, in order 
to feel assured of his confinement. This episode occurs sandwiched between descriptions 
of Bevis’s own imprisonment. Nearly 100 lines earlier, the text relates Bevis’s capture by 
Brademund, wherein Brademund’s men bind Bevis to “a ston gret” (1423), or a large stone, 
and leave him at a “petes grounde” (1431), or at the bottom of a pit, that was “twenti teise” 
deep (1426), or twenty fathoms deep, and filled with “wormes” (1430), or snakes, one of 
which bites him and scars his face badly. The text lingers on Bevis’s “meche miseise” 
(1418), or his mental and physical pain/distress.69 As with Arondel, Bevis’s jailers confine 
him to an excessive degree, with minimal food and water (1419-1422). When the text 
circles back to Bevis (a scant 34 lines after it relates Arondel’s confinement), it reiterates 
the shared straits of the two captives: “[...] hadde Beues lein in bendes / Seue ȝer in peines 
grete, / Lite idronke and lasse iete” (1568-1570), or Bevis had lain seven years in 
bondage/chains in great pain with little to drink and less to eat. The text self-consciously 
returns to these descriptions of “rakenteie” (1529, 1636, 2159), “bendes” (1534, 1568), and 
minimal food lowered from above (1529-1534, 1598-1600, 1638, 1644). The text thus self-
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consciously and repeatedly redeploys similar terminology when describing both 
imprisonments and creates mirror scenarios of detainment. The manuscript itself presents 
the ordeals of the two captives, human and equine, on facing pages: Arondel’s capture 
occurs on folio 184 verso (column a), while Bevis suffers his imprisonment on folio 185 
recto (columns a-b).70 The very layout of the manuscript exhibits the imprisonments as two 
sides of the same ordeal, as the leaves in the manuscript exemplify a side-by-side mirror 
image of each episode. The narrative elements and the manuscript’s physical presentation 
of the passages only serve to unite Arondel and Bevis textually and materially. 
The romance’s investment in this partnership of dual-heroes breaks the text’s own 
narrative continuity. Near the start of the romance, when fifteen-year-old Bevis rides into 
his “ferste bataile” (585), or his first battle, he does so astride Arondel: “Beves rod on 
Arondel, / That was a stede gode and lel” (589-590), or Bevis rode on Arondel that was a 
good and loyal steed. And yet Josian does not bestow Arondel upon Bevis until over 400 
lines later, when she formally knights and rewards him for his valor and service in the fight:  
After that she yaf him a stede, 
That swithe gode was at nede, 
For hit was swift and ernede wel. 
Me clepede hit Arondel. (985-988) 
 
After the battle, Josian gives him a steed that was both “swithe gode [...] at nede” (986), or 
very excellent as needed, and “swift and ernede wel” (987), or swift and ran well, named 
Arondel. While Bevis’s riding Arondel into battle before the text has even introduced the 
“stede gode and lel” may be attributed to scribal error, I resist dismissing this detail upon 
those grounds. This battle occurs before Bevis has been knighted: he performs great feats, 
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carrying his sword Morgelay and riding Arondel — the sword and spurs that mark him as 
a knight before their ritual donning later in the knighting ceremony.71 As if to emphasize 
these chivalric signifiers as such, almost immediately after Josian formally bestows 
Arondel upon Bevis, the knight leaps upon his destrier to ride once more into battle (989) 
and the poem notes that “[h]e smot Arondel with spures of golde” (999, emphasis added), 
or he struck Arondel with golden spurs. The text draws attention to the earlier presence of 
the sword and horse and also the lack of official chivalric equipment that it here 
emphasizes, indicating that this may not be a scribal error. Within the world of the 
narrative, the romance so strongly associates Arondel with Bevis that even before his 
knighting, Bevis cannot engage in his chivalric endeavors without Arondel to bear him 
through them. And nor can Arondel be absent from the knight’s first battle, as they are not 
only an affective unit but Arondel himself also inhabits the state of becoming-hero. While 
he is not become-hero, the horse nonetheless appears outside his reflective imitation of 
Bevis-as-hero.  
Even Josian, Bevis’s lady-love, equates the knight with the horse. After his long 
captivity and escape, Bevis learns that Josian and Arondel reside at Mombraunt, where his 
love has married Yvor and assists the poor, asking all who come for aid for news of Bevis 
of Hampton. Disguising himself as a pilgrim, Bevis approaches the castle and speaks with 
Josian, but she does not recognize this “niwe palmare”, or this new palmer, whatsoever 
(2134): “whan þe maide seȝ him þar, / Of Beues ȝhe nas noþing war” (2119-2120), or when 
the maid saw him there, she was not at all aware of Bevis. When she asks Bevis if he knows 
of her knight, he affirms that he does “wel inouȝ!” — or ‘well enough’ — and claims that 
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he and Bevis are both earls “in is contre,” or in his country (2136-2138). While the 
disguised knight here references his own earldom of Hampton, it is not until he mentions 
Arondel that Josian considers his professed connection to Bevis to be confirmed:  
At Rome he made me a spel 
Of an hors, men clepede Arondel: 
Wide whar ichaue iwent 
And me warisoun ispent 
I souȝt hit boþe fer & ner, 
Men telleþ me, þat it is her; (2139-2143) 
 
He explains that while in Rome, Bevis told him “a spel” (2139) or story about a horse 
named Arondel, and that he has since traveled widely and spent his money to seek this 
horse “fer & ner” (2142), or far and near, until men told him it was here (at Mombraunt). 
Once Bevis mentions Arondel, Josian believes his claim and takes him to the stables to 
meet the horse he has supposedly sought for so long. Only now, as Josian brings Bevis to 
his horse, does his resemblance to her lost love strike her: “‘Ner þis mannes browe to-tore, 
/ Me wolde þenke be his fasoun, / Þat hit were Beues of Hamtoun!’” (2153-2156), or ‘were 
not this man’s brow torn, I would think by his appearance that it was Bevis of Hampton.’ 
Bevis’s scarred face ostensibly hampers her recognition of him, but she does not note the 
similarities between this “niwe palmare” and her knight until after he mentions Arondel: 
his knowledge of and desire for Arondel alert Josian to further connections between the 
two men. The text even remarks upon this lapse: “Iosian be-held him be-fore” (2149, 
emphasis added). Despite having looked at him previously, she must bring him toward 
Arondel in order to perceive any resemblance, whereupon she calls to Boneface and notes 
Bevis’s scarred brow, as shown above. The text seems to draw attention to her lack of 
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recognition and focuses instead on Arondel as the only functioning signifier for Bevis that 
Josian can comprehend. 
But Josian does not fully recognize Bevis until after Arondel does so: as shown 
above, Arondel moves not a foot until Bevis has his stirrup, whereupon “Beues in to þe 
sadel him þrew, / Þar bi þat maide him wel knew” (2179-2180), or Bevis threw himself 
into the saddle, thereby that maid knew him well. Arondel’s placid acceptance of Bevis 
triggers Josian’s recognition of the knight: as soon as Bevis sits in the saddle with no violent 
reaction from his steed, Josian realizes his identity. And once again, the text seems rather 
ironic in its depiction of Josian’s previous ignorance: when Arondel breaks free of his 
chains and launches himself into the courtyard, Josian laments the steed’s escape as 
disastrous because she does not recognize Bevis, the one knight most capable of taming 
Arondel (2164-2166). Her interjection, within this context, only serves to emphasize that 
she has still not realized that the “niwe palmare” is in fact Bevis, even while Arondel and 
the audience know as much. Only after Bevis has mounted Arondel can she recognize him: 
“Beues in to þe sadel him þrew, / Þar bi þat maide him wel knew” (2179-80, emphasis 
added). Josian cannot conceive of Bevis without Arondel and so only recognizes him when 
he is restored to his horse. The chivalric pair acts as a single unit, sharing an affective 
identity through which Arondel reflects Bevis’s heroic figure such that the two are 
conceptually indistinguishable. 
Indeed, Bevis cannot imagine himself without Arondel. After his harrowing escape 
from prison, Bevis finds himself too weak and hungry to stay on his horse, and Trenchefis 
throws him off when the other animal shakes himself, as we saw. In response, Bevis falls 
 46 
into despair, lamenting that “‘Whilom ichadde an erl-dam / And an hors gode and snel, / 
Þat men clepede Arondel’” (1822-24), or ‘Formerly I had an earldom and a good and swift 
horse that men called Arondel.’ Here, Bevis links his earldom and his horse as he recalls 
them together in his lament as equivalent, upsetting losses. Shockingly, he immediately 
claims he would trade them for food: “Now ich wolde ȝeue hit kof / For a schiuer of a lof!” 
(1825-1826), or ‘Now I would give it quickly for a slice of a loaf.’ Crane explains this 
comment as evidence of Bevis’s desperation: both his horse, a costly investment and 
chivalric signifier, and his noble heritage are integral to his very identity, and so, this 
moment is clearly hyperbolic in nature and such a trade “thinkable only in a life-or-death 
moment.”72 However, her reading dismisses the implications when the text ties Arondel to 
the knight’s heritage itself. Even if his frantic offer to trade horse and earldom constitutes 
desperate hyperbole, Bevis nonetheless links the two together: both are incredibly shocking 
to trade in such a manner, and he groups both as equally important and hyperbolic. In fact, 
the descriptors for Arondel give the horse more weight in Bevis’s lament: while Bevis cites 
his lost heritage as part of his tragedy, the text gives his “hors gode and snel” two lines 
over his earldom’s half-line reference. Even while Bevis states that he would trade both for 
a single loaf of bread, he places more emphasis, more elaboration of value, on the horse in 
the proposed exchange.  
While Bevis’s proposal here remains hyperbolic, he does at a later point in the 
romance sacrifice his earldom — his heritage and his identity — for Arondel. After the 
race and Arondel’s exemplary performance therein, King Edgar’s son tries to steal Arondel 
after Bevis refuses to sell him, only for the English prince to be slain by the steed in his 
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attempted theft. The king demands Bevis’s death for this, but the barons decide to spare 
the knight and instead “hongen is horse” (3572) or hang his horse. Bevis cannot endure 
such a sentence for his beloved horse, however, and chooses to exile himself from England 
to save Arondel’s life. In doing this, Bevis forsakes not only his land and heritage but also 
that of his future line: the pregnant Josian will accompany him into exile, and Bevis’s 
punishment trickles down to his unborn and now newly disinherited sons. In his (and their) 
place, Bevis names his mentor and uncle Saber to be his heir and renounces England 
altogether: 
‘Nai,’ queþ Beues, ‘for no catele 
Nel ich lese min hors Arondele, 
Ac min hors for to were 
Ingelonde ich wile for-swere; 
Min eir ich wile make her 
Þis gode kniȝt, min em Saber.’ (3575-3580)  
 
Bevis’s speech insists that “no catele” (3575), or wealth/property/goods, is worth losing 
Arondel for, but for his horse he will “for-swere” (3578) England entirely and supplant his 
own unborn “eir” (3579) with his uncle Saber. Bevis views self-exile as the clear solution 
because he values Arondel as not only his chivalric partner but also as an extension and 
reflection of his own identity. Bevis holds true to this perception from the start of the 
episode: when the English prince sought to buy Arondel from Bevis, the knight had 
declined, saying, “’Nay,’ queth Beves, ‘so mot I leve, / Though thow wost me take an hond 
/ Al the hors of Ingelonde!’” (3546-3548), or ‘Nay’ said Bevis, ‘so long as I live, even if 
you would have me take in hand all the horses of England.’ Given the ability to purchase 
another horse to replace Arondel, or even “al the hors of Ingelonde,” Bevis refuses to part 
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with his steed. Bevis’s affective investment in Arondel exceeds the economic or martial 
value of a knight’s horse. However, Cohen reads Bevis’s sacrifice for Arondel, whom he 
admits was “demonstrating as much moral as horse sense” in slaying the would-be thief, 
as indicative of chivalric identity’s dependence on nonhuman bodies.73 Cohen’s claim 
highlights both the importance of the horse in the knightly pairing as well as Arondel’s 
capacity to understand and respond in a traditionally human — i.e., ‘moral’ — manner, but 
Cohen does not emphasize these points in the context of the text’s overall patterns of 
nonhuman animal rationality. Instead, Cohen’s focus stays with the knight-and-horse 
relationship as a machine, a model that inherently strips the affect and rationality from the 
chivalric unit in favor of emphasizing its interconnected processes. But clearly, this scene 
seems to present the intimate relationship of knight and horse as superior to the more 
mechanical pairing of knight and equipment.  
There remains some rational component to Arondel’s role in this situation: Crane 
notes that Arondel “was ‘in control’” of his actions and “committed a ‘wrong’ in killing 
King Edgar’s son.”74 She observes that Bevis only tries to save Arondel’s life: he does not 
argue Arondel’s culpability in the murder, nor does he deny the accusations. And Crane is 
correct: Bevis does not even address the issue of his horse’s culpability and instead leaps 
straight to his offer to forswear England. However, Crane interprets Bevis’s response 
differently by tying it to his recognition of his chivalric disadvantage: without a horse, 
Bevis suffers much higher “physical vulnerability” in battle, and so a threat to Arondel 
constitutes one to Bevis as well. For Crane, the stakes are not in the morality or rationality 
of Arondel’s actions, but in the knight’s own martial and economic investment in the horse 
 49 
as a chivalric accessory.75 While this feature of their relationship is certainly in play, this 
does not negate Bevis’s long-standing bond with Arondel. Bevis’s affective relationship 
with Arondel entails that each of them recognizes and responds to the needs and affective 
states of the other, but here Bevis goes further and equates Arondel with his own identity 
and person. To lose Arondel does not mean losing his earldom — it is in fact much worse. 
It seems more akin to losing himself. Bevis has survived without his earldom, but not 
without Arondel, and the horse constitutes not only a chivalric partnership but also a 
reflection of Bevis and, in that mimetic image, a figure of the-horse-as-becoming-hero.  
Admittedly, it may be precarious to claim that Arondel’s conflation and 
identification with Bevis, that his mirroring of his knight, constitutes a sufficient imitation 
to enter a state of becoming. Yet a mirror reflects what is presented to it: when we stand in 
front of one, it creates a simulation of ourselves that we rarely hesitate to identify as us. 
We may refer to it as ‘my reflection’ but more often, when we catch glimpses of ourselves 
or others reflected, we are more likely to think of those images as ‘me’ or ‘you.’ I can know 
my hair is messy because I see it so in the mirror, but I almost never consider each step of 
that logic — that by seeing that my reflection’s hair is messy, I can extrapolate that my hair 
is messy. We skip the distance and differentiation of ‘reflection’ and automatically identify 
it as ourselves. But the reflection is still a simulacrum, and when the mirror is cracked or 
dirtied, we more easily identify the mirror-as-intermediary: the facsimile is exposed as a 
reflection, as not-us. And so, when the text mirrors Arondel and Bevis, it creates a reflective 
imitation that at points conflates the two — Bevis is Arondel, Arondel is Bevis. Their 
identities intertwine like images in a glass, even while their physical “real” bodies never 
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change. In this way, the text’s conflation and mirroring of Arondel with Bevis serves to 
depict the horse as becoming-hero. 
 
Above the Rational: Arondel’s Soul 
Bevis’s self-exile in response to the threat on Arondel’s life foreshadows his own 
death and the closing of the romance itself. As the narrative draws to an end, Bevis has 
attained his vengeance and reclaimed Hampton, his sons are mature, with holdings of their 
own, and Josian has fallen ill. Full of sorrow for Josian’s state, Bevis goes to the stable to 
visit his beloved steed:  
Arondel a fond þar ded, 
Þat euer hadde be gode at nede; 
Þar fore him was swiþe wo, 
In to chaumber he gan go 
& seȝ Iosian drawe to dede: 
Him was wo a moste nede, 
And er her body be-gan to colde, 
In is armes he gan hire folde, 
And þar hii deide boþe ifere. (4597-4605) 
 
He finds Arondel “ded” (4597) in his stall and suffers “swiþe wo” (4599), or intense 
sorrow, at the sight. Retreating to his private chambers, Bevis finds Josian “drawe to dede” 
(4601), or near to death, and he takes her into his arms before “her body be-gan to colde” 
(4603), or before her body began to grow cold. They both die “ifere” (4605), together. 
While Josian’s illness and death grieve Bevis to “moste nede” (4602), or to greatest need, 
Arondel’s death ends his life: without their intimate bond, Bevis cannot exist. Indeed, 
Arondel’s death triggers that of Bevis and Josian, ultimately ending the narrative. The text 
makes it clear that Josian is dying before Bevis comes across Arondel’s corpse — “Þanne 
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swiche siknesse the leuedi tok, / Out of þis world ȝhe moste wende” (4590-91), or then the 
lady took such an illness that she must go out of this world, implying she has not yet done 
so — but only after Arondel has passed does Josian rapidly deteriorate: “Iosian drawe to 
dede” (4601), “her body be-gan to colde” (4603), and “þar hii deide boþ ifere” (4605). 
Josian rapidly begins to die/draws toward death after Arondel’s demise, and she does not 
die until Bevis holds her in their bed. The text too closely links Arondel and Bevis for one 
to survive without the other. Their affective and chivalric bonds merge to create a single, 
reflective identity.76 But more than that, the poem treats Arondel as a character equal to the 
knight’s, not only through his companionship with Bevis but also through his rational 
personality and his shift out of the category of nonhuman animal and into the state of 
becoming-hero. By necessity, the romance itself must end with Arondel’s life. 
To that end, the romance’s closing lines are the most telling. The text concludes by 
stating that masses are sung for the heroes’ souls — and as before, the poem does not 
separate Bevis and Arondel:  
An hous he made of riligioun, 
For to singe for Sire Beuoun 
And ek for Iosian þe fre: 
God on here saules haue pité! 
& also for Arondel, 
Ȝif men for eni hors bidde schel, (4613-4618) 
 
The manuscript presents the lines as a miniature hierarchy: the religious house sings for 
Bevis on one line, Josian the next, pauses to bid “pité” (4616) or ‘mercy’ for their souls, 
and then ends on Arondel in the conditional. The passage represents almost a sliding scale 
of rationality or even the human/nonhuman animal hierarchy of the Great Chain of Being. 
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Thomas Aquinas, like many medieval thinkers, asserted that nonhuman animals do not 
possess souls and therefore cannot be divinely resurrected or taken into heaven.77 The 
romance’s careful use of the conditional here, then, makes sense: it must be “Ȝif” one 
should pray because the conditions for doing so are always and already incommensurable 
in contemporary thought. And yet, the conditional does not close the door on the possibility 
of praying for Arondel. 
Nonetheless, the text remains very carefully within the bounds of medieval 
theology: it insists that the house sings prayers for the “saules” of Josian and Bevis, and 
“also for Arondel” but does not directly specify a soul for the horse — it merely implies 
one. As if to support this hesitation, Crane interprets that last quoted line (“Ȝif men for eni 
hors bidde schel” [4618], or if men should pray for any horse) as “backtracking” and 
“retreat[ing] toward orthodoxy”: she reads the romance’s closing lines “God ȝeue vs alle 
Is benesoun! / Amen” (4621-21), or ‘God give us all His blessing, Amen,’ as ensuring that 
“Arondel is not one of the ‘us’ blessed by God.”78 However, the songs cannot be unsung: 
they remain present in the text in what Crane calls an “interlinear clashing.”79 The masses 
cannot be erased by the closing lines: they have been and continue to be sung in the words 
preceding. However, the romance’s conclusion is not any sort of retreat. The conditional 
provides safety in ambiguity, but the lines refuse to fully differentiate between Bevis and 
Arondel, between human and nonhuman animal. The very nature of the conditional phrase 
implies that the possibility cannot be closed: the conditional opens the option as viable 
under the correct circumstances and leaves it in a perpetual state of potential. Thus, it is 
not a retreat, but an invitation: it is by its nature allowing for belief. The text here has the 
 53 
opportunity to answer the question of Arondel’s soul and close off the matter entirely, but 
it instead throws it open and insists upon the possibility that one may pray for a horse. The 
very structure of the verse, its rhyming couplets, connects “Arondel” to “bidde schel,” 
metrically aligning the horse with prayer. The visual layout of the line furthers this 
implication: the line previous places “Arondel” atop “for eni horse” and leaves the eye to 
catch up both phrases together and complete the line’s “bidde shel.” The text leads the 
reader to this question and presents its own answer: if men for any horse should pray, then 
they should pray for Arondel.  
The text’s conditional phrasing, also, befits Arondel’s intermediary state of 
perpetual becoming: Arondel the horse, the becoming-hero, represents a continuous and 
untapped potential energy. He is always becoming-hero, becoming-more-than-‘animal,’ 
but Deleuze’s and Guattari’s becomings-animal do not possess objective conclusions — 
they are always becomings in potentia. The poem’s “Ȝif” acts as a textual parallel of 
Arondel’s becoming: the conditional presents praying for Arondel as a practicable 
potential, and in doing so questions the contemporary norm that nonhuman animals, 
lacking intrinsic value, have no soul for which to pray. While the line can be discounted 
as conditional, the invitation and the potential of it, woven through the major, cannot be 
retracted. Once evoked, the idea of praying for a horse — as a worthy option, no less — 
cannot be so easily erased. In this text, with its conditional invitation, it is possible for 




Bevis of Hampton presents Arondel as more than a warhorse ruled by training and 
instinct: as a rational animal, he can develop and reciprocate affective bonds with Bevis 
and enter a state of becoming-hero. The affective bond between knight and horse does not 
itself enact this shift, but rather how the text emphasizes Arondel’s participation in that 
bond and his conflation with Bevis serves to render Arondel as, one could even say, 
becoming-human. Yet even as Arondel is becoming-hero, Bevis cannot remain unaffected: 
as Arondel is conflated with and mirrors him, so is Bevis conflated with and mirrored in 
Arondel. Both knight and horse enter a becoming, and we could say that they are, together, 
becoming-chivalry. Their affective conflation through shared emotions can function as a 
model, perhaps, to render these two as shared becomings. Both are imitating and reflecting 
each other, working toward a common becoming while aware of the other’s state of 
becoming: knight and horse work together in tandem so as to become a single, chivalric 
unit. But they are always and already two creatures instead of one, both miming and 
becoming together but never fully become. 
Nonetheless, the romance — and Bevis himself — treat Arondel as a fully rational 
animal, and the text even offers the possibility of a soul that contemporary belief insisted 
the horse could not possess: thus, the conditional nature of praying for Arondel’s soul. The 
conditional opens the potential for the existence of Arondel’s soul, like a syntactical minor 
gesture, and disrupts the normative belief that a horse cannot possess one. The conditional 
implies that certain conditions can activate the power to sing prayers for a horse’s soul, but 
it does so without challenging, one way or the other, whether those conditions are even 
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possible. And yet, Arondel has already shown himself to be rational, has undermined the 
definition of rationality as an exclusively human property, and so, the romance seems to 
coyly intimate, why cannot the horse also possess a soul? The text cannot answer that 
question, of course, because becomings do not ever become — becoming is a process that 
does not and cannot finish. Arondel is becoming-hero, but he can never become-hero. He 
cannot become-human. But here, too, the romance challenges what it means to be human 
at all: if Arondel is rational, then it cannot be a trait exclusive to human animals. The text 
implies that humans are not exceptional, as a human animal and a horse animal can be 
rational partners in a reciprocative, affective bond. Instead, the text teases its audience: 
safely ensconced in its generic space of play, the romance claims that only the existence of 
Arondel’s soul is uncertain — a condition that remains in potentia. 
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Chapter 2. ‘The Most Dangerous Game’: Hunting Humans and 
Traumatic Self- Skinning in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight1 
 
 
They flee from me that sometime did me seek  
With naked foot, stalking in my chamber.  
I have seen them gentle, tame, and meek,  
That now are wild and do not remember 




When Gawain returns from his adventure at the Green Chapel in Sir Gawain and 
the Green Knight, he bears the green girdle across his armor — his self-proclaimed “syngne 
for my surfet” (2433) and “token of vntrawþe” (2519), or the symbol for his misdeed and 
token of dishonesty/faithlessness.3 But Gawain’s peers of the Round Table misunderstand 
their companion, and when they, too, don green baldrics to imitate Sir Gawain, they do so 
for “þe renoun of þe Rounde Table” and their own “honour” (2519-2520). The Knights of 
the Round Table cannot understand Gawain’s story, cannot reconcile his courtly reputation 
with his report of chivalric failure. And so, they reframe Gawain’s narrative within a 
different, more familiar context: one of chivalric success, wherein his shame is taken to be 
humility.4 This reframing is in fact necessary since Gawain himself cannot properly express 
the trauma the green girdle represents, for, as with most trauma, Gawain’s is ultimately 
unfathomable and inexpressible even to himself.5 Gawain is thus marked twofold, as 
Norman Simms notes, by his scar and by the girdle that covers it, and while the knights 
mimic the girdle by wearing it as a baldric, Gawain “cannot share [the scar] even though it 
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is the stigma which assigns its meaning to the green girdle.”6 Gawain’s inability to 
articulate his trauma, and the Round Table’s inability to reconcile their honored fellow with 
courtly fault, lead the knights — and often, the romance’s audience — to see the girdle as 
the sign of a chivalric dishonor. Indeed, scholars have long been reading Sir Gawain and 
the Green Knight with a strong preference for its chivalric context, setting aside or 
overlooking the parts of the narrative that do not fit that perspective. The interlaced hunting 
and bedroom scenes constitute a chief example: scholars often read with the hunts and 
skinning sequences acting as a metaphor for Gawain’s courtly trial and eventual chivalric 
fall. It is uncommon that the two sequences are viewed from the other direction: with the 
courtly scenes acting as the metaphor for the hunt, and eventual skinning, of Gawain 
himself. And so, allow me to do a bit of reframing myself: I suggest that the hunting scenes 
are the primary lens of the poem, rather than a secondary filter or a metaphor through which 
to view Gawain’s courtly trial. Hunting as a theme runs throughout the poem, acting as an 
overarching narrative model through which audiences can re-examine Gawain’s notorious 
bedroom “asay” as part of the romance’s hunting rituals. In this interpretation, Gawain 
does not fail a chivalric test but rather is himself skinned as an animal of the hunt.7 
However, the poem’s revelation that humans are huntable — are indeed themselves 
animals — is not merely a reduction of humanity into animality, and to conclude such is 
to participate in the very human exceptionalism that the romance seems so determined to 
dismantle. Bear in mind that the overall culture of the fourteenth century held humans as 
exceptional, compared to nonhuman animals, because of the rationality of the human 
intellect, the human mind.8 Thomas Aquinas, for one, defined man, with his immortal soul 
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and rational mind, as a person with intrinsic value, while the nonhuman animal, irrational 
and defined by instrumental value, was merely a thing.9 However, the romance Sir Gawain 
and the Green Knight instead seems to propose, safely within the confines of the romance 
genre, that humans are in and of themselves animals. Humans, like the animals slain and 
skinned in the poem, are fair game for the hunt. 
Hunting, its processes and rituals, are a striking part of the text. The hunting scenes 
in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight are famous for their detail as each game animal is 
skinned and dressed with manual-like precision. The hunt itself was a “gentle game and 
disport” reserved primarily for the aristocracy, and hunters themselves were “less 
displeasable unto God.”10 The skinning of game in the medieval era was quite a strict 
process of cutting, shaping, and transforming skins through set codes of procedure. In fact, 
hunting and skinning was ritualized enough to draw scorn from Salisbury and Erasmus: in 
Policraticus, Salisbury warns “not to misuse any of their hunting jargon in speaking, or 
you will be flogged or be branded with ignorance of all propriety in displaying your lack 
of knowledge of their technique,” while Erasmus comments that anyone can carve up 
cattle, “but only a gentleman has the right to carve wild game.”11 These passages are meant 
to be parodic, yes, but their humor derives from some truth behind the hyperbolic claims. 
Skinning held a certain, inherent power: it was a display of class skill but also, as William 
Marvin describes it, a “transformative moment of [...] unmaking.”12 Marvin’s description 
of the aristocratic skinning rituals highlights the ability of the “hunter’s craft to draw off 
the integuments of skin and enable a forbidden view of the soul’s volatility, or even 
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absence.”13 The skin, then, can be a type of shield for the soul as well as the body’s innards, 
and its removal allows a glimpse of a creature’s internal physical and spiritual nature.  
Sir Gawain and the Green Knight does not shy away from this procedural, powerful 
approach but devotes entire passages to the process of “unmaking” the animals that Bertilak 
has captured. However, not all hunting ritual was centered on this disassembly of the body: 
“the lord shall take up the hart’s head by the right side between the surroyal and the fork 
or troche whichever it be that he bear, and the Master of the Game, the left side in the same 
wise, and hold the head upright that the nose touch the earth.”14 Even after the animal (in 
this case a deer) has been broken down entirely, the hunters ritualistically recreate its body, 
reforming and remaking it to its original state. It is clear that Sir Gawain and the Green 
Knight participates in the traditions put forth by hunting manuals, but this dynamic of 
hunting and skinning is not limited to its hunting scenes — the poem itself revolves around 
the hunt. 
 
Christmas Crasher: The Green Knight as Hunter 
From the moment that the Green Knight enters King Arthur’s court at the New 
Year’s feast, he bears an aura of the hunt.15 Despite his axe, the Green Knight appears 
otherwise unarmed: the text repeatedly points out that the Green Knight wears no armor, 
having left it and all his weapons “at home” (268). The Green Knight himself says as much: 
“‘I haue a hauberghe at home and a helme boþ, / A schelde anda a scharp spere, schinande 
bryȝt, / And oþer weppenes to welde”’ (268-270), or ‘I have both a mail-coat and helm at 
home, a shield and a sharp spear, shining bright, and other weapons to wield.’ When Arthur 
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asks him if he seeks a “batayl bare” (277), the Green Knight insists that he “frayst [...] no 
fyȝt” (279), or seek[s] no fight, and again points out his lack of arms. Even the Green 
knight’s subsequent boast — “If I were hasped in armes on a heȝe stede, / Here is no mon 
me to mach, for myȝtez so wayke” (281-282, emphasis added), or ‘if I were buckled in 
armor on a high steed, there is no man here to match me, for (you are) so weak of might’ 
— draws attention to the absence of them. However, while the Green Knight lacks any 
telling chivalric armor, he nonetheless wears the “clene spures” (158) or bright spurs that 
mark him as a knight.16 His self-conscious reference to his lack of “a heȝe stede” highlights 
another feature of the Green Knight’s appearance: he has ridden a “rouncé” (304), a horse 
that, while often as strong as a warhorse, was used for either non-knightly cavalry or as a 
simple riding horse.17 Nonetheless, medieval texts from romances to horsemarket records 
were typically inconsistent or unspecific in naming the types of horseflesh utilized, often 
defaulting to equus or hors.18 Sir Gawain and the Green Knight itself never uses the term 
war horse or destrer in the text, though the romance refers to Gringalet freely by name 
(597, 748, 776, 2047, 2062, 2160, and 2480), a famed destrier in Arthurian tradition. The 
poem seems less concerned with matters of war than with chivalric accoutrements. Instead, 
it commonly refers to horses as either a hors or stede, with no reference to a specific 
category outside the Green Knight’s rouncé. While the term fits the alliteration of the line, 
the unique use here of rouncé nonetheless implies that the type of horse the Green Knight 
rides is significant: a horse powerful enough for war but not typically meant for battle. The 
text separates the Green Knight’s presence from martial intentions, and his horse, like his 
axe and spurs, is not the proper battle equipment he left at home. 
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The text is thus rather insistent that the strange interloper does not act in a martial 
capacity. The focus on the Green Knight’s attire is understandable, since his appearance is 
fantastical, and the poem devotes something of a blazon — or even an inverse-arming scene 
— to him, beginning with the knight’s hood and moving down to his unshod feet. And that 
small detail of his being “scholes vnder schankes” (160), or shoeless under calves, gives 
the audience a hint at what the Green Knight’s purpose may be: instead of a knight’s typical 
“steel shoes,” the Green Knight wears only stockings, which were popular additions to 
fourteenth-century armor but typically so beneath said armor.19 Editors Malcolm Andrew 
and Ronald Waldron observe that this detail reinforces the Green Knight’s unarmed state, 
but they also briefly note that because he wears “only stockings or soft socks,” he is more 
appropriately dressed for “peaceful pursuits” — like the aristocratic sport of hunting.20 This 
brief aside gestures at unexplored implications in the Green Knight’s appearance. If he 
came to Arthur's court as a hunter, then what is he hunting? 
First, let us look at the Crystemas gomen he offers (283-300). The Green Knight 
demands an exchange of blows, even offering to “bide þe first bur as bare as [he] sitte” 
(drawing attention yet again to his unarmed or “bare” state). What I want to focus on in the 
Green Knight’s proposal is its attention to exchange, which he emphasizes twice in his 
speech: first in his initial offer for someone to “strike a strok for anoþer” (283) and then 
again in his reiteration that, as he says, “And I schal stonde hym a strok, stif on þis flet, / 
Ellez þou wyl diȝt me þe dom to dele hym anoþer” (294-295), or ‘And I shall take from 
him a stroke/blow, bold in this hall, provided you will grant me the authority to deal him 
another.’ This game serves as only the first of two exchange-oriented bargains in the poem. 
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The Green Knight’s alter ego, Bertilak, introduces the second bargain when he offers 
another Christmas game to Gawain while the traveling knight rests at Hautdesert a year 
later: Bertilak tells Gawain,  
‘[.................................] a forwarde we make: 
Quatsoeuer I wynne in þe wod hit worþez to yourez 
And quat chek so ȝe acheue change me þerforne. 
Swete, swap we so: sware with trawþe, 
Queþer leude so lymp lere oþer better,’ (1105-1109) 
 
Bertilak offers Gawain a “forwarde” (1105) or ‘agreement’ to “swap” (1108), meaning 
‘exchange’ or ‘strike’ (see below) whatever Bertilak “wynne[s]” (1106) in the woods with 
whatever “chek” (1107), either ‘doom’ or ‘success’ Gawain achieves. They swear to the 
terms “with trawþe” (1108), that is, swear on their honor, and agree to exchange their 
winnings no matter if one fares “lere oþer better” (1109), which editors typically gloss as 
‘worse or better.’ Of particular interest here are the words chek, swap, and lere: typically, 
editors modernize these terms as chek: ‘doom, bad luck’;21 swap: ‘strike a bargain, 
exchange (?)’;22 and lere: ‘worse (?).’23 Note that for two-thirds of these terms, editors 
Malcolm Andrew and Ronald Waldron mark the glosses as uncertain for this passage. As 
with chek in particular, the above gloss seems tailored to a presupposed (and negative) 
context. And yet when the word chek appears in Middle English in the specific formulation 
“chek acheven,” it means to ‘achieve a feat, have success.’ Looking at the syntax of the 
above passage (“quat chek so ȝe acheue”), this achievement-oriented (and more positive) 
gloss fits better for the passage’s syntactic context as well as its narrative context. Despite 
the aristocratic culture of hospitality and Bertilak’s role as a generous host, the “sinister 
overtones” of Andrew and Waldron’s gloss — that Bertilak will trade what he ‘wins’ for 
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Gawain’s ‘bad luck’24 — neglects the more likely positive connotation — that Bertilak will 
exchange what he ‘wins’ for what Gawain ‘achieves.’ That is not to say that both 
connotations are not at play, as audiences who know the tale already can interpret Gawain’s 
coming trial at the Green Chapel as haunting this passage even before it has passed. 
However, to disregard the equivalence in the exchange being presented also undermines 
the text’s parallels between this second bargain and the first. And the text almost self-
consciously creates that parallel in these bargains — if we look at the term swap, we see 
that editors more frequently gloss the word as either the noun, ‘a blow or stroke’ or the 
verb, ‘to strike.’25 The additional particulars of ‘striking a bargain’ are unique to this 
instance and suggest that editors emphasize the gloss’s metaphorical meaning without 
considering the implications of the literal definition.26 Mainly, the phrasing ‘strike we so’ 
evokes the Green Knight’s previous game (as seen above, “strike a strok for anoþer” [283]) 
and highlights the parallel between the two bargains.  
By contrast, the term lere proves harder to pin down.27 While the standard gloss of 
‘worse’ still holds well in the passage’s context, the word also bears connotations of ‘flesh,’ 
‘body,’ or ‘meat.’28 The line could be rendered, then, as ‘to whichever man belongs flesh 
or better.’29 When considering the overall context of the bargain — that Bertilak will 
exchange what he has won while hunting with Gawain’s own domestic successes — this 
more gruesome reading proves rather appropriate. Whether hide or meat from the forests, 
or “better” (like a kiss, perhaps?), Bertilak and Gawain will exchange one for the other. 
And, of course, there persists the first game: an exchange of beheadings, flesh for flesh. 
Editors have glossed all three terms variously as meaning an ‘attack,’ a ‘blow’ or to ‘strike,’ 
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and ‘flesh’ or ‘meat’ either elsewhere within this poem or others of the Pearl Poet. The 
persistent connotations to strikes and flesh in these terms, as well as the hesitant and 
uncertain glossing of words in this passage, serve to open parallels between the two games: 
the violent underpinnings of this second proposal reflect and connect to those of the 
original Christmas Game — an exchange of blows and rent flesh. Even without the 
overshadowing hunt that constitutes Bertilak’s side of the deal, the romance shades this 
second bargain with the echoes of the Green Knight’s first bargain.  
 
The Game’s Afoot: Gawain as Hunted Prey 
If Bertilak’s later hunt takes root in the preceding Crystemas gomen the Green 
Knight proposes at the poem’s start, then his quarry in these twin traps becomes Gawain 
himself. Allegedly, the primary objective of the Green Knight’s spectacle is to frighten 
Guinevere to death, according to Morgan Le Faye’s orders, but the Green Knight never 
seems to have intended the queen to be his bargain-mate — Guinevere’s fright requires she 
act as a witness and not a participant. When Gawain rises to take the deal in Arthur’s place, 
the Green Knight appears to be quite pleased: “quoþ þe grene knyȝt, ‘Sir Gawan, me lykes 
/ Þat I schal fange at þy fust þat I haf frayst here’” (390-391), or ‘said the green knight, Sir 
Gawain, I am pleased that I shall take at your hand that (which) I have sought here.’ 
Andrew and Waldron further note that in the line before and the stanzas following, the 
Green Knight’s addresses to Gawain bear “a suggestion of special stress on þou.”30 The 
Green Knight changes targets, then, and refocuses his orders to frighten Guinevere to favor 
his desire to bargain with Gawain.  
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Medieval hunting terminology was very precise, and Sir Gawain and the Green 
Knight redeploys that precision: the poem pays a great deal of attention to the details in the 
hunting scenes, and the first sequence, the flaying of the hart, is the most detailed of all — 
encompassing an entire stanza with bob-and-wheel.31 I found the following lines of this 
lengthy passage to be of particular interest: “þay [...] þe bowelez out token, / Lystily for 
laucyng þe lere of þe knot” (1333), “Alle þe rymez by þe rybbez radly þay lauce” (1342), 
and “Bi þe byȝt al of þe byȝes / Þe lapez þay lauce bihynde” (1347-1348). Roughly 
modernized, the lines detail the loosening of flesh, pellicles/membranes, and skin from the 
deer as the huntsmen break down the corpse.32 Note the repetition of the specific 
terminology “lauce” and “laucyng.” The terms are variant formulations of the verb losen, 
which can mean to ‘detach’ or ‘loosen (skin),’ while in the gerund laucing or losing 
signifies the ‘[u]ntying of knots, [or] bonds.’33 The word appears three times in less than 
twenty lines, throughout this first — and lengthiest — skinning sequence, a passage that 
begins only thirteen lines after Gawain has accepted Lady Bertilak’s first kiss.34 The close 
proximity of the sequences, the interlacing of hunting and bedroom, has previously been 
read as an indicator of thematic connection. However, as I mention above, scholars often 
see that connection as one-way: how the hunting scenes allegorize the courtly test ongoing 
in the bedroom.  
A notable exception to this trend is Dorothy Yamamoto, who examines the hunting 
scenes as the main interpretive focus of the poem. However, she demurs from claiming any 
“specific symbolic connection between Gawain and the hunted animals,” even while she 
arguably reveals those very connections. She acknowledges that the bedroom and hunting 
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scenes are “intimately interlinked” and cites the brief transitions (often only one sentence 
connecting the different scenes with a conjunction) as emphasizing the parallels between 
them: “‘While this is going on here, that is going on there,’ the poet insists.”35 By the third 
hunt, Yamamoto claims, “the enchainment itself becomes a part of the fiction.” The story 
absorbs this interlacement into the narrative as the text moves from fox-chase, to bedroom 
scene, to fox-capture as a natural progression. However, Yamamoto immediately draws 
away from any concrete connections and ultimately reinforces the idea that hunting was a 
celebration of human exceptionalism, or something for the inscription of “human 
sovereignty upon the bodies of the not-human” even while “its discourse rested upon a 
forgetting of the fact that humans are bodies, too.”36 She cautiously concedes that, when 
the third hunt transitions from the last bedroom scene to the capture of the fox, the return 
acts as a closing of a loop or “hiatus” through which Gawain “just might have slipped.”37 
However, calling the bedroom scene a “hiatus” implies a complete break, a full stop in the 
narrative for an unrelated interlude before the story picks back up again. This implication 
almost contradicts her earlier observation of the “intimate” nature of the sequences’ 
interlacement. Instead of parallels that weave together to supplement the internal world of 
the narrative itself, calling the final bedroom scene a break from the final hunting scene 
reinforces the perceived divide between them and negates both the textual and symbolic 
connections that the romance so carefully crafts. Even while Yamamoto draws back from 
such conclusions, her analysis highlights and reinforces the self-consciously interwoven 
nature of the scenes, and the poem invites those very connections. 
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But to what end do those persistent connections draw? I suggest that the interlaced 
relationship between the courtly and hunting sequences implies that Gawain himself, like 
the animals in the hunt, is also lauced of his hide. While Bertilak hunts and dresses game 
in the woods, his wife fulfills the ‘craftsman’ role in Gawain’s bedroom and prepares the 
game for skinning. The Green Knight states that he had sent Lady Bertilak to “asay” 
Gawain (2362), just as the hart in the first hunt was “asay[ed]” prior to its cleaning (1328). 
Typically, scholars have read this term as meaning a courtly test, as “asay” can be defined 
as a testing of troth.38 However, the term also has meaning in hunting ritual: Marvin’s 
analysis of medieval hunting practices states that “the asay is a test or trial initiating the 
English dismemberment ritual, in which the hunter cuts into the deer’s brisket to adjudge 
its quality by measuring how much ‘grease’ (i.e. fat) it has under the hide.”39 Considering 
again the text’s precise hunting terminology and procedure, Marvin’s definition fits neatly 
with the poem’s overall preoccupation. These bedroom encounters, then, can be read as 
not only a courtly test but also an investigation of Gawain’s subdermal features. In the final 
bedroom encounter, Lady Bertilak teases Gawain about having a lover, one to whom his 
pledge is “‘festned so harde / Þat yow lausen ne lyst’” (1783-1784, emphasis added), or 
‘fastened so hard that you desire not to loosen (it)’. Gawain’s supposed reluctance to be 
lausen from his love relates this scene to the flaying of the hunted animals — particularly 
that of the deer — threading this final bedroom encounter back to that first hunting 
sequence. That the text tellingly employs hunting terminology in Lady Bertilak’s dialogue 
further presents Gawain as skinnable, and it offers a strong invitation to read these scenes 
through the lens of the hunting sequences rather than the other way around. Moreover, 
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Gawain lies naked in his bed here, having already stripped for bed the previous night.40 
Bare to Lady Bertilak’s “asay” of his body, Gawain faces the threat of being lauced, just 
as the animals’ skins are lauced from them by Bertilak in the forest. It is significant that 
the poem formulates Gawain’s courtly test in hunting etiquette: Bertilak acts as the 
mastermind supervising the hunt and asay of Gawain’s chivalric identity. And yet the 
repetition of this hunting terminology highlights Gawain’s position as game to be skinned 
as much as knight to be tested. 
When Gawain finally meets the Green Knight at the Chapel, the text draws attention 
to his flesh being torn: the Green Knight “lyftes lyȝtly his lome and let hit doun fayre / 
With þe barbe of þe bitte bi þe bare nek” (2309-2310), or ‘quickly lifts his weapon and lets 
it travel down with the cutting edge of the blow by the bare neck.’ The text fixates on the 
“barbe of þe bitte” upon Gawain’s “bare nek,” emphasizing the image of a sharp edge 
sliding through exposed flesh that was so vividly articulated in the deer’s skinning: “Syþen 
þay slyt þe slot, sesed þe erber, / Schauved wyth a scharp knyf, [...] / Þen scher þay out þe 
schulderez with her scharp knyuez” (1331-1337, emphases added), or ‘then they slit the 
throat, seized the gullet, scraped (it) with a sharp knife … then they cut out the shoulders 
with their sharp knives.’41 The romance describes Gawain’s neck as vulnerable and naked 
as that of any hunter’s prey and portrays the shearing of his hide in a similar fashion to that 
of the deer. In fact, the text does not stop at the cut, but lingers to describe the damage to 
Gawain’s skin: the axe “snyrt hym on þat on syde, þat seuered þe hyde. / Þe scharp schrank 
to þe flesche þurȝ þe schyre grece” (2312-2313), or ‘snicked him on that side, which 
severed the hide/skin; the sharp (blade) sank into the flesh through the shining grease.’ The 
 73 
barb cuts into Gawain’s “hyde,” rupturing his “flesche” like the knives did the hunted 
animals in the previous passus. In fact, the only other time the romance employs the term 
hyde is in that first hunt, when the hunters “rent of þe hyde” or ‘tore off the hide’ of the 
hart (1331). The poem’s limited use of the word draws attention to its presence in these 
two passages, both of which entail the rending or separating of skin from the body. The 
hart’s “rent of [...] hyde” prefaces Gawain’s own “seuered [...] hyde” and creates a 
reference point for the latter to gesture back toward and bring forward — Gawain’s “hyde” 
is like that of the hart: cut open upon capture. 
Similarly, the poem only sparingly uses the term grece. Meaning ‘[r]endered or 
melted fat,’ the word can refer to either human or nonhuman animal fat.42 This term appears 
in the first hunting sequence’s skinning of the deer — they “Gedered þe grattest of gres þat 
þer were” (1326), or ‘gathered the fattest of grease that was there’ — and again when 
Bertilak presents the hart’s hide to Gawain, as per their bargain — he “Schewez hym þe 
schyree grece schorne vpon rybbes” (1378), or ‘shows him the bright grease cut upon the 
ribs.’ Note that when Bertilak shows Gawain the “schyree grece” of the deer’s hide, the 
text uses the same terminology in describing Gawain’s own cut: “schyre grece.” The text 
draws more parallels between nonhuman animal and human skinning, this time via the 
shared process of cutting the hide’s “grease.” And so, Gawain’s body — his very skin — 
is akin to that of the animals’ in the hunt, as the chasing and cleaning scenes interlace with 
the bedroom scenes in a woven pattern of lauced skin. 
However, Bertilak’s ability to hunt and trap and lauce Gawain seems rooted in the 
knowledge that he can — he refutes human exceptionalism by pursuing human prey. 
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However, the Green Knight himself does not seem exceptional. The term grece, used 
previously in the deer’s and Gawain’s skinning sequences, appears in only one other 
instance in the text — at the Green Knight’s beheading: “[...] þe scharp of þe schalk 
schyndered þe bones / And schrank þurȝ þe schyre grece and schade hit in twynne” (424-
425), or ‘the sharp (blade) sundered the warrior’s bones and sank through the bright grease 
and severed it in two.’ Once more, we see the cutting of “schyre grece.” Moreover, 
Gawain’s later cut echoes almost verbatim this earlier line’s overall phrasing: “Þe scharp 
schrank to þe flesche þurȝ þe schyre grece” (2313), or ‘the sharp (blade) sank into the flesh 
through the bright grease.’ Even the Green Knight’s recovery from his beheading aligns 
him with the animals of hunting ritual: the broken-down bodies could be reformed again 
through the hunter’s will.43 And so the Green Knight, unmade by his beheading, is made 
whole yet again to appear later as Bertilak. While the Green Knight can — and does — 
hunt human prey in the form of Gawain, so too is the Green Knight himself susceptible to 
being hunted in turn. 
 
The Bargains Fulfilled: Flesh Paid for Flesh 
While I read the Green Knight’s re-making into Bertilak as aligning the 
hunter/Green Knight with his prey/Gawain, others, such as Yamamoto, interpret it as 
setting the Green Knight further apart from Gawain: despite his fantastic bodily presence, 
the Green Knight, unlike other animals, can put his head back on his shoulders after its 
removal. For Yamamoto, this ability removes the Green Knight from the bodily realm 
occupied by everyone else, as he “pens humans and [nonhuman] animals together in a 
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common mortality.” As Gawain cannot similarly un-wound himself, Yamamoto says, the 
detailed hunting sequences “raise the stakes” by revealing what is in store for Gawain.44 I 
argue, however, Gawain does remake his lauced hide — through the infamous green girdle. 
When speaking of lauced skin, one cannot ignore the other infamous lace of the 
poem.45 The girdle has proven difficult to interpret, as scholars variously attribute it 
geopolitical, sexual, magical, chivalric, and/or feminizing signification. While these 
interpretations are all valid within their own readings, I would suggest an alternative. The 
green girdle is undoubtedly the primary focus of the Green Chapel confrontation: 
knowingly and unknowingly, both Gawain and the Green Knight seek to close their second 
bargain through the girdle. While Gawain has received the answering “dint” (389) or blow 
that completes his first deal with the Green Knight, their other game remains unconcluded: 
Gawain has yet to surrender his prize from Lady Bertilak (the belt she gave him), and 
Bertilak’s final hunted quarry is not yet surrendered to Gawain (Gawain’s own hide). The 
romance ties up the first of these loose ends after Gawain receives his stroke from the Green 
Knight’s axe: soon after the Green Knight nicks Gawain’s neck, he reveals the subterfuge 
behind his bargains. He even claims the green girdle as his own: he tells Gawain, “‘hit is 
my wede þat þou werez, þat ilke wouen girdel. / Myn owen wyf hit þe weued’” (2358-
2359), or ‘it is my garment that you wear, that same woven girdle; my own wife weaved 
it.’ Bertilak then reveals that he had sent his wife “to asay” Gawain (2362) and reinforces 
his ownership of the girdle: the belt belongs to Bertilak not only in origin but now also 
through their exchange bargain as Gawain’s prize to surrender. In response, Gawain throws 
the girdle away from himself — “Þenne he kaȝt to þe knot and þe kest lawsez, / Brayde 
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broþely þe belt to þe burne seluen” (2376-2377), or ‘then he seized the knot and loosened 
the girdle/missile, violently flung the belt to the man himself.’ Gawain has finally fulfilled 
his end of their bargain: he has given to Bertilak what he won in Hautdesert. 
But Gawain not only returns an illicit gift: he also surrenders the girdle as his own 
skinned hide. The above “lawsez” is a formulation of lauces from the verb losen — with 
all that that implies.46 By removing the girdle, Gawain lauces himself of the garment. And 
once this prize is handed over, Bertilak promptly returns it to Gawain as promised in their 
agreement. This exchange is the natural progression of their hunting bargain, and it has 
been read variously as such. For one, Geraldine Heng observes that the Green Knight’s 
return of the girdle evokes Bertilak’s hunting bargain and his previously surrendered prizes. 
She asserts that the return “surreptitiously reconstructs the girdle as merely another of his 
trophies to give away, a prize, this time from a manhunt.”47 Heng reads this move as the 
Green Knight’s taking control back from Lady Bertilak: his hunting bargain with Gawain 
takes primacy over the Lady’s “subtle hunt” of the knight and demotes her to a supervised 
minion.48 However, I interpret this self-conscious insertion of the hunting exchange not to 
be metaphorical but literal. This sequence of surrender and return is necessary for the 
fulfillment of their second bargain: having now successfully hunted Gawain, Bertilak owes 
the knight the prize he has won in the woods — the hide skinned from his prey. As with 
the boar in the second hunt, Gawain is unlaced. While the skinning and breaking scene 
with the boar is comparatively brief — only about 10 lines (not even half the length of the 
deer-skinning sequence) — it nonetheless opens with a craftsman beginning “[t]o vnlace 
þis bor” (1606) or ‘to unlace this boar.’ Much like the term losen, vnlacen is a hunting term 
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for cutting or flaying game, and likewise means to “loosen” or “unfasten.”49 The similarity 
of being “unlaced” of hide to being “unlaced” of the girdle itself is an aural slippage that 
invites parallels between the actions. And, in this climactic scene, Gawain’s literal 
surrender of the garment acts as a symbolic dressing of game and renders Gawain as 
complicit in his own skinning.50 Assayed and hunted by Bertilak, the knight must literally 
and figuratively unlace himself, loosening the girdle but also rending off his hide. 
Unlike the other hunting prizes Gawain receives from Bertilak, Gawain wears the 
girdle — the representation of his skinned hide and, by extension, animal identity — atop 
his armor, “Abelef, as a bauderyk, bounden bi his syde, / Loken vnder his lyfte arme, þe 
lace, with a knot” (2486-2487), or “slantwise, as a baldric, bound by his side, the lace 
fastened under his left arm with a knot.’ Gawain also wore the girdle when he left 
Hautdesert for the Green Chapel earlier that day, dressing in the garment last and placing 
it atop all of his armor: “Þe gordel of þe grene silke [...] / Vpon þat ryol red cloþe, þat ryche 
watz to shewe” (2035-2036), or ‘the girdle of green silk ... that was ornately shown upon 
that splendid red cloth.’ His garb before and after his encounter at the Green Chapel places 
the lace, an unmissable slash of green against the “red cloþe” of his surcoat, as part of his 
identity. Gawain’s armor absorbs the girdle as a signifier: rather than showcasing his 
chivalric (and human) identity, Gawain stripes his distinctive arms with the skinned hide 
of his animality. But more than that, Gawain conflates his ruptured skin with the girdle. 
The text makes a point to indicate both that the wound is healed and that Gawain 
nonetheless covers it: “Þe hurt watz hole þat he hade hent in his nek / And þe blykkande 
belt he bere þeraboute” (2484-2485), or ‘the hurt was whole that he had torn in his neck, 
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and he bore the shining belt therabout.’ Gawain’s torn hide has been made “w/hole” again, 
but he still obscures the mark with the girdle by wearing it laced “þeraboute” the scar on 
his neck. When Gawain tells his peers about his adventure, he “þe lace hondeled” (2505), 
or ‘handled the lace,’ before ambiguously identifying “þe brende” (2506) or ‘the brand’ 
from his adventure at the Green Chapel. His immediate fiddling with the girdle seems to 
indicate that it may be the line’s subject, and several scholars have interpreted the line as 
such.51 However, I suggest that the line likely refers to the scar that the baldric covers — 
thus his need to “hondel” it, to move it aside and reveal the mark it obscures. The pseudo-
hide of the girdle covers the site of rupture in Gawain’s flesh, creating an illusion of 
unmarred hide: he obscures the scar and its implications of animal unmaking beneath the 
cloth itself, hiding it from view beneath the lace.  
Nevertheless, just as in the reformation fiction of the hunting ritual wherein hunters 
ritualistically remade the broken-down body of the prey animal into an illusion of a 
reconstituted body, Gawain’s own cut skin is reconstructed.52 While Gawain’s neck has 
literally remade itself through the healed scarring, the girdle enacts the ritualistic 
reformation of his ruptured hide. The lord of this hunt, the Green Knight, returns the girdle 
to Gawain and bids him wear it: “Þenk vpon þis ilke þrepe þer þou forth þryngez / Among 
prynces of prys, and þis a pure token / Of þe chaunce of þe Grene Chapel at ceualrous 
knyȝtez” (2396-2399), ‘think upon this same contest when you pass forth among esteemed 
princes and this, a pure token of the adventure of the Green Chapel among chivalrous 
knights.’ He urges Gawain to remember the girdle, to use it as “a pure token” of their 
encounter at the Chapel. On the one hand, Gawain is to show and speak of their hunter-
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and-hunted relationship, and so visually and narratively interlace his identity with that of 
the Green Knight as both hunted animal and hunter of men. On the other hand, the Green 
Knight has enacted his part in the remaking ritual by replacing the skinned hide so the 
animal can be reformed as whole. The girdle is necessary for Gawain not only as the mark 
of his skinned animality but also as his returned, reconstituted hide.  
 
Traumatic Echoes: Gawain’s Ritual Re-Skinning 
Even while Gawain wears his skinned hide atop his clothing and armor, he 
identifies his adventure as a chivalric failure: he reframes its new truth in a familiar context 
that he, like his peers, better understands. When urged to take the girdle by the Green 
Knight, Gawain laments that he will do so, but only as “syngne for [his] surfet” (2433) or 
‘symbol of his misdeed’: 
‘When I ride in renoun remorde to myseluen 
Þe faut and þe fayntyse of þe flesche crabbed, 
How tender hit is to entyse teches of fylþe. 
And þus, quen pryde schal me pryk for prowes of armes, 
Þe loke to þis luf-lace schal leþe my hert.’ (2434-2438) 
 
Gawain bemoans that he rides in “remorde” (2434), or ‘lament,’ with the “crabbed” (2435) 
or ‘perverse’ deceitfulness that enticed him to “fylþe” (2436) or ‘filth’ now leaving him 
chastised by “quen pryde” (2437), so that the “luf-lace” (2438) or girdle will ‘leþe (2438) 
or ‘humble’ his heart. The Green Knight exhorts Gawain to remember the girdle, and 
Gawain will do so. However, Gawain will not recall it as a “pure token / [...] of þe Grene 
Chapel” (2398-2399) as Bertilak asks him to, but as his own “token of vntrawþe” (2509), 
or token of dishonor. It reminds him of a chivalric failure, of his “couardise and couetyse” 
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(2508) or ‘cowardice and avarice.’ Gawain, faced with the inexplicable truth of the Green 
Knight’s human hunting, transmutes the meaning into a more familiar mode. He cannot 
see Lady Bertilak as a huntress’ assaying him, but he can conceive of a seductress’ tempting 
him, and so he rants against traditional temptresses of old (2409-2428). Neither can he see 
himself or the Green Knight as human hunters or human prey, but he can imagine a failed 
trial of his own courtly merit (2429-2438). Even so, Gawain’s emotional outburst and 
subsequent shame appear somewhat out of proportion to his perceived crime, as Michael 
Foley asserts: Gawain’s guilt rests in merely “cheating in a layk or game. His honor as a 
gentleman is slightly besmirched, but his soul is clene.”53 Gawain’s strong reaction, Foley 
comments, betrays an “excessive remorse” and a “tendency to exaggerate.”54 In Foley’s 
reading, Gawain does not seem to grasp that even in a chivalric context his fault is minor 
and forgivable. What Gawain perceives has happened is disconnected from how he has 
responded to it, and he cannot properly express the source of his overblown response.  
 Gawain’s apparent inability to express or understand his encounter(s) with the 
Green Knight fits well into the context of suffered trauma. In her explication of trauma 
theory, Cathy Caruth examines Freud’s concept of latency, which she defines as “the period 
during which the effects of the experience are not apparent”:  
The experience of trauma, the fact of latency, would thus seem to consist, 
not in the forgetting of a reality that can hence never be fully known, but in 
an inherent latency within the experience itself. The historical power of the 
trauma is not just that the experience is repeated after its forgetting, but that 




Gawain’s inability to express his trauma, here read as the revelation of the human as (prey) 
animal, can be explained by the concept of traumatic latency: because Gawain cannot 
consciously recall, cannot grasp and express the new truth he learns, his reactions manifest 
as a traumatic deferral. He “forgets” the reality of the hunt in order to cope with it and 
transfers an inconceivable experience into an alternate reality that he can express. 
However, as Caruth suggests, it is only by “forgetting” the trauma that one can experience 
it through its repetition, and for Gawain, the pseudo-forgetting precedes his own repetition 
of the trauma — his wearing of the girdle. 
By its very nature, trauma is not a single event but the “way that its very 
unassimilated nature — the way it was precisely not known in the first instance — returns 
to haunt the survivor later on.”56 Caruth explains the phenomenon of “traumatic repetition”: 
the unknowable, inexpressible nature of trauma requires repetition, recurring echoes of the 
original trauma — echoes that are not precisely the same as the initial event.57 For Gawain, 
his inexpressible trauma echoes in his ritualistic re- and unlacing of the girdle as he wears 
and removes it every day. He cannot fully know his trauma, and his attempts to reconcile 
his worldview with this new truth lead to his displacing the trauma onto a chivalric context. 
And so, the trauma must repeat.  
And repeat the trauma he does: Gawain wears the girdle as his reminder, 
presumably never to be seen without it. The implication, then, is that each morning Gawain 
will tie the girdle “Abelef, as a bauderyk” (2486) over his scar and each evening he will 
vnlace the girdle from himself yet again. Viewing the repeated tying and untying through 
the lens of the hunt, Gawain’s wearing of the girdle fits beautifully into the ritualistic 
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skinning of the animal and ritualistic remaking of the animal again, in hunting tradition, 
but in reverse. Each day, Gawain ties on the girdle and reforms his cut hide, and then he 
laucens himself when he removes the girdle again: he performs the reconstitution hunting 
ritual each morning only to skin himself of his hide at the day’s end. Gawain thus 
unconsciously enacts his own traumatic echoes as he relives his encounter with the Green 
Knight and endures his self-skinning again and again. While he cannot express or 
comprehend his trauma, Gawain will continue to execute it almost precisely as it had first 
occurred.  
Similarly, the other knights of the Round Table cannot conceive of the truth Gawain 
learns either, and they instead wear their own baldrics for the honor and renown of the 
Round Table. They remain ignorant of the baldric’s true meaning as a signifier for their 
very skin, laced and unlaced over and over, but they, too, enact Gawain’s traumatic 
repetitions: “Vche burne of þe broþerhede, a bauderyk schulde haue / A bende abelef hym 
aboute, of a bryȝt grene” (2515-2516), or ‘each man of the brotherhood should have a 
baldric of bright green, an ornament diagonally about him.’ In their imitation, they 
surround Gawain with the visual echo of his skinned and reformed hide: their lacing and 
unlacing of their own green laces mimic Gawain’s ritualistic remaking/unmaking. Gawain 
faces from all sides the reminders of the Green Knight’s hunt and lives encompassed by 
the echoes of his own skinning. The poem more or less ends with that image58: the 
romance’s final glimpse of Arthur’s young court is one of green baldrics across every chest, 
a misreading that continuously propagates a signifier of the human as skinned prey.  
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Each of the Round Table knights, in wearing the girdle-as-hide, implicitly 
participates in the hunt. Bertilak admits to Gawain that Morgan le Faye devised the Green 
Knight’s disruption of and gruesome decapitation at King Arthur’s feast in order frighten 
Guinevere to death and “to assay” the reputation of the Round Table (2457, emphasis 
added). By wearing the pseudo-hides, the knights are not only mimicking Gawain’s 
skinning but also suggesting their own. The Round Table knights, hunted and assayed by 
the Green Knight, unknowingly enact their own metaphorical skinning on a daily basis.  
 
Mistress of the Game: Gawain’s Female Frame in the Context of the Hunt  
The human-hunting in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight reveals an intricate 
hierarchy of roles in the narrative: the women of the piece participate in this hunting 
scheme right alongside their male counterparts and perpetuate the paradigm of human as 
hunted. Typically, the lord’s role in a hunt is to oversee the skinning of the game,59 and as 
we have seen it is a role Bertilak fills in the poem’s main hunting sequences. Bertilak’s 
compulsive need to display ownership (my wede, myn owen wyf, my goune [2358, 2359, 
2396]) can be read as an extension and emphasis of that supervisory position in Gawain’s 
hunt as well. 
Bertilak controls, supervises, and participates in that hunt as he does the ones in the 
woods. And yet, Bertilak’s cutting of Gawain’s neck at the chapel, wherein he nicked 
Gawain’s flesh to expose the grease, removes him from the supervisory role that is his by 
right of status. He no longer oversees the skinning but performs it by slicing Gawain’s 
neck. Even before this confrontation, however, Bertilak acts more as a huntsman or hound 
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for his wife as he flushes Gawain out and then chases him to ground by arranging the 
scenario with his and Gawain’s exchange bargain: now that she has securely ‘captured’ 
him in his bedroom, Lady Bertilak comes to asay Gawain and to test his grece prior to 
skinning.  
And yet the Lady herself becomes a huntsman when penetrating the “cortyn” of the 
bedchamber: she “[k]est vp þe cortyn and creped withinne”(1192), or ‘cast up the curtain 
and crept within’ on the first day and “commes to þe cortyn and at þe knyȝt totes” (1476), 
or ‘comes to the curtain and at the knight’s toes’ on the second. Her breach of this external 
barrier reads as complete by the third night: “Þe lady luflych com, laȝande swete, / Felle 
ouer his fayre face and fetly hym kyssed” (1757-1758), or ‘the lovely lady came, laughing 
sweetly, (and) dropped over his fair face and kissed him prettily.’ The text makes no 
mention of the curtain on the third night, the opportunity for a third repetition noticeably 
absent after the previous two depictions. The Lady has successfully removed that obstacle: 
she has cut away that barrier to reach the intimate, internal realm of Gawain’s bed. She has, 
one could say, skinned him of that protective layer. And so, instead of once more 
penetrating through the curtain to reach the knight, Lady Bertilak cuts straight to kissing 
Gawain’s “fayre face” (1758) the third day. The Lady herself employs hunting terminology 
when she teases Gawain about having a lover, one to whom his pledge is ‘“festned so harde 
/ Þat yow lausen ne lyst’” (1783-1784, emphasis added), as we saw earlier. The text not 
only shows Gawain to be as vulnerable to being lauced as the animals in Bertilak’s forests 
but also reveals how Lady Bertilak is testing him, much like the animals are tested: 
Gawain’s exposure before the lady, and the romance’s interwoven terminology between 
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hunting and bedroom scenes, implicate the Lady in the ‘craftsman’ role of the hunt just as 
it does Gawain the prey of it. Lady Bertilak asays him, testing to see if he can or will lausen 
himself, which Gawain does later at the Green Chapel.  
But even so, the text identifies Lady Bertilak, hunter as she acts here, through her 
own hide. The text introduces her via a twist on that courtly trope of fairness: “Ho watz þe 
fayrest in felle, of flesche and of lyre” (945), or ‘she was the fairest in skin, of flesh and of 
face.’ The text characterizes her first emergence onto the scene not only by her beauty (a 
common introduction in romance), but it also insists on keeping her skin at the forefront 
during her entrance: she is fair in felle and of flesche and of lyre — her skin, her flesh, her 
face. The text falls back on this identifier when it reintroduces Lady Bertilak upon her first 
excursion into Gawain’s bedchamber: it focuses on the complexion and shape of her 
“chynne,” “cheke,” and “lyppez” (1204-1207), or ‘chin,’ ‘cheek,’ and ‘lips,’ and reminds 
the reader of her fleshly body even as she acts as huntsman. The circling attention on flesh 
serves to highlight the dermal, in the composition of the Lady’s identity.  
However, neither Lady Bertilak nor Bertilak himself skins Gawain: their asay of 
Gawain’s grece is typically a pre-skinning act by the craftsmen of the hunt. Instead, in that 
episode of pseudo-skinning, it is Gawain who violently removes the girdle soon after his 
asay. If we read this passage as Gawain’s performing his own skinning, then we can do the 
same for Lady Bertilak in the final bedroom scene: “Ho laȝt a lace lyȝtly þat leke vmbe hir 
sydez / [...] / And ho bere on hym þe belt” (1830-1860). The diction here implies a 
somewhat violent action — she ‘quickly seizes the belt around her sides’ and, once Gawain 
agrees to accept it, ‘thrusts the girdle upon him.’60 The swift seizure and aggressive passing 
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off of the belt echo in Gawain’s own pseudo-skinning later on, when he, too, roughly seizes 
the girdle and throws it from himself. 
Lady Bertilak unlaces herself in this scene in a near-perfect parallel to how Gawain 
unlaces himself at the Chapel. She then presents her love-gift to Gawain, not unlike how 
Bertilak presents his freshly hunted skins to Gawain during their game. This additional 
layer of signification and pointing accentuates the parallels between the bedroom scenes 
and the hunting scenes, as the playful exchange of courtly banter mirrors the chivalric 
exchange in the knights’ games. The interlaced hunting scenes do not merely underscore 
Lady Bertilak’s amorous pursuit, but rather the infamous bedroom scenes function as 
extensions of the more literal hunting of Gawain himself. Lady Bertilak is not just a love-
hunter, but a craftsman of the hunt, as she skins away Gawain’s external layers to asay 
him. And yet, she also unlaces herself of her hide in a similar game of courtly exchange.61 
Once more hunter and hunted, skinner and skinned, are interchangeable. Bertilak, his wife, 
and Gawain all act at various points as huntsmen and prey, quarry and craftsmen. Who, 
then, is overseeing this hunt? 
As the instigator of the narrative events, Morgan le Faye best fills the role of hunt 
supervisor. We are told that Morgan devised the whole ordeal in order frighten Guinevere 
to death and asay the Round Table (2457). Fully exploring this framing of the poem, Heng 
describes Sir Gawain and the Green Knight as the “theater of its feminine figures” who 
drive the narrative forward with their own motivations and schemes.62 It is not so 
surprising, then, that the Green Knight disavows his authority and defers to Morgan le 
Faye, to whom he is “a servant, and Morgan’s obedient creature.”63 Elsewhere in this 
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chapter, I read the Green Knight’s deferment of authority in the light of the poem’s hunting 
theme: the Green Knight’s retraction of his power serves to push the supervisory authority 
for all the hunts onto Morgan le Faye, who had initially sent him as her obedient hound to 
pursue her original quarry, Guinevere.  
Male or female, human or nonhuman animal, no one is exempt from the hunt. 
Morgan’s initial and eventual prey are even side-by-side at the feast as Guinevere sits next 
to Gawain, the chivalric exemplar of the Round Table.64 The text notes this positioning of 
Morgan’s primary prey and the Green Knight’s eventual (perhaps intended?) quarry not 
once, but twice: first, when Guinevere enters the hall and sits at the dais (“gode Gawan 
watz grayþed Gwenore bisyde” [109], or ‘good Gawain was seated beside Guinevere’), 
and then again when Gawain rises to take the Green Knight’s challenge (“Gawan, þat sate 
bi þe quene” [339], or ‘Gawain, who sat by the queen’). Most tellingly, this second instance 
attributes Gawain’s juxtaposition with Guinevere as part of his identifying features — he 
is Gawain, who sat by the queen — as though such a detail were necessary to help identify 
this famous knight.  
But Guinevere’s role in the hunt stretches past merely that of prey. The text 
carefully connects the queen to Lady Bertilak, as Heng observes: the former replaces the 
latter at Gawain’s side at the Hautdesert feasting (1003) and as the text’s illustrious beauty 
(947). Of note in Heng’s analysis is the emphasis on physical bodies: “the Lady’s bodily 
beauty is caught and communicated through the body of Guinevere’s name, itself the 
embodiment of beauty in the Arthurian universe.”65 If we accept that the two women are 
physically interchangeable in this way and that Guinevere’s embodiment of beauty 
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translates to Lady Bertilak, then we can also claim that there occurs an equal and opposite 
transfer from Lady Bertilak to Guinevere. After all, Lady Bertilak’s skin-centered 
introduction in the text doubles as the moment she replaces Guinevere as the text’s beauty 
icon. Their connection implies a progression from Guinevere/prey to Lady Bertilak/hunter, 
reinforcing the poem’s recurrent shifting roles of hunter/hunted.  
Using this concept of substitution, we can see the poem shift its focus from clothing 
to flesh (and for Gawain, back to clothing) as identifiers, as the romance transmutes the 
former into a version of the latter. Guinevere’s initial introduction focuses on her garments:  
Whene Guenore ful gay grayþed in þe myddes, 
Dressed on þe dere des, dubbed al aboute: 
Smal sendal bisides, a selure hir ouer 
Of tryed tolouse, of tars tapites innoghe 
Þat were enbrawded and beten wyth þe best gemmes 
Þat myȝt be preued of prys with penyes to bye 
In daye. (74-80) 
 
The text ignores the traditional focus on the lady’s face, complexion, or general physical 
appearance altogether. Instead, the poem introduces Guinevere by her lavish clothing, 
“dubbed al aboute” (75) with silks and rich fabrics, delicately “embrawded” (78) or 
embroidered and studded with precious gems. The queen’s entrance into the poem is not 
unlike the Lady Bertilak’s, as the text fixates on one facet of her beauty to articulate the 
whole. However, that fixation transfers from Guinevere’s dress to Lady Bertilak’s flesh. If 
Lady Bertilak does replace Guinevere as the poem’s model of beauty, then so does flesh 
replace clothing as a primary signifier both of beauty and identity — a transference that 
the poem reverses again when Gawain uses the girdle to remake his torn flesh and relies 
on the lace to reform his cut hide. 
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Just as the romance connects Lady Bertilak and Guinevere, so too does it connect 
Lady Bertilak and Morgan le Faye. Heng asserts that Morgan le Faye and Lady Bertilak 
are “twinned” in their descriptions, that they function as “nonidentical doubles” and each 
constitutes “the other’s reference.”66 The lady cannot be properly formulated without the 
hag, and their first appearance serves as the clearest moment of this connection. While the 
poem introduces Lady Bertilak by the beauty of her flesh, it sets Morgan le Faye as both 
her contrast and her transition from Guinevere. The romance describes Morgan le Faye as 
having “rugh runlked chekez þat oþer on rolled / [...] þe blake broȝes, / Þe tweyne yȝen and 
þe nase, þe naked lyppez” (953-962), or ‘rough wrinkled cheeks that rolled over each other 
… the black brows, the two eyes and the nose, the naked lips’. The text lingers on Morgan’s 
“soure” (963) or ‘disgusting’ face, her “ȝolȝe” or sallow flesh (951), and her “schort and 
þik” body (966) in an interwoven contrast to Lady Bertilak’s own fair face with “Hir brest 
and hir bryȝt þrote, bare displayed” (955, emphasis added), or ‘her breast and her white 
throat, bare displayed.’ I find it significant that while the text briefly notes that Lady 
Beritlak wears clothing — “Riche red on þat on rayled ayquere, / [...] / Kerchoves of þat 
on wyth mony cler perlez” (952-954), or ‘rich red on that one (was) arrayed everywhere 
… kerchiefs of that one with many clear pearls’ — the text nonetheless returns to her 
explicitly bare skin as her primary identifier. However, Morgan le Faye’s description, 
which also focuses on her fleshly qualities, splits itself between her “naked” face and her 
heavily wrapped body: Morgan is thoroughly covered, “gered ouer” (957), “Chymbled 
ouer” (958), and “enfoubled ayquere” (959), or ‘clothed over,’ ‘muffled up,’ and ‘swathed 
everywhere,’ with veils and embroidered cloth, so that “noȝt watz bare” (960), or ‘nothing 
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was bare,’ but her “soure” or ‘disgusting’ features (963). And yet even these covers do not 
hide her physical form — her “body [...] schort and þik, / Hir buttokez balȝ and brode” 
(966-967), or her ‘body … short and thick, her buttocks bulging and broad,’ remain clearly 
discernible. Morgan le Faye hovers between Lady Bertilak’s bared flesh and Guinevere’s 
extravagant dress, as the text simultaneously covers over and exposes her body. She acts 
as a thematic bridge between the two courtly women, a hunter aligned in flesh and hide 
with both her craftsmen and her prey.  
However, the text also connects Morgan le Faye to the Green Knight beyond the 
use of her crafts to create his magical disguise. When he interrupts Arthur’s feast as the 
romance’s start, the Green Knight’s body is mistaken for clothing: as Suzanne Craymer 
argues, the later description of the Green Knight’s “fannand fax” (181) and “much berd” 
(182) or fanned-out hair and large beard covering his shoulders and chest contradicts the 
initial description of his “mantile” (153) does the same, conflating body and cloth.67 This 
is not to say the Green Knight was not wearing a cloak, but rather the cloth and the hair are 
interchangeable to the audience within the text. The Green Knight’s disguise, Craymer also 
argues, hinges on the green hue of his flesh to keep him unrecognizable to Gawain, when, 
later, the text uses similar terms to describe both the Green Knight and Bertilak, such as 
their broad beards (182, 845), apparent mature age (280, 844), and tall, powerful legs (139, 
846).68 Yet the Green Knight’s disguised-and-disguising skin melts into his distinctive 
clothing: his hair and his mantle elide into a single, interchangeable feature of his 
appearance.69 The initial ambiguity of body/cloth in the Knight’s appearance prefaces 
Morgan le Faye’s own exposed-but-clothed introduction, as the clothing of both does little 
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to obscure their bodies. Both characters also present parallel images of a thick, blocky 
figure: the text describes Morgan as “schort and þik” upon her first appearance (966) and 
the Green Knight similarly as “so sware and so þik” (138) — even the Green Knight’s 
horse is “gret and þikke” (175). Morgan le Faye thematically aligns not only with Lady 
Bertilak (huntsman) and Guinevere (prey) but also the Green Knight (hunter/prey). She 
possesses the potential to be any and all of them — both skinner and skinned, swathed and 
bared — but does not step out into either position because of her own role as “Morgne þe 
goddes” (2452). The Green Knight portrays Morgan as a suprahuman figure who, while 
engaged in human matters, remains above them in some way. She is therefore participatory 
in the hunt, yet also supervisory to it. 
In this overarching scheme, Morgan le Faye acts as the overseer of the hunt, 
Bertilak and his wife her hunters and hounds, and Guinevere and the Round Table her 
quarry. In fact, Morgan le Faye’s hunting position in the poem remains exclusively that of 
overseer: she sends her hounds and hunters out after her prey without slipping into their 
roles. The Green Knight tells Gawain of Morgan le Faye’s plot, how “þe goddes” (2452) 
had sent him “to assay þe surquidré” and “þe grete renoun of þe Rounde Table” (2457, 
2458), or ‘to asay the pride and the great renown of the Round Table.’ He utilizes the exact 
same terms as he had in his interruption of Arthur’s feast: “Where is now your sourquydrye 
and your conquestes, / [...] / Now is þe reuel and þe renoun of þe Rounde Table / Ouerwalt 
wyth a worde of one wyȝes speche” (311-314, emphasis added), or ‘where is your pride 
and your conquests now … now is the revel and the renown of the Round Table overthrown 
with a word from one man’s speech.’ The Green Knight not only denies his control of the 
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hunt but, in his very disavowal of it, he disowns even his own speech from the very start 
of the poem (and, by extension, the game itself). They are Morgan’s words — her orders, 
not his own will. The romance, then, presents its very narrative as a sort of hunting manual: 
launched and overseen by Morgan Le Faye, all the figures within, both human and 
nonhuman animal, participate in the rituals and processes of the hunt, and the text renders 
all as animals vulnerable to slipping into the role of hunted prey. 
 
Conclusion 
Morgan le Faye’s potential to be skinned presents itself in her initial appearance, in 
her parallels to the flesh-focused craftsman, Lady Bertilak, and the clothed prey, 
Guinevere, but she herself is not hunted or skinned. She orders the asay of her quarry and, 
even as the text presents her potential to be skinned, it forecloses that potential with her 
silent, supervisory position. As Heng indicates, Morgan le Faye’s unspoken desires push 
the poem’s characters into articulated motion.70 However, Morgan le Faye herself never 
speaks, and neither skins nor is skinned. Her “koyntyse of clergye” (2447), shared with and 
demonstrated through Bertilak and his games, may just be the simple truth that humans are 
much like the deer, the boar, and the fox: animals. Whether characterized by courtly 
behavior, chivalric status, or gender, the narrative’s persistent interlacing of hunting 
language and ritual imply that true human identity may not be so exceptional after all. 
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“swappen (v.).” 
26 This line of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight is the only time editors swap have glossed it as ‘strike a 
bargain, make an agreement’; MED, s.v. “swappen (v.).” By the late fifteenth century, the gerund form 
swapping meant exclusively ‘striking, beating,’ removing any concept of a deal from the definition 
altogether; MED, s.v. “swapping (ger.).”  
27 The term lere is a very flexible one. While Andrew and Waldron have pinned it down to lur, meaning 
‘loss,’ they have also glossed lere variously as ‘ligature’ from lere, n. (during the skinning of the deer [1334]); 
‘flesh’ from lere, lyre, n. (when the Green Knight bares his neck for Gawain’s strike [418]), and ‘teach’ from 
lere, v. (in Cleanness); Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, 330, 331.  
28 MED, s.v. “līre n.” 
29 The term lymp is often glossed as ‘to befall’ or ‘experience,’ but can also mean ‘to belong, pertain’; MED, 
s.v. “limpen (v.(1)).” 
30 Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, 222n389. 
31 For perspective here: the deer is skinned in roughly 31 lines (1325-1361); the boar, approximately 13 lines 
(1605-1618); the fox is not shown skinned at all (1900ff). Foxes, however, were considered a type of vermin, 
and its skinning procedures were not strictly ritualized; see Dorothy Yamamoto, “Bodies in the Hunt,” in The 
Boundaries of the Human in Medieval English Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 113, 
127.  
32 The modernized lines in full read, “Carefully loosening for the ligature of the knot” (1333); “All the 
membranes on the ribs they quickly loosen” (1341); and “they loosen the skin folds” (1350).  
33 MED, s.v. “losen (v.)” and s.v. “lọ̄sing(e (ger.(2)).” 
34 The Lady kisses Gawain (1305-136), then she leaves and Gawain rises, dressing for mass (1307-11) and 
partaking of the holiday celebrations (1312-1319) before the text moves straight into Bertilak’s hunt. 
35 Yamamoto, “Bodies in the Hunt,” 129. 
36 Ibid., 130. 
37 Ibid., emphasis retained. 
38 More specifically, both the noun and verb forms of the word hold the primary definition of a testing of ‘the 
quality of (materials)’ — ‘as of a metal or other object’ — and secondarily as a test of ‘character or qualities 
of (a person)’ or their ‘personal traits,’ and thirdly as a martial test of ‘arms, combat’ or ‘(one’s strength) in 
combat’; MED, s.v. “assai (n.)” and s.v. “assaien (v.)”  
39 Marvin, “Blood, Law, and Venery,” 148, emphasis retained. 
40 The Cotton Nero MS even bears an illustration of one of the bedroom scenes (fol. 125r of London, British 
Library MS Cotton Nero A.x): Gawain, wrapped in a green blanket but with his shoulders and upper chest 
exposed, lies on a red bed as Lady Bertilak toys with his chin or beard. A dark-inked dot rests on Gawain’s 
chest that could be an accidental mark or a nipple. Using this picture in my analysis would be problematic, 
but it serves as an example of contemporary interpretation: even the manuscript drafters, who mocked up 
where the illustration would go, and/or the illustrator themselves read Gawain as exceedingly vulnerable in 
this sequence. 
41 The romance even calls the axe “þe scharp yrne” or the sharp iron when Gawain flinches from the blow 
(2267).  
42 MED, s.v. “grēs(e (n.).” 
43 Edward, The Master of Game, 100; Yamamoto, “Bodies in the Hunt,” 111. 
44 Ibid., 130. 
45 In fact, the poem insists on referring to the garment as a lace. More specifically, it does so on eight separate 
occasions (1830, 1851, 1874, 2030, 2438, 2487, 2497, & 2505). The word is heavily reminiscent of the 
hunting term lauce, a correlation only reinforced by the usage of brayden, meaning both to ‘pull tight’ or 
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‘draw out (bowels, etc)’ and also ‘embroidered […] ornamented, adorned’; MED, s.v. “breiden (v.(1)).” 
Brayden appears roughly a dozen times in the poem, and in addition to drawing swords and general lifting, 
the text uses the word to refer to blood gushing at the Green Knight’s beheading (“Þe blod brayd fro þe body” 
[429]); breaking down the deer in its skinning scene (“Siþen britned þay þe brest and brayden hit in twynne” 
[1339]); disemboweling the boar in the second skinning sequence (“Braydez out þe bowels” [1609]); the 
girdle when first described in the bedroom scene (“Noȝt bot arounde brayden” [1833]) and again when 
Gawain rips the girdle off at the Green Chapel (“Þenne he kaȝt to þe knot and þe kest lawsez, / Brayde 
broþely þe belt to þe burne seluen” [2376-2377]). That both the girdle and the skinning sequences are linked 
even further through this linguistic repetition only serves to reinforce the connection between lace and hyde. 
46 MED, s.v. “losen (v.).” 
47 Heng, “Feminine Knots,” 508. 
48 Ibid. 
49 MED, s.v. “unlāsen (v.).” 
50 Similarly, the Lady Bertilak “laȝt a lace lyȝtly” (1830), or ‘quickly seized that lace,’ when giving it to 
Gawain, foreshadowing Gawain’s later “kaȝt to þe knot” (2377), or ‘seized the knot.’ While two distinct 
verbs are utilized (and they rhyme very neatly), the basic definitions and gestures implied are strikingly 
similar. The verb lacchen means not only ‘to seize’ but also indicates an ‘arrest’ or the more violent animal 
trapping or capture; see MED, s.v. “lacchen (v.(1)).” Similarly, Gawain’s later kaȝt bears the simple 
definition of ‘To grasp (sth.), seize’ but also a ‘secondary, and again more violent, definition of ‘to catch (an 
animal in the chase, with a snare or trap, etc.); entrap (sb.)’; see MED, s.v. “cacchen (v.).” The connotations 
of capture, specifically animal and presumably nonhuman capture, in these definitions are certainly telling.  
51 Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, 299n2506-9.  
52 Yamamoto, “Bodies in the Hunt,” 111. 
53 Michael Foley, “Gawain’s Two Confessions Reconsidered,” The Chaucer Review 9, no. 1 (1974): 76. 
54 Ibid., 77.  
55 Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, 17. 
56 Ibid., 4, emphasis retained. 
57 Ibid., 101, 107. 
58 After, of course, the standard references to the old “bokez” and call for God’s blessing (2524-2531). 
59 Marvin, “Blood, Law, and Venery,” 148. 
60 The text’s use of “Laȝt [...] lyȝtly” (modernized: seized quickly) implies the second definition of the verb 
“lacchen”: ‘To seize (sb. or sth.) quickly or violently, snatch; seize (sb. or sth.) as prey’; MED, s.v. “lacchen 
(v.(1)),” emphasis added. However, as seen above, the first definition is no less violent than the second. And 
so when the Lady “bere on” Gawain the girdle, while it can be read as the more sedate ‘offer (sth.) to (sb.),’ 
the preceding context of swift removal would imply instead ‘to thrust (sth.) upon (sb.)’; MED, s.v. “bēren 
(v.(1)).”  
61 For more on the medieval animalization of women, see Joyce Salisbury’s The Beast Within: Animals in the 
Middle Ages (New York: Routledge, 1994) and Church Fathers, Independent Virgins (London: Verso, 1991); 
Caroline Bynum’s Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). 
62 Heng, “Feminine Knots,” 501.  
63 Ibid., 508. 
64 For more on Gawain’s reputation in the Arthurian tradition, see Sean Pollack, “Border States: Parody, 
Sovereignty, and Hybrid Identity in ‘The Carle of Carlisle,’” Arthuriana 19, no. 2 (2009); and Kristin 
Bovaird-Abbo, “Alison’s Antithesis in The Marriage of Sir Gawain,” Medieval Feminist Forum 49, no. 2 
(2013). 
65 Heng, “Feminine Knots,” 502. 
66 Ibid., 503.  
67 See Larry Benson, Art and Tradition in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 1965), esp. 62, and Suzanne Craymer, “Signifying Chivalric Identities: Armor and Clothing 
in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight,” Medieval Perspectives 14, no. 1 (1999): esp. 56-57. 
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68 Ibid., 50. 
69 This conflation also appears in the final hunt for the fox, wherein the hunters “tyruen of his cote” (1921), 
or strip him of his coat. The term cote typically indicates a ‘tunic or kyrtle,’ or other ‘outer covering,’ and 
less often can be ‘the coat or pelt of an animal’; MED, s.v. “cōte (n.(2)).” The text playfully refers to the fox’s 
pelt as his garment, even as the hunters strip it from his body. And the audience, through the hunters’ 
unmaking of the fox, supposedly glimpses a soul beneath the skin: “Hit watz þe myriest mute þat euer men 
herde, / Þe rich rurd þat þer watz raysed for Renaude saule” (1915-1916), or ‘it was the merriest baying (of 
hounds) that ever man heard, the rich roar that was raised for Reynard’s soul there.’ After his capture, the 
baying hounds create a roar or ‘song’ to send off the fox’s soul; MED, s.v. “rērd(e (n.).” However, considering 
the plethora of insults hurled at the fox during the hunt, it it more than likely, as Yamamoto observes, serves 
to highlight the very absence of said soul; Yamamoto, “Bodies in the Hunt,” 129. For more on the potential 
soul of nonhuman animals in romance, see chapter one of this project. 
70 Heng, “Feminine Knots,” 503. 
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Chapter 3. Hiding Skin and Skinning Hides: Transformation and the 
Vulnerability of Species Categories in William of Palerne 
 
 
Et ut omnem abstergeret dubietatem, pede quasi pro 
manu fungens, pellem totam a capite lupæ retrahens, 
usque ad umbilicum replicavit: et statim expressa 
forma vetulæ cujusdam apparuit. 
[“To remove all doubt he pulled all the skin off the 
she-wolf from the head down to the navel, folding 
it back with his paw as if it were a hand. And 
immediately the shape of an old woman, clear to 
be seen, appeared.”] 




When William and Meliors resolve to flee Rome in William of Palerne, they turn 
to the crafty handmaiden Alisaundrine for “cunseile” (1661).2 Alisaundrine’s response is 
at first disheartening: she says that the lovers will be hunted until all roads — “eche brug, 
eche paþþe, eche brode weye” (1674), or each bridge, each path, each broad way — are 
unsafe to travel. However, Alisaundrine soon touches upon an idea just outlandish enough 
to work: in the kitchens men are skinning wild beasts, and Alisaundrine proposes that they 
steal two bear skins to sew the lovers into as a perfect disguise. Thus is hatched the plan to 
sew the lovers into “tvo skynnes / of þe breme beres” — two skins of the fierce bears — 
so they may escape Melior’s unwanted marriage (1688-1689). William and Meliors cross 
the countryside disguised first as bears and then as deer, chased by hunters and Roman 
forces along the way. A “witty werwolf” aids them on their journey, the same werewolf 
who had saved William as a small child, and guides them to William’s ancestral home of 
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Palerne only to find it besieged by the Spanish. Once William saves Palerne from the siege, 
the defeated King of Spain reveals that William’s friendly werewolf is the lost Spanish 
prince, Alphouns, whom the king’s second wife, Braunde, had transformed via an ointment 
rubbed into his skin. When Braunde restores him to human form, Alphouns then relates his 
rescue of William, the lost heir of Palerne. With both princes returned to their respective 
kingdoms, they marry worthy maidens (William weds Meliors and matches Alphouns to 
William’s sister), and everyone lives happily thereafter.  
With so many important animal skins in the romance, Alisaundrine’s plot well 
represents the romance’s concern with disguise, and especially the use of nonhuman animal 
hides to obscure human identity. As I noted in my previous chapter, medieval hunting 
tradition highly ritualized the process of skinning animals, more for hunted prey than for 
butchered chattel. The practice involved precise vocabulary and correct use of terminology. 
Skinning served as the focal point of a hunter’s endeavors: a hunt’s power resided in the 
“transformative moment of [...] unmaking” that skinning represented.3 Skin itself is no less 
powerful in William of Palerne: for this romance, skin acts as a site of transformation, as 
permeable and potent. The role of skin in medieval writing, as Sara Kay observes, served 
both as a medium of writing (vellum) and as the subject of writing (werewolf tales, 
bestiaries, etc.). Manuscripts that bear a “suture” in their vellum visually emphasize that 
dual function, Kay argues, and reassume the significance of skin when flesh appears in a 
text.4 Nonhuman animal hides carry meaning assumable by human speakers or human 
bodies, and skin represents a metonymy not only for the body, but also for the self.5 In this 
way, skin functions as a transferable component: one type of skin connects to another and 
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creates ambiguity in signification. The medieval Latin word pellis refers to both human 
and nonhuman skin as well as to parchment. The sutures in the manuscript of a romance, 
then, act as a physical counterpart in the writing surface of the sutures that, in William of 
Palerne, Alisaundrine sews into the bearskins within the romance narrative. The hides of 
the lovers’ disguise counterpoint the hide of the vellum, and the nonhuman pellis of the 
manuscript page dovetails into the human pellis of the hand that holds it. Skin is universal, 
yet transmutable: human and nonhuman animal skins, vellum, books – it remains skin even 
while it inhabits various forms or serves various functions.6  
William of Palerne treats skin as almost interchangeable, particularly the skin one 
owns and the hides one wears. The romance showcases several disguises that render 
boundaries ambiguous, from the lovers’ skins to Alisaundrine’s infamously wearing of 
“boiȝes cloþes” (1705), or boys’ clothes, to the transfigured Alphouns’s wolfish shape. I’ve 
already discussed the prevailing distinction in medieval thought that humans were, by 
definition, the “rational animal.”7 That definition as the singular divide breaks down when 
applied to certain romances, I argued in Chapter 1, and it does so yet again in William of 
Palerne.8 While the medieval paradigm of human definition, known as the Great Chain of 
Being, presents a multitude of difference, it nonetheless implies a hierarchy of animals, 
atop which sits the human.9 Medieval attempts to further define the human result in 
additional defining features (physical characteristics, clothing, diet, etc.)10 that 
continuously qualify the definition of man with these other signifiers and underpins itself 
with a binary opposition of human/nonhuman animal. When William of Palerne questions 
definitions of the human, it also deconstructs this binary opposition by complicating what 
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signifies human and nonhuman animal.  
The romance William of Palerne resists presenting a primary distinction between 
human and other animals and instead confuses those categories — hide or skin, beast or 
knight, prey or person — and refuses to settle on a single, clear divide. Skin is worn as 
clothing, hides are sewn together and cut away, flesh is shaped and altered and cleansed. 
The interchangeability of these skins leaves open and vulnerable what defines a shape, a 
flesh, and an identity as human and another as nonhuman animal. Instead, the romance 
depicts the status of human and other animals as interchangeable: it presents skin as a 
flexible category that encompasses and reinscribes the human into the animal category. 
After all, Alisaundrine chooses bearskins both for the bear’s ferocity and for its close 
approximation to man, when she remarks that bears in “alle maners arn man likkest” (1694) 
— that is, not merely in shape or size do bears resemble humans, but in alle maners. In 
fact, while editors most commonly gloss the term likkest as ‘similar’ or ‘most like,’ it also 
means ‘same’ or ‘identical.’11 The term implies that the two creatures, humans and bears, 
are so similar as to be nearly identical in form and manner. Medieval thought supports the 
implication, as bears and humans were believed to possess the same internal organ 
arrangements, to perform intercourse in the same manner (i.e., in an embrace, with one 
partner lying atop the other), and were thought even be able to successfully crossbreed.12 
The bear and the human share a multitude of physical similarities, with any single division 
elided into the overriding likeness of the two species.  
However, the romance goes farther than offering brief references to prevailing 
medieval thought: it places the human within the category of animal, rendering the single 
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distinction of human rationality into variegated differences among animal species. Courtly 
romances are spaces of fantasy, and readers of romance are conditioned to expect wonders 
and magic and are willing to suspend their disbelief accordingly.13 The poem’s 
undermining of the strict hierarchy of species, then, remains always and already within the 
world of fantasy. Yet even so, romance’s magical aspects, conventional though they may 
be, do not automatically nullify its engagement with contemporary definitions of the human 
and the nonhuman animal. If anything, it utilizes anticipated generic features as a means to 
question such definitions.14 For instance, William of Palerne relies on the romance genre’s 
comedic elements, or what Geraldine Heng identifies as romance’s “healing and aggressive 
properties,” to dilute its potentially subversive species ambiguity.15 While Heng was 
referring to Richard I’s jokes in Richard Coer de Lyon as a mechanism by which to alleviate 
and transform cultural trauma into national pride, William of Palerne’s comedic elements 
operate to “make the transgression of taboos acceptable, narratable.”16 To examine the 
romance’s conflation of human/nonhuman animal categories, this chapter first examines 
how William of Palerne depicts humans as becoming Other, revealing the permeability of 
human boundaries even as it utilizes the romance genre’s space of play and comedic 
elements to normalize the subversion of divine human exceptionalism. Secondly, this 
chapter investigates how the romance complicates its transformations by leaking the 
nonhuman animal into the ‘restored’ human. Doing so undermines the ‘rational’ as an 
exclusively human definition and emphasizes instead the “wild space of play” between 
species. Through Alisaundrine, Alphouns, and William and Meliors, the romance relies on 
 102 
disguise and transformation to confuse and ultimately break down that singular division of 
nonhuman and human animal.  
 
The Gendered Disguise: Swaggering like a Man 
This romance has an alternate title, William and the Werewolf, so editors clearly 
find the subject of transformation to be an integral part of the romance. One transformation 
in the romance, and a less obvious one it seems than that of the infamous werewolf, is that 
of the helpful handmaid Alisaundrine. The French Guillaume de Palerne passes quickly 
over Alisaundrine’s disguise — which the romance gives only a half-line — while the 
Middle English William of Palerne expands the half-line into a full description.17 For the 
Middle English poem, then, Alisaundrine’s pseudo-shape-shifting warranted more 
attention. In fact, Alisaundrine’s transformation establishes the pattern for the other 
transformations in the poem, mainly the pseudo-comedic transformation between human 
and nonhuman animal. In her efforts to secure the lovers their bearskin disguises, 
Alisaundrine herself must become something else — a man:  
Wiȝtly, boute mo wordes, sche went forþ stille, 
and blive in a bourde borwed boiȝes cloþes, 
and talliche hire atyred tiȝtli þerinne; 
and bogeysliche as a boye busked to þe kychene, 
þer as burnes were busy bestes to hulde, 
and manly sche melled hire þo men forto help, 
til sche say tidi time hire prey for to take. 
Sche awayted wel þe bere-skinnes, 
þat loveli were and large to lappen inne hire frendes; 
and went wiȝtly awei, wel unparceyved (1704-1713). 
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The text is rife with masculine plays on words. It touches on the correctness of 
Alisaundrine’s disguise, noting she put on the clothing “talliche” (1706), or ‘properly, 
suitably, [...] in a fitting manner.’18 But Alisaundrine does more than dress in the garments 
of a boy — she puts on a male swagger, walking “bogeysliche” (1707), or ‘haughtily, 
saucily,’ about the kitchen.19 She even enters and exits the kitchens “wiȝtly” (1704, 1713), 
‘quickly’ or, even, ‘like a man,’20 and works “manli” (1709) — ‘in a masculine way’ — 
alongside the men in the kitchen.21 It is not enough for her to look the part, but she must 
also walk the walk, so to speak. And walk the walk she does: Alisaundrine struts around 
the skinning workroom and waits for her moment to snatch the bearskins. She “melled” 
(1709) with the men, a term that means either ‘blended’ or ‘exerted, busied oneself.’22 
While melled may simply mean that Alisaundrine is ‘speaking’ with the men, as Hannah 
Priest argues, the full line (“and manly sche melled hire þo men forto help” [1709]) implies 
that she applies herself to “help” (1709) the men in their work — “busy” as they are the 
“bestes to huld” (1710), or to skin the beasts. Nonetheless, all three definitions may likely 
be at play: in blending with the men at work, Alisaundrine converses with them and exerts 
herself in the masculine tasks at hand.23 In other words, Alisaundrine successfully 
transforms herself from female to male: she engages in the bloody work of the skinning, 
speaks with the workmen, and blends in perfectly in the masculine space. She dresses and 
conducts herself so convincingly as a boy that her presence among the men goes entirely 
unnoticed: she “went wiȝtly awei, wel unparceyved” (1713) — departing quickly (or, 
again, as a man), entirely unperceived. Alisaundrine has passed herself off as a male 
without a hitch, more or less transforming herself from female to male.  
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However, one must remember that Alisaundrine’s gender-shifting was not very 
subversive for the fourteenth century, as cross-dressing women were a common joke in 
medieval English tournament games.24 In fact, the text uses the term “bourde” (1705) — 
meaning ‘game,’ ‘joke,’ or ‘prank’25 — to describe Alisaundrine’s quick acquisition of 
“boiȝes cloþes” (1705) for her ruse. The Middle Ages had precedents for such a game, and 
some scholars read Alisaundrine’s cross-dressing as ultimately non-threatening because, 
as Priest argues, Alisaundrine’s disguise fails to convince the audience, who is “in on the 
joke.”26 Extrapolating from that bourde, Priest reads all of the text’s transformations as 
“ironic,” more “a masked dance or a mumming” than real shape-changing: “this is pure 
performance,” she continues, “and none of it is permanent.”27  
Although, humor and irony do not necessarily negate the transformative aspects of 
the poem: the bourde merely participates in the romance genre’s space of play, a space 
enables romance in general and William of Palerne in particular to employ the “healing 
and aggressive properties” of humor: “The joke taps conventions of humor,” Heng says, 
“that make the transgression of taboos acceptable, narratable.”28 The text defers 
Alisaundrine’s potential transgression of gender boundaries through the humor of her 
disguise, through her exaggerated strut and her transformative bourde. Even as the romance 
depicts the vulnerability of boundaries, the text keeps the potentially threatening conflation 
of man and not-man safely within the realm of playful humor. Alisaundrine participates in 
a familiar tournament game, an elaborate prank on one of the main antagonists in the 
narrative, even as she slides freely between one human category and another. 
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While Alisaundrine’s mischievous boundary-crossing may be more 
anthropocentric than the other boundary-crossings I will discuss, her transformation 
nonetheless bears the same elements of playful disguise that recur in different formulations 
with different characters in the poem. Alisaundrine’s transformation across genders 
facilitates a similar slide from the carapace of one being into another — into an Other — 
creature entirely. After all, genderbending and cross-species transformations, Valerie 
Hotchkiss notes, breach both social norms and biology.29 And, from the twelfth century 
onwards, visual and literary representations of women increasingly connected them to 
those of nonhuman animals and the line between female and nonhuman animal became 
progressively narrower and less clear.30 By the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, as Joyce 
Salisbury notes, this perceived “interchangeable nature” of women and nonhuman animals 
transitioned from comparisons through simile to more direct metaphor. The transition 
illustrates, Salisbury continues, “a blurring of the lines between [...] a different species, and 
all women,” such that the two categories were increasingly conflated.31 Even 
Alisaundrine’s manli behavior recalls the underlying edge of her disguise: editors often 
gloss the term manli as ‘masculine, male’ but it also means ‘in the human way’ or having 
the ‘characteristics of human beings.’32 Alisaundrine’s disguise, then, represents not only 
a transformation from one gender to another but also implies the transformation of one 
species to another — from nonhuman animal to man. Her pseudo-shape-changing, then, 
fits right alongside the others at play in the romance and sets the tone for how the poem 
depicts and normalizes transformation across species boundaries. 
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The Rational Wolf: A Man in Wolf’s Clothing 
Alisaundrine’s costuming also prefaces her act of disguising the lovers, and the text 
presents even the witty werewolf Alphouns, the most dramatically shapeshifted figure of 
the romance, more as forcibly-disguised than as entirely transformed. In fact, many 
scholars argue that the Middle English romance’s recurring depictions of disguise imply 
that Alphouns may have never physically or fully transformed at all.33 Others interpret 
Alphouns as a hybrid entity, as Randy Schiff does, and read the werewolf’s participation 
in human rationality and practices as a “[nonhuman] animal literally gesturing toward 
human status.”34 However, this ambiguity of form seems to be the whole point of the 
romance, as the ambiguity illustrates the confusion of physical and rational boundaries 
between traditional human and nonhuman animal definitions that Alphouns represents. 
Alphouns functions as a human in nonhuman animal form: the text makes it very clear that 
Alphouns changes physically, as I will show shortly, even while it insists on his rational 
mind. And if rationality defines the human as distinct from other animals, then Alphouns’s 
conflation of human reason and nonhuman animal shape serves to interrogate that 
definition and, by extension, its inherent human exceptionalism. To fully explore this slide 
between the human and nonhuman, I address Alphouns’s physical transformation and 
rational mind, as well as his performance of traditional werewolf violence and his human 
moments of genuine savagery.  
The romance provides little room for doubt that Alphouns experiences a bodily 
transformation. His stepmother Braunde transforms Alphouns as a part of her plot to 
disinherit him so that her own children may succeed to the Spanish throne. Her plan hinges 
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on transforming Alphouns through “nigramauncy” (119) and “wicchecraft” (118, 120), or 
necromancy and witchcraft, by rubbing into his flesh “[a] noynement” made by 
“enchaunmens of charmes” (136-137), or an ointment made by enchantments of charms35:  
[...] whan þat womman þerwiþ hadde þat worli child  
ones wel anoynted, þe child wel al abowte,  
he wex to a werwolf wiȝtly þerafter,  
al þe making of man so mysse hadde ȝhe schaped.  
Ac his witt welt he after as wel as tofore,  
but lelly oþer likenes þat longeþ to mankynne, 
but a wilde werwolf, ne walt he never after. (138-144) 
 
Braunde “wel anoynted [...] wel al abowte” (139), or thoroughly anointed (Alphouns) all 
over, such that he “wex to a werwolf” (140), or grew into a werewolf. However, while his 
body is “so mysse [...] schaped” (141), or so shaped askew, he retains his intelligence “as 
wel as tofore” (142), or as well as before his transformation: it is his only “likenes [...] to 
mankynne” (143), or similarity to mankind, and Alphouns is otherwise entirely a “wilde 
werwolf” (144), or wild werewolf. Rather than the more traditional mode of lycanthropy 
(the wearing of a wolf’s pelt, which emphasizes putting on the skin of a separate creature 
entirely),36 Alphonse transforms through his own flesh, and the text emphasizes how 
thoroughly that flesh must be covered — “wel anoynted [...] wel al abowte” (139, emphasis 
added) — to enact this transformation. Yet only his body is “mysse [...] schaped” (141), 
and his human reason persists as if he were still in human shape and serves as the only 
human trait he has left.37 Alphouns’s nonhuman animal status, then, seems questionable 
despite his skewed body: he is as rational in this shape as he was in his previous shape, a 
nonhuman animal with the traditionally human capacity for thought.38 The romance 
continues to insist on Alphouns’s human mind by showing the wolf planning and cleverly 
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enacting his strategies at nearly every turn and reinforcing his recurring title, “þe witti 
werwolf.” Even when Alphouns toes the line between savagery and rationality, the poem 
presents Alphouns as a disguised figure more than a transformed one and highlights the 
retention of his human intellect. But at the same time, it throws into question the very 
definition of that humanity.  
Indeed, the text depicts Alphouns as not only a rational creature, but also as an 
atypical werewolf: wolves (and by extension werewolves) were known in the Middle Ages 
as evil, murderous beasts.39 Instead, Alphouns participates in the small “Werewolf 
Renaissance” of twelfth-century literature, wherein transformed werewolves are rendered 
as sympathetic characters.40 However, the text pushes his portrayal even further: he is not 
merely rational but rather parodic in his overall lack of viciousness. Whenever Alphouns 
displays a traditional werewolf persona, he does so almost always as an act. Let us focus 
on the three main examples of these performances. The first and second occur nearly 
consecutively, when the hapless lovers require food and drink and the lupine prince mock-
attacks travelers in order to steal their foodstuffs. First, Alphouns charges at a man “wiþ a 
rude roring, as he him rende wold” (1851), or with a ferocious roaring as though he would 
tear him (apart) and frightens the man into dropping his bag of food and fleeing. Alphouns 
is “glad” of the victory (1860), and his wolfish ferocity immediately dissipates: cheerfully, 
he takes up the booty and brings it to the lovers before heading out again to find them 
wine.41 Then, we find the second parody: Alphouns comes upon a clergyman, whom he 
ambushes “bellyng as a bole þat burnes wold spille” (1891), or roaring like a bull that 
would kill that man. Once more, the man drops his parcels (in this case, flagons of wine) 
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and flees, which the werewolf then happily takes to the lovers. On the third occasion, when 
hunters attack Alphouns while he tries to protect William and Meliors, he pretends to roar 
and rage: “wiȝtly as a wod best went hem aȝens / [...] / and ran forþ for al þat route wiþ so 
rude a noyse, / as he wold þat barn blive have forfrete” (2371-2376), or he went against 
them quickly like a wild/mad beast and ran forth at that entire group with such a ferocious 
noise (it was) as if he would have quickly devoured that child. In all of these episodes, the 
text exaggerates Alphouns’s behavior and renders it in simile. He acts “as a wod best” and 
is “bellyng as a bole” — playing the wild beast and roaring like, of all things, a bull — as 
he pretends that he will “rende” and kill his targets. That is to say, the poem focuses on 
Alphouns’ performance, not his shape. The repeated and insistent use of “as” to create a 
simile for Alphouns’s behavior only places its performativity into sharper focus: he is not 
actually “a wod best” just as he is clearly not “a bole,” but merely acting “as” one. 
Werewolf he may be, but Alphouns is no crazed, murdering beast. His antics are instead 
humorous, as he puts on a melodramatic show to frighten his victims. He seems less a 
werewolf in these moments and more an actor in costume.  
Even when the text draws attention to Alphouns’s wolf body, as it does in the final 
parodic-violence sequence, the performative presentation of his behavior undermines the 
potential threat. Alphouns gapes his mouth open “ful grimli” (2372) and seizes the child 
“be þe middel in his mouþe, þat muche was and large” (2374), and the text lingers on the 
image of his wide-open jaws, of his “large” mouth snatching up the child’s torso. But 
Alphonse only pretends as though he will harm the child as he carries him off “as he wold 
þat barn blive have forfrete” (2376, emphasis added). The pretense behind his actions belies 
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the sudden playing up of his nonhuman animal body, and the romance dispels any doubts 
when Alphouns releases the child after the hunt: he sets the child down “wiþoute eny maner 
wem þe worse it to greve / for non schold in þat barnes bodi o brusure finde / as of þat bold 
best, but bold it was and faire” (2460-2462). The poem emphasizes that Alphouns returns 
the child entirely unharmed, assuring us that the wolf leaves no ‘blemish or bruise’ on his 
body despite the long chase for the “bold best” that stole him. But although the text refuses 
to allow Alphouns to be purely a nonhuman animal, it also does not allow the audience to 
forget his animality altogether. Even when he playacts the werewolf’s murderous 
rampages, Alphouns is still very much a physical wolf. However, his lupine shape and 
bristling fur are superficial — only skin-deep so to speak — and do not affect his rational 
mind.  
In fact, Alphouns’s exaggerated performance of werewolf behaviors evokes the 
healing joke: he ambushes unsuspecting passersby with a great show of slavering jaws and 
bristling hackles and, as soon as they have fled, reverts to joy at his success, gladly serving 
his spoils to the hapless lovers. His escapades read like a prank, and the juxtaposition of 
overblown ferocity with celebratory glee only reinforce the absurdity of his performances. 
The text continually reassures readers that Alphouns is not ‘that kind’ of wolf: it depicts 
Alphouns instead as rather blatantly playing at those roles. In the scenes I discuss, 
Alphouns certainly performs what Priest calls “mumming,” though his act owes less to his 
physical transformation and more to the violence culturally associated with his lupine 
body.42 This playful joking at a savagery typically associated with nonhuman animals in 
medieval thought,43 not only reinforces Alphouns’s humanity, but pokes fun at his physical 
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lupine state: Alphouns bridges the human and nonhuman, but the humor of his play-acting 
eases the tension in that connection. 
That is not to say that Alphouns is without violent outbursts, but even in moments 
of genuine ferocity, the text never questions Alphouns’s humanity. For instance, when 
Alphouns returns to his ward to find the young William missing, the wolf prince goes wild, 
howling and ripping at his furred flesh in a great sorrow (86). Despite his violence in this 
scene, Alphouns rends his own hide as a man would tear at his hair in a traditionally human 
gesture of distress. In his acute reuliche or sorrow, Alphouns displays what Norman Hinton 
calls a “manlike ‘dool.’”44 Even in his two assaults on his stepmother Braunde, Alphouns 
exhibits the rational thinking and emotions contemporarily assigned to humans: in the first 
attack Alphouns reacts to his transformation by attempting to strangle Braunde to death 
(145-151), but even in this violence, he is not described as enraged: he merely plans to get 
whatever vengeance he can before being forced to flee, no matter the consequences (147-
148). In the second attack (4341–4344), Alphouns merely glares angrily at Braunde (4338-
4339) and his rage only spurs violent action after seeing Braunde sit happily with his father. 
Thomas Aquinas may have labelled nonhuman animals savage and violent, but he also 
allowed for the human capacity to descend into savagery and, so, to become bestial.45 To 
distinguish the nonhuman animal from the human, then, Aquinas insists that humans 
possess a “logical violence” that has motives and goals, and so can be understandable or 
justified. By contrast he defined nonhuman animal violence, like the creatures themselves, 
via irrationality.46  
Traditional romance tropes of vengeance justify Alphouns’s violence in both 
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assaults, as Braunde had caused his forced transformation and subsequent loss of his royal 
inheritance: as Michelle Freeman identifies it, his is a “[r]ightful vengeance” characterized 
by “rightful human fury.”47 In fact, Alphouns’s desire for vengeance is not only reasonable 
but also expected of him: medieval romance hosts an entire sub-genre of vengeance-driven 
tales, some which, like the thirteenth-century Havelok and King Horn, focus particularly 
on “the value of strong emotions in vengeance, specifically anger” when seeking often 
“violent retaliation.”48 Yet Alphouns can be appeased: the wolf’s rage subsides as soon as 
William promises him that Braunde will either restore Alphouns or be burned alive for her 
failure (4363-4367): William offers Alphouns the violent retribution that the wolf sought 
through his attacks and answers Alphouns’s romance drive for vengeance. In response, 
Alphouns is “ful glad of Williams speche” (4375) — he understands the knight’s words 
and calms himself accordingly: Alphouns makes no further dispute and works “in alle 
wise” or all manners to do as William bids him with as gracious a bearing as he can (4378-
4380). He goes so far as to bow and kiss William’s feet in gratitude (4377). We thus see 
that Alphouns responds logically to William’s words despite the fervor of his rage just 
before. Even with Alphouns at his most savage, his most wild, the text does not portray 
him as an irrational beast. Instead, the text’s insistence on Alphouns’s humanity implies an 
uncomfortable but not uncommon truth — that humans are as capable of violent outbursts 
as nonhuman animals. While this knowledge was not particularly revelatory in medieval 
thought, what renders it potentially uncomfortable for contemporary audiences is 
Alphouns’s dual animal status: a rational werewolf who inhabits both human and wolf 
animal categories, Alphouns is literally a rational animal whose depiction implies that other 
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nonhuman animals may also be rational animals with traditionally human emotions and 
motivations.  
However, while William of Palerne joins other medieval texts in its reminder of 
humans’ base drives, it only partially does so with an injection of comedy. The text renders 
Alphouns’s initial attack by depicting mixed human and nonhuman animal behaviors: 
rather than a wolf gripping Braunde in its jaws, Alphouns violently hente (a general 
grabbing verb) her with his paws in order to choke her.49 He does not rend or tear at her 
with his teeth as a wolf might, but instead attempts to strangle her to death, like a human 
would. Alphouns’s plan to eke out what revenge he can is rooted in his memory of his 
former human body and its capabilities. His very human attempt at murder while occupying 
a nonhuman body — strangling someone with paws that have no opposable thumbs — 
creates a ludicrous and anatomically challenging image.50 Alphouns’s attempted 
vengeance invites laughter and thus draws attention to his altered anatomy, despite the 
text’s insistence on his human mind and motivations. The juxtaposition lends some humor 
to Alphouns’s situation as a whole, as he hilariously fumbles his vengeance because of his 
lupine body, and the healing joke acts to render his circumstances — a rational mind in a 
nonhuman animal body — more acceptable.  
The three sequences I describe serve as a sharp contrast to Alphouns’s previous 
“mummings” of werewolf violence: whereas before the werewolf’s savagery was prankish 
and playacting, here it is genuine and serious. There is little of the humor that previously 
mediated Alphouns’s straddling of the human/nonhuman animal divide/hierarchy. Instead, 
the text depicts Alphouns exhibiting fits of dangerous aggression and interchanges the 
 114 
comical bourde of his ambushes with the insistence on the human aspects of his 
overwhelming emotions. Alphouns still possesses a rational mind in a nonhuman animal 
body, but outside his hilariously fumbled attempt at vengeance early on, the text leaves the 
audience to imagine this conflation with little assistance of its previous humor that helped 
to make it “acceptable, narratable.”51 The parodic scenes are even nestled between 
Alphouns’s wild outbursts, bookending the humorous episodes and emphasizing them as 
the heart of his werewolf portrayals. Alphouns’ genuine violence frames his play-violence 
and swaddles the healing joke of man-pretending-to-be-wild with stark moments of man-
being-wild.52 While the comedy of his parodic antics colors the flanking drama of his rage 
and sorrow, the latter are nonetheless left bare of humor. The framing passages of genuine 
violence, then, remain outside of the acceptable, normalizing power of the joke. Without 
the mediating force of the romance’s humor, the text reinforces its depiction of Alphouns 
not merely as a human-being-bestial but as a nonhuman animal possessing rational 
motivations. 
William of Palerne not only depicts Alphouns as rational, but it also seems to 
willfully ignore Alphouns’s human identity. The romance reveals Alphouns’s 
transformation within the first 400 lines of the poem and so leaves his human identity as 
no secret.53 However, while I have referred to Alphouns by name throughout this analysis, 
the text itself never refers to the him by name or title — or by any human moniker — but 
refers to him only in nonhuman animal terms like werwolf or best until after he returns to 
his original form.54 But even as narrative apparently sets aside the knowledge of his 
identity, it cannot seem to completely forget it, as the romance reveals Alphouns’s human 
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identity early in the narrative and depicts it as intrinsic to his behavior and portrayal. And 
yet the poem insists on Alphouns’s wolfishness and abandons his established human 
identity in favor of presenting a rational, nonhuman animal. He is a wild wolf only in 
parody or passion, as feint or fervor. In these moments, Alphouns is seemingly wolf in 
shape alone and bears a human mind driven by both reason and emotion. Alphouns, then, 
presents a sort of conflation between the two categories of human and nonhuman animal, 
cohabitating both at once and belonging to neither. What makes him human — his rational 
mind — does not and cannot exempt him from being animal. And yet, even free of his 
quadrupedal form, Alphouns cannot fully escape his animal identity. 
 
The Wolf Within: Clothes Cannot Make the Man 
Alphouns cannot elude the shadow of his animality even after his stepmother 
Braunde returns him to his human shape as the lost Spanish prince. In fact, William himself 
still doubts his friend’s restoration after Braunde — and the romance — insist upon it, as 
though William cannot conceive of Alphouns outside of his lupine identity. And yet, the 
narrative makes no secret that William should not be confused: William knows that 
Alphouns has been transformed, and accordingly treats the wolf as more human even 
before Braunde restores the Spanish prince to his bipedal shape. The King of Spain, after 
being captured by William when the siege is broken, reveals to our titular knight that he 
had a son named Alphouns (4085) who was transformed “into a wilde werwolf” by his 
second wife, Braunde (4105). Having seen the werewolf in Felice’s court, the king also 
tells William that he knows for certain “þis werwolf is my sone” (4114). William agrees 
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with him and admits that he also knows for certain, as the werewolf “has mannes munde 
more þan we boþe” (4123), or has more a man’s mind than both of us. In other words, 
William verbally acknowledges what the text always makes clear — that Alphouns has a 
“mannes munde” despite his lupine body. Indeed, William resolves to force Braunde to 
cure Alphouns if she can and states twice his wish for Alphouns to be made a “man aȝeine” 
(4131, 4137). The text leaves William’s knowledge of Alphouns’s plight without a doubt 
as it circles back to the knight’s resolution to restore his friend to human form.  
Nonetheless, William still struggles to reconcile his knowledge of Alphouns’s curse 
with the physical body in front of him. Let us look again at William’s appeal during 
Alphouns’s rage: William pleads with Alphouns to trust him as his “owne broþer” (4360) 
or like a “fader to þe sone” (4361). He even refers to the Spanish king as “þi sire” (4368), 
or your father: William not only calls upon familial ties but also explicitly reminds the 
wolfen Alphouns of his human father. Knowing as he does that Alphouns is the 
transformed prince of Spain and that the wolf retains a man’s mind, it makes sense that 
William relies on traditional human relationships to appeal to Alphouns and speaks to the 
wolf as he would if Alphouns were in a human body. Nonetheless, William cannot ignore 
Alphouns’s shape as he holds him “aboute þe necke” (4358). And so, William begins to 
mix Alphouns’s signifiers: he calls Alphouns “mi swete dere best” as easily as he calls him 
“mi lef swete frend” (4359, 4372, emphases added). This speech constitutes the first 
moment in which William calls Alphouns by a human referent. In all their time together, 
William never calls the werewolf frend, and even Meliors only calls Alphouns “oure worþi 
werwolf” (2795) and “our gode best” (2797). William’s use of the term in this context, 
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then, seems to indicate that he here attempts to see his lupine companion as more than a 
nonhuman animal. Yet despite his invocation of human ties as he urges Alphouns to 
acquiesce as “þou me derli lovest” (4374), William cannot resist referring to Alphouns as 
a beast. William knows Alphouns’s name and treats him as more human in this moment 
than he has in previous interactions, but still the knight cannot look entirely past 
Alphouns’s physical shape. Knowing Alphouns’s humanity is not enough, and for William, 
Alphouns remains a seemingly impossible anomaly — a rational mind in an inescapably 
nonhuman animal body. 
However, even after Braunde restores Alphouns to his original shape by means of 
charms and reading, William’s difficulty persists. He cannot extricate his werewolf 
companion from the Spanish heir even with Alphouns returned to human shape. And the 
text is thorough in presenting Alphouns as restored: Alphouns reacts to his restoration 
first by being “gretli glad” (4441) and, immediately after, with shame at his nakedness: 
“he was so naked sore he was aschamed” (4443), or he was so naked that he was 
intensely ashamed. This shame marks Alphouns as fully human and, in turn, as having 
not been so before. Among several features such as diet and language, medieval culture 
defined the monstrous races by the ability (or inability, as the case often was) to wear 
clothing.55 Alphouns’s sudden shame upon his reversion to humanity, then, serves as an 
indication that he has, supposedly, left his animality behind. His new clothes, as a 
defining human feature, signal his restored human status. Accordingly, the text renders 
Alphouns’s acquisition of clothing with a great deal of attention: when Braunde informs 
William that Alphouns has requested clothing, William responds with both joy and also 
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great suspicion of the veracity of her claims: “‘Is þat soþ,’” William asks, “‘Cleymeþ he 
after cloþes, for Cristes love in heven? / Deceyve me nouȝt with þe dedes, but seie me þe 
soþe’” (4480–4482). William questions Braunde’s claim that Alphouns asks for clothing 
and warns her not to deceive him but to tell the truth. William puts Braunde unnecessarily 
on the defensive, and twice invoking God (4483, 4484), she must reiterate that she has 
made Alphouns wholly human again, or made him as “‘hol [...] in alle maneres as to man 
falles’” (4484–4485). Alphouns’s request for clothes, then, serves as no minor detail: it 
indicates his human status, and as such the romance renders it highly important to the 
figures within the romance. They must confirm without a doubt such a significant 
indicator of humanity, and so the text lingers on the discussion and creates an almost 
comedic back-and-forth over an ordinary and, seemingly, trivial request.  
During this episode, the text also lengthily notes how Braunde bathes and clothes 
Alphouns. The entire sequence, from when Alphouns first finds himself ashamed to when 
William finally provides him with clothing, spans roughly 55 lines of the poem, with the 
discussion of clothing making up the majority of the passage with nearly 40 lines of text.56 
Only after his private bath under Braunde’s care does the matter of clothing arise. Yet 
despite his shame, Alphouns does not ask for clothing — Braunde must broach the subject, 
just as she offered him his bath when she initially saw his shame. If clothes act as a signifier 
of this return, then this mediation of them through Alphouns’s original assailant, Braunde, 
befits his earlier curse: even restored “to man aȝe in maner as he ouȝt” (4256), or back to 
man in manner(s) as he ought to be, Alphouns is not yet fully human again until Braunde, 
who had “him wrouȝt a werwolf” (4135) in the first place, also guides him through the 
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symbolic restoration of his humanity. However, the nature of the passage’s progression, 
with Braunde offering and then furnishing clothing for Alphouns, serves to stretch out the 
sequence, as the romance stubbornly lingers on each aspect of the prince’s return to 
humanity. The poem’s prolonged insistence points to a sense of anxiety, one that implies a 
fear that Alphouns’s werewolf status constituted monstrous status: Alphouns’s dressing in 
clothes references a contemporary discomfort in defining the middle-races between 
humans and other animals. Alphouns’s ambiguity of species plays into this defining-the-
monstrous conundrum and layers an anxious coloring onto his full return to humanity. And 
so, the text emphasizes that, more than his physical shape alone, human practices (re)define 
Alphouns as more than a ‘savage animal.’ In this manner, the text seems to highlight human 
exceptionalism by presenting the self-reflective customs of civilization as separating man 
from other animals or even man from the monstrous-middle. Man, aware of his nakedness, 
clothes himself. Alphouns, shamed by his nudity, dresses accordingly, and this developed 
sense of self-awareness renders him as human. However, the text immediately undermines 
this human exceptionalism by casting doubt on Alphouns’s human identity. 
Even after all this engagement in humanizing practices, William — and everyone 
with him, for that matter — does not recognize Alphouns when they first see the prince as 
a man: “of þat companie, be Crist, þer ne knew him none” (4505). To some degree, the 
romance trope of recognition tends to deploy this type of deferment — a delay through 
unrecognition to dramatize the moment of realization and reunion. However, we have 
already seen the poem’s use of generic tropes building into its questioning of 
human/nonhuman animal definitions. And so, while the protracted sequence of recognition 
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fits romantic conventions, it also furthers a comedic purpose as William requires such 
extensive proof despite his own machinations to restore Alphouns. Again, William has no 
reason not to recognize Alphouns. He knows that Braunde has undone her curse and that 
Alphouns desires clothing. William even knew of Alphouns’s condition while the Spanish 
prince was yet a wolf: he not only connects the Spanish king’s lost heir to his lupine friend, 
but he also keeps Braunde in Felice’s court in order to heal Alphouns: “‘I sent after hire 
for þi sake,’” William tells Alphouns, “‘to help þe of þi hele hastli, ȝif sche miȝt. / And 
sche has brouȝt now þi bote’” (4363-4365). William assures Alphouns of Braunde’s help, 
hele, and bote, terms of healing and aid that reinforce our impression of William’s 
knowledge of Alphouns’s curse: William knows that Alphouns was “wrouȝt a werwolf” 
(4135) and so requires some manner of cure or remedy. And yet somehow, even after the 
restored Alphouns chastises William for his lackluster welcome, William must admit to 
Alphouns that he does not know who (or what) Alphouns is: “‘I ne wot in þis world what 
þat ȝe are’” (4517). Despite William’s having been led to this room expressly to meet his 
restored friend and even though sees “þe baþ” (4502) in which Alphouns has bathed, 
Alphouns’s human shape still confuses William. Only when Alphouns directly states “‘I 
am he, þe werwolf’” does William finally make the connection (4520). Alphouns must 
realign himself to his former shape for William, must cast backwards for a familiar signifier 
and reassociate his human body with its previous quadrupedal anatomy. Alphouns the man 
cannot exist without Alphouns the werewolf. The two have become inextricable from each 
other in the narrative.  
Most tellingly, however, Alphouns utilizes the present-tense — “‘I am he’” — 
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instead of the past in this passage. Alphouns’s use of the present tense here reflects the 
text’s own frequent present-tense references to Meliors and William while they wore the 
deerskins. Alphouns’s line, then, connects his sense of identity to that of the lovers’ while 
in disguise. The reflected tenses may, as Priest reads them, render Alphouns’s 
transformation more a disguise itself than a shape-shifting.57 However, such a connection 
need not be one-way: the reflected tenses may also serve to imply that the other characters’ 
disguises function as transformations — these humans are as intensely animal in their 
disguises as a physical wolf. The text treats skin as a set of clothing one wears, and presents 
human status, rooted as it is in self-awareness of nudity, as malleable as the skins one can 
put on or remove — or as the animals, human or nonhuman, one can easily become.  
Alphouns’s use of the present tense, rather, throws doubt upon the humanity of his 
supposed restoration. Even now, fully human once more, Alphouns still intertwines his 
sense of self with his nonhuman animal form. And Alphouns claims, in present tense, his 
supposedly past werewolf identity not once but twice: when later telling of how he snatched 
William as a child to save him from a deadly plot, Alphouns says once more and with 
greater emphasis, “‘I am þe werwolf, wite ȝe for soþe’” (4627, emphasis added) — you 
[should] know [this] in truth, he adds. Even though physically human once more, Alphouns 
still repeatedly conceives of himself in his old wolf skin — even human, Alphouns thinks 
of himself as being animal “in truth.” His use of present tense throws doubt on the integrity 
of a human shape and clothing as defining features of humanity. Nor is Alphouns the only 
one to confuse his nonhuman animal identity with his human shape. When initially 
broaching the subject of clothing to William after she has restored Alphouns, Braunde 
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herself identifies the now-human Alphouns as werwolf: “þe werwolf þe bisecheþ / þat tow 
tit com him to to tire him in his wedes” (4477-4478). It is the werwolf that asks for William 
to bring him clothes to dress in, not Alphouns or the prince or even William’s frend, though 
Braunde knows Alphouns by all those monikers. Similarly, when William goes to see his 
restored friend, the text describes the room as the place where “chaunged was þe best” 
(4500). The form he held overshadows Alphouns’s human shape as the text identifies him 
not simply as “a worþi kniȝt” but also as one just “out of þe werwolfs wise” (4501). While 
Alphouns’s rationality as a werewolf marked him as human, his return to bipedal shape 
remains haunted by his previous lupine one. Even while Alphouns later marries William’s 
sister and ascends to the Spanish throne, so signaling his full reabsorption into human 
society, the specter of his transformation lingers with this expression of conflation. He 
cannot shed animal identity because there he has nothing to shed. As a wolf, he behaved 
as a human by engaging his “mannes munde” and utilizing his reason despite his form. As 
a human, he identifies with his bestial figure and remains unable to distinguish between 
who he was as a wolf and who he is as a man. Alphouns instead inhabits both shapes: he 
perceives himself as a bipedal wolf while the text treats him as a quadrupedal human. 
Nor does the text try to soften any potential discomfort in Alphouns’ dual identities. 
While the previous scenes involving clothing and recognition are arguably comedic, thanks 
to William’s lack of understanding, the text does not render Alphouns’s report of his 
identity comedic. The romance provides no normalizing joke and offers no healing humor 
to turn a potentially dangerous idea into playful speculation. While the audience cannot 
forget the borderline ludicrousness of Braunde’s and William’s argument over clothing or 
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Alphouns’s later chastising of William for his lack of recognition, Alphouns’s speech 
cannot be read as playfully silly. If the text relates Alphouns’s animalness as humorous 
misadventure, then it depicts his return to humanity as a more serious matter. One could 
argue, as Birrer does, that this scene does not need to be played as a joke because it 
represents a restoration of humanity and, she argues, a privileging of the “category of 
‘(hu)man’” over other animals.58 In her reading, William of Palerne erases its own 
representation of the human animal and instead perpetuates human exceptionalism by 
restoring Alphouns to his proper place as separate and above nonhuman animals. But we 
know that Alphouns does not allow that separation to persist and undermines his supposed 
restoration by conflating his present human identity with his past lupine one. If the text 
used humor to alleviate the tension between his human mind and wolf shape, it leaves his 
lingering animality while in human form uncomfortably out in the open, exposed, 
unresolved. The text refuses to close the loop, leaving the audience holding the loose end 
without the playful distance of a jest. Alphouns is not just a humorous imagining of the 
human-as-animal, but a representation of human animality that cannot be laughed off: he 
encompasses both werewolf and man, no matter the state of his skin or the arrangement of 
his limbs. The text returns to him all his human trappings but refuses to relinquish 
Alphouns from his identity as an animal.  
 
Dressing for the Part: Shaping and Performing the Animal 
Alphouns is not the only figure in the romance who dances on the physical 
boundaries between human and nonhuman animal. While Alphouns’s skin grew fur to 
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obscure his flesh, his friends William and Meliors disguise their own human skin with 
nonhuman animal hides in their escape from Rome. Of interest here is the fact that not only 
does the text insist on the success of the lovers’ disguises, but it also emphasizes the 
ambiguity between human and nonhuman animals with depictions of the playful dressing 
and inter-layering of clothes and pelts. 
The lovers dress in bearskins to escape Rome and Meliors’s unwanted marriage, 
which starts them on a long journey through the land. The romance devotes quite a bit of 
attention to the lovers’ disguises, expending nearly 40 lines over two separate sequences 
(1719-1748; 2585-2598) on the lovers’ putting on the skins. This abundance of detail 
sharply contrasts with the noticeable lack of detail in William’s arming scenes. Considering 
the many battles in which William engages, one would expect William of Palerne to offer 
the common romance trope of a knight’s arming sequence. And yet, while William does 
undergo several arming and disarming scenes over the course of the romance, none exceeds 
a single line: “Anon he was armed at alle maner poyntes” (3278); “unarmed him anon, and 
afterward cloþed” (3476); and “unarmed him anon, and afterward him cloþed” (3669–
3670). In the first mention of arming, William is immediately armed in all necessary ways, 
and in the latter two, he is immediately unarmed and then clothed. None of these scenes 
provides any detail about William’s arms themselves or the process of arming or disarming. 
The scenes serve merely to inform the audience that arming or disarming has occurred. In 
fact, the text only affords one arms-related scene great detail: William’s choosing of a 
shield, which requires four lines to describe the shield’s design (3216–3219). Therefore, 
the focus in the text seems to be not on William’s martial dressing but his (and Meliors’s) 
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nonhuman animal disguises. The text thus deemphasizes the traditional arming trope in 
favor of highlighting the lovers’ dressing in their skins. The poem pulls to the forefront the 
disguising scenes, which take over the function of the arming scene as an identity-forming 
ritual.59 In this way, the poem places great weight on these sequences and presents them as 
identity-shaping moments of greater impact for the romance than the traditionally and 
generic ritual of arming a knight.  
The text thus invites its audience to read these scenes as pivotal to the definition 
and representation of the lovers’ identities. And so, let us examine these scenes more 
closely. Alisaundrine first disguises Meliors, fastening her into the skin until none would 
believe she were anything but a bear:  
And sche melled hire Meliors ferst to greiþe, 
and festened hire in þat fel wiþ ful gode þonges 
above hire trie atir, to talke þe soþe, 
þat no man upon mold miȝt oþer parceyve 
but sche a bere were to baite at a stake, 
so justislich eche liþ joyned. (1719–1724)  
 
Alisaundrine “melled hire” — and again we see the handmaid exert herself — to “greiþe” 
or dress Meliors (1719) so she is “tiffed” in “þat tyr” (1725), or dressed in that attire. The 
bearskin acts as an additional, outer layer of clothing, since Alisaundrine has craftily 
“festened” (1720) the skins above Meliors’s “trie atir” (1721), or fastened the skins atop 
Meliors’s fine clothing. And yet that seemingly simple depiction of lacing one’s clothing 
transforms Meliors into a convincing nonhuman animal: Alisaundrine has so “justislich 
eche liþ joyned” (1724), or closely joined each joint or flap of the skin over Meliors that 
“no man upon mold” (1722) would perceive her as anything but a “bere [...] to baite at a 
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stake” (1723), or no one on earth would recognize Meliors as a human and, instead, see her 
as a bear to bait at a stake.60  
And, once she suitably costumes Meliors, Alisaundrine “in þat oþer bere-skyn 
bewrapped William þanne, / and laced wel eche leme wiþ lastend þonges” (1735–1736), 
or wrapped William in the second bearskin and tightly laced each of his limbs therein. 
Alisaundrine so successfully disguises the lovers that she essentially transforms them: the 
skins entirely conceal their human identities to any who see them, such that William and 
Meliors become real bears (or, later, deer) to any and all outside who perceive them (1722, 
2594-2595). The skins obscure the lovers’ identities — their very humanity, in fact — to 
all but those already in the know. The text invites its audience, then, to be both the outside 
eyes that see only a pair of bears and the confidante who knows what lies beneath those 
pelts. The audience’s inclusion in the big ‘secret’ of the lovers’ disguises lends an almost 
playful air to the text’s confusion of species categories.  
 However, when their pursuers discover their bearskin disguises, William and 
Meliors do not have Alisaundrine’s clever assistance to provide them with another pair of 
animal hides. Instead, their werewolf companion Alphouns kills and brings to the lovers 
two deer, a hart and a hind. Whereas in the French Guillaume de Palerne Alphouns skins 
the deer for the lovers, William of Palerne depicts the lovers themselves flaying the deer. 
For the Middle English text, the lovers must be actively complicit in obtaining and dressing 
in their next disguise-cum-identity. Nonetheless, the lack of Alisaundrine’s pseudo-
magical assistance does not detract from the efficacy of the lovers’ guises:  
þe skinnes sat saddeli sowed on hem boþe,  
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as hit hade ben on þe beste þat hit growed.  
And better þei semed þan to siȝt semliche hertes,  
þan þei semed before, bere whan þei were,  
so justilion eþer of hem were joyned þe skinnes. (2592-2596)  
 
The lovers so “saddeli sowed” (2592) or tightly sewed the deerskins on that the skins seem 
like those “growed” by “þe beste” itself (2593). The text comments, too, that the lovers are 
“to siȝt” (2594) or by sight the “semliche” (2594) or handsomest of deer because they have 
“so justilon [...] joyned” or so closely and tightly joined the skins together — seeming 
“better” (2594) and more like deer, in fact, than they seemed like bears “before” (2595). 
The final line here echoes the text’s previous assurances about the bearskins — that they 
have “so justisliche [...] joyned” (1724) or closely joined the skins that no one can 
“parceyve” (1722), or perceive, that they are not in fact bears or deer. Even without 
Alisaundrine’s clever skills, the lovers convincingly disguise themselves yet again. They 
no longer need a pseudo-magical mediator to become other animals and playfully dress 
each other in their new skins to smoothly transform from bear to human to deer. In fact, 
this transition — from human to bear to deer — can be read, Schiff argues, as the lovers’ 
“ascending in status in the animalized” as deer were the most prized prey in Western 
European venery.61 This sequence serves to push the lovers further from the human and 
into the nonhuman animal category: the lovers begin as bears, animals known for their 
similarity to humans, and change to deer, the most huntable animal in contemporary 
tradition. And they change with ease: the lovers take on other animal identities as easily as 
they would dress themselves in their clothes. The text invites the reader to imagine how 
easily the human can slip deeper and deeper into the category of animal. 
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And the romance seems again to highlight how easy a transition it is for the lovers: 
“Eiþer gamliche gan greþe oþer gailiche þerinne / [...] / þei were greiþed gayli in þat gere” 
(2591-2597). The lovers “greiþed gayli” or ‘dressed happily’ in the skins as though they 
were simple cloaks, “gamliche” and “gailiche,” or playfully and cheerfully, sewing each 
other up in their new disguises. The skins function as “gere” or apparel that they wear and 
serve the same function of ‘clothes’ that the bearskins had previously.62 What begins as 
cunning clothing becomes something more as the disguised party seemingly transforms 
into the very being whose tyr they wear. Not unlike how Alisaundrine’s wearing “boiȝes 
cloþes” (1705) enabled her to strut “bogeysliche as a boye” (1707), effectively 
transforming her, the lovers transform into something that goes beyond their outer layer of 
disguise. And, just like Alisaundrine, they do so with the bourde-like joy of a joke.  
As the lovers skin, and then put on the deerskins, the text glosses over the highly 
ritualized process of removing the animal’s hide: “William hent hastili þe hert, and Meliors 
þe hinde, / and as smartli as þei couþe, þe skinnes of turned” (2589-2590). Again, we see 
the general grabbing verb “hent” as the lovers ‘grab’ their respective deer (William, the 
hart, Meliors, the hind) and “of turne” or strip off the skins as “smartli” or neatly as they 
can before they cheerily don their new skins in the very next line (2591). While the text 
also utilizes hent when the lovers remove their bearskin disguises (2420), the term then 
makes sense in the context of removing clothing-like garments, whereas now it seems 
strange here when applied to specifically skinning game. Indeed, the text passes over the 
often-gruesome details of the skinning process that were so important to aristocratic 
hunting practice, ignoring this human-constructed ritual in favor of the gamliche and 
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gailiche (again, playfully and cheerfully) dressing in the deer pelts for a perceptibly perfect 
transformation into the very likeness of deer. Unlike for Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, 
the aristocratic and elaborate skinning ritual is not important for William of Palerne. 
Instead, the romance focuses on only the most basic actions needed to get to that shift from 
human to nonhuman animal: the lovers merely ‘grab’ these clothes and ‘dress’ themselves 
in them without the narrative belaboring the process of properly skinning and cleaning the 
deer carcasses. In doing so, the text suggests that the hunt’s hierarchizing process (in which 
humans ritualistically ‘unmake’ and ‘reform’ animal bodies at will) serves no purpose 
here.63 Instead of placing themselves above the slain deer through the exercise of skinning 
and “unmaking” them, William and Meliors become the deer by taking on those animals’ 
skins and, as I will show in the next section, their nonhuman identities. The lovers 
transform from nonhuman animal to human and back again as easily as changing their 
clothes, and the text leavens this perhaps too-easy shift with an almost insistent light-
hearted tone — it repeatedly notes how gamliche and gailiche and gayli the lovers disguise 
themselves, or how playfully and cheerfully and happily this transformative process 
unfolds.  
However, even as the lovers wear the skins as clothing, we must remember the 
narrator’s observations that the lovers have fastened the hides over their own clothing. The 
text self-consciously notes this detail for each lover at several points: first, as they first 
dress in their bearskins (“above hire trie atir” and “above his cloþes, þat comly were and 
riche” [1721, 1737], or above rich and beautiful clothing); second, while they hide from 
quarriers in the woods (“dof blive þis bere-skyn, and be stille in þi cloþes” [2343], or as 
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William urges Meliors, remove [her] bearskin and be in [her] clothes, ostensibly so that 
she may be known by her fine clothing); and third when Queen Felice sees the deerskin-
clad lovers near the end of their disguising sequences (“here comli cloþing þat kevered 
hem þerunder / Þe quen saw” [3034-3035], or the queen saw the handsome clothing that 
covered them under the skins). The textual insistence is significant: the text refuses to take 
for granted that William and Meliors do not go naked beneath their skins, but rather makes 
a point to repeatedly indicate they are clothed beneath the disguises. Why draw attention 
to this detail?  
One popular theory offered by critics is that the romance had, at one point at least, 
some form of oral predecessor which explicitly rendered the lovers as physically 
transformed.64 The detail of clothing-beneath-hides, then, may serve to separate this 
romance from its folkloric forerunners, or at least differentiates it from folkloric tropes of 
transformation that occur when humans wear nonhuman animal pelts. However, the textual 
insistence that the lovers stay clothed under their hides fits our previous discussion of 
nakedness and humanity, i.e.: Alphouns’s clothing as signaling his return to humanity, and 
medieval understanding of the human (mainly, here, that humans wear clothing). If we 
continue to read clothing as a signifier of humanity, then the lovers retain their humanness 
even as they take on the bears’ and deer’s skins and, as we shall see shortly, those animals’ 
postures. The lovers appear and act in the quadrupedal shape of a nonhuman animal, having 
no shame in their ‘naked’ hide, because they are still clothed, still human, beneath those 
pelts. The text renders the skins themselves as clothing, as the lovers dress in them as they 
would any other garment. What so convincingly presents them as nonhuman animal also 
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acts as buffer to that animality — even if the lovers were not dressed beneath their hides, 
the skins would fill the role of covering their nakedness. In that sense, the lovers are doubly 
dressed in both the rich garments beneath their disguises and the hides they wear as gere, 
and these two surfaces, the human beneath the nonhuman animal, function very similarly 
as clothing. Even while the skins of the outermost layer may act as a sign of nakedness, as 
the perception of the lovers as bears or deer imply a lack of such human signifiers, the 
lovers’ apparent absence of shame cannot so readily be interpreted as a correlating absence 
of humanity. Signifiers double and compete here as hide and clothing work with and 
against each other as indicators of human and nonhuman animal definitions. As the 
clothing the lovers wear helps to exclude them from the category of animal, the skins they 
put on reinscribe them into that very category. 
But the lovers do not leave their disguises to just the wearing of skins alone — they 
also perform the animals they pretend to be. Not unlike Alisaundrine before them and 
Alphouns in the narrative, the lovers mingle with their environment and exert themselves 
as nonhuman animals. In their bearskins, they alternately walk as man and as other animals: 
“faire on þer tvo fet þei ferde upon niȝtes, / but whan it drow to þe dai, þei ferde as bestes, 
/ ferd on here foure fet in fourme of tvo beres” (1913-1915), or they travelled on two feet 
at night, but during the day they traveled as beasts, on four feet in the form of two bears. 
In medieval thought, bipedalism was a human state and quadrupedalism a nonhuman one, 
rooted in the concepts of divine creation: God created humans distinct from other animals 
via the human’s upright gait, “thereby making mankind the only animal species that could 
behold the heavens and partake of the divine.”65 Given this perspective, we see how Schiff 
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reads the lovers’ dressing in the bears’ hides and utilizing their postures as “a first phase in 
the shedding of their humanity.”66 The text, then, presents the lovers as diverting from their 
divine privilege of bipedal posture when they descend onto all fours. But the lovers do not 
remain on all fours: instead, they vacillate between traveling upright and walking on hands 
and feet. If William and Meliors shed their humanity when they walk on four feet, then 
they rather quickly regain it when they resume walking on two. They perform their 
disguises and, in doing so, alternately inhabit human and nonhuman animal categories such 
that they can easily transition from one to the other over the course of their journey. 
The text renders these transitions among animal categories with quite a bit of 
humor. When the lovers escape from Rome in their newly sewn bear disguises, they run 
on all fours through the gardens where a Grecian man spies them (1767-1785; 2157-2167). 
The man flees the gardens terrified for his life because he is certain the bears will devour 
him — literally, ‘make meat of him and murder him to death’ (“to have mad of him mete 
and murþered him to deþe” [1774]). His fear, for the audience, seems comically hyperbolic, 
given our knowledge that those supposedly murderous bears are merely two fleeing 
paramours. The scene prefaces and informs a later scene, unique to the Middle English 
version67: as William and Meliors attempt to escape a barge on which they stowed away to 
cross to Palerne, their disguises frighten a ship boy who assumes they are stray deer (2771-
2781). The boy, like the Greek man almost precisely a thousand lines before, fears 
desperately for his life, and the text evokes the Greek man’s terror earlier in its description 
of the boy’s: each grows “neiȝ wod of his witt,” or nearly insane/out of his wits for fear 
(2772) and dread (1771). The text describes the boy’s fear and the Greek’s dread in the 
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identical phrase, neiȝ wod of his witt, and creates a parallel between that first encounter and 
this second one.  
However, instead of fleeing as the Greek does, the boy attacks the deer in an attempt 
to kill “þe bestes” (2773): he strikes “þe hinde” and lands a blow on Meliors’s neck such 
that “sche top over tail tombled over þe hacches” (2776), or tumbled over the deck. The 
word choice here, “top over tail,” implies Meliors falls head-over-coccyx but also head-
over-literal-tail, as the romance plays with the image of Meliors in her deerskin with, 
presumably, its tail.68 Immediately after, William (as the hart) leaps to Meliors’s rescue: 
“þe hert ful hastili hent hire up in armes” (2777). Leaping overboard, William flees with 
Meliors in his arms. The text follows its wordplay with the image of deer-clad William 
scooping her into his deer-arms and making off into the night. Appropriately, the ship boy 
watches in “wonder” (2805) as these bestes escape “wiþ so comely contenaunce clippend 
in armes, / and ferden ferst on foure fet, and seþþe up tweyne” (2808-2809): William races 
off with “comely contenaunce,” or handsome bearing, first on four feet and then on two, 
“clippend” or holding Meliors all the while securely in his embrace. If the text plays with 
the image of Meliors’s human-bottom/nonhuman-tail, then it rolics in this scene: William, 
still clad in his deerskin, flees on four feet with Meliors “clippend in armes” in an 
anatomically challenging arrangement before giving up on the pretense and standing “up 
tweyne” (2809) to run away.  
While William attempts to maintain the posture of a deer while holding Meliors as 
no deer can, he eventually must rise up on two feet in a traditionally human posture to 
escape, all while still appearing to be a deer. And while standing to run on two feet should 
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betray William’s disguise for what it is, the ship-boy remains none the wiser. Instead, 
again, he marvels in “wonder” at this deer’s “coynte cuntenaunce” or clever, perhaps even 
supernatural, bearing or posture that allows it to flee in such a manner (2806, 2824).69 The 
scenario is rather comedic from the audience’s perspective: a man in a deer-suit scoops up 
a woman in a deer-suit and, carrying her in his arms, somehow manages to flee on all fours 
before giving up and running away on two feet, all the while as a boy watches in amazement 
that deer could be so clever or fey. Nor is the boy alone in his marveling: when he tells his 
shipmates of the incident, they too feel “awondred” (2826) of these potentially magical 
deer who can walk upright. They find it easier to believe that these nonhuman animals 
behave in human-like ways than to believe the deer are not deer at all.  
This sequence contrasts with its preface in the scenes with the Greek man: when 
the man tells his friends of his supposed near-death experience in the gardens, they feel 
“fain for he was adradde, / and lauȝeden of þat gode layk” (1783-1784), or amused that he 
was afraid and laughed at his ‘amusing adventure’ or even his ‘game.’70 This passage, too, 
is quite humorous: a pair of people in bear-suits “awai a wallop, as þei wod semed” (1770), 
or gallop away as though they were mad, and terrify a random man who, despite the fact 
that these supposed bears wildly careen on all fours away, believes that they are about to 
turn and devour him. Here, the Greek’s friends act as a stand-in for the romance’s audience 
and encourage us to recognize the absurdity of the anecdote and respond accordingly with 
amusement.  
As if to remind us of our secret knowledge, in both scenes the text references the 
lovers’ humanity beneath their disguises by having them walk upright — William during 
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his escape from the barge with Meliors (2809) and both lovers when they leave behind the 
Roman garden: “Whilum þei went on alle four, as doþ wilde bestes, / and whan þei wery 
were, þei went upriȝttes” (1788-1789), or at times they went on all fours like the wild beasts 
and, when they were tired, they went upright. In both sequences, the text invites us to revel 
in our secret knowledge of what those vicious bears or magical deer are beneath their skins 
and realize the full ridiculousness of these scenarios. 
The text seems to delight in this confusion of human and other animal behaviors. 
Particularly in the case of the ship-boy scene, these perceived nonhuman animals fall into 
human practices even as the narrative itself insists on the truth beneath the skins. The 
textual vacillation between tearing down and setting up human/nonhuman animal 
boundaries creates a sense of ambiguity: while it is humorous to read the back-and-forth 
between one and the other and both at once, the careful interjections of comedic miming 
also serve to undermine clear distinctions between human and other animals and, by 
extension, human exceptionalism. The lovers emphasize the confusion between the 
categories of human and nonhuman animal as they fluidly slip between both categories and 
the humor of their antics eases this confusion of species into a playful game. The lovers’ 
species transformations follow Alisaundrine’s earlier gender transformation and can be 
similarly read as a jest — just a bourde. On the other hand, the lovers’ shifting postures 
may also, as Schiff argues, indicate an increasing tension between human/nonhuman 
animal boundaries as the lovers descend further into animality.71 The juxtaposition of 
quadrupedal travel, so unnatural for humans, with bipedal travel, unusual for nonhuman 
animals, creates tensions in the text — comedic tension and tension between species 
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categories. The disguises may serve, as Houwen argues, as the means by which William 
and Meliors cross the human/nonhuman animal divide, but the text’s frequent references 
to their postures and gaits while in bear or deer disguises act to create comedic relief and 
to reinstate boundaries.72 The text renders the lovers’ disguises as, yes, a humorous jape 
but also nonetheless a convincing transformation. We have already discussed the power of 
the joke to heal and to normalize transgressive or traumatizing truths, and its use here aligns 
with the romance’s depiction of the performative aspects of disguise. The efficacy of the 
performance enhances the success of the disguises while inviting the audience, with our 
secret knowledge of the narrative, to laugh at the duped parties. The text encourages 
amusement in the ease with which these characters transform from human to nonhuman 
animal and implies that the two categories cannot be definitively held apart and separate.  
 
A Roe by Any Other Name: Mixing Textual Referents 
William of Palerne not only emphasizes the ambiguity of nonhuman/human animal 
distinctions through the lovers’ shifting postures and gaits but also through species 
confusion expressed by the romance’s characters and, indeed, by the text itself. Primarily, 
we focus here briefly on the Roman Emperor and at greater length on Queen Felice, both 
of whom learn of William’s and Meliors’s disguises. Interestingly, neither of these figures 
treats the lovers as the humans they know them to be; instead they seem to consider William 
and Meliors as the animals their disguises present them as. For one, when the Roman 
Emperor discovers the lovers’ ruse to escape Rome, he immediately calls for a hunt: “Þan 
was it kenly komanded a kri to make newe, / þat eche burn schuld bisily tvo white beres 
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seke” (2174-2175), or then it was urgently commanded to make anew a hunt or 
proclamation that every man should diligently seek two white bears. While “kri” here likely 
indicates a ‘proclamation’ or ‘public command’ — the Emperor’s ‘decree’ that all shall 
pursue the bears — it is also part of the “set terms” of the hunt, referring to a hunting cry 
or even ‘the bay of a hound’ or ‘pack of hounds.’73 Considering the text’s phrasing during 
this pursuit and its emphasis on hunting images elsewhere,74 the word evokes the setting a 
hunt. Note, too that when the Roman emperor calls for a hunt, he does so for beres, not 
humans. The text here emphasizes his demand for a hunt, with men pursuing the beres “on 
hors and on fote, / huntyng wiþ houndes alle heie wodes” (2177-2178). The poem 
references the “houndes” 5 times in roughly 16 lines, and the hounds’ “hauteyn of cryes” 
(2187, emphasis added), or powerful cries, as they chase down their “prey” (2196) echo 
the previous kri that began the hunt.75 While the emperor’s hunt for beres may have been 
an effort to save face in light of his daughter’s flight from Rome (and from an important 
political match with the Greek emperor’s son), the text focuses on the consequences of that 
decree: in calling for the hunt of “tvo white beres” (2175), whom he knows not to be actual 
bears, the emperor elides the lovers’ humanity with the category of prey animal.  
By contrast, the text depicts Queen Felice as less unwilling and more unable to 
reconcile her knowledge of the lovers’ human species with her perception of their deer 
shapes. William of Palerne provides a veritable deluge of clues to show that Queen Felice 
knows the lovers’ identities. Initially, Felice has a prophetic dream about a werewolf and 
his bear companions, one with a knight’s face and the other with a lady’s face, who become 
deer and then, as a wise man interprets the dream for her, save Palerne from its siege (2868-
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2916). Soon after, Queen Felice sees a pair of deer outside her window and spies beneath 
their hides “here comli cloþing þat kevered hem” (3034), or the handsome clothing that 
covered them. Felice knows by this point what the sign of the deer means. However, she 
continues to contemplate “þe hert and þe hinde” (2979) at her window, and with “styf 
studie” (2781), or intense thought or perplexity, observes how they “lye collinge in fere, / 
makende þe most joye þat man miȝt devise” (2984-2985), or lie together embracing and 
making the most bliss that man might conceive. Felice becomes besotted with their “prive 
pleyes of paramoures wordes” (2987), or furtive (and implied amorous) play of lovers’ 
words, despite being unable to hear “of nouȝt þat þei seide” (2988), or nothing that they 
said. She can see the lovers embracing and speaking with each other and identifies their 
speech as “paramoures wordes” — lovers’ words — even without hearing it. She 
recognizes their behavior in human contexts, but still thinks of them as hert and hinde. 
Queen Felice even seeks advice from her priest and shows him the deer from her window. 
In response, he reminds her of the dream he had interpreted for her just the other day and 
of the stories that they had heard from Rome about the escaped lovers William and Meliors 
(3040-3058). He even tells Felice, “þe ȝond is þat semly and his selve make” (3051), or 
that over there is that noble (one) and his very same beloved, who will “wiȝtli þis werre 
winne” (3052), or quickly win this war. The priest urges her to figure out how to best “þo 
bestes winne” (3057), obtain or even persuade those beasts, and have “þe kniȝt and þat 
komli” (3058), or that knight and that beautiful (one), come to her chambers.76 That is to 
say, the priest freely mixes human and nonhuman animal referents in his discussion with 
Felice, as though he both recognizes these ‘deer’ as humans and yet also as contained in 
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nonhuman form. The text gives Felice more clues as to the identities of this hart and hinde 
than the emperor himself had received when he realized the truth behind the ‘bears.’ And 
yet, Felice determines that she must sneak closer to them and hide nearby to hear them 
speak to be sure of who or what they are. And to do so, she dresses in a deerskin of her 
own so as not to startle these ‘deer’ when she approaches. 
Queen Felice’s decision to wear such a disguise has piqued scholarly interest. 
Some, like Caroline Bynum and Kate Tibbals, think Felice’s deerskin could be a detail that 
is left over from the romance’s presumed folkloric predecessors, stories in which the lovers 
had shapeshifted and that necessitated the queen’s disguise to approach actual deer.77 I am 
concerned less with why Felice wears the deerskin and more with the implications and the 
execution of that choice. The text emphasizes Felice’s strange refusal to acknowledge the 
lovers’ human species and instead juxtaposes the learned man’s story of William’s and 
Meliors’ escape from Rome with Felice’s subsequent order for “wel to be sewed / an huge 
hindes hide, as þe oþer were” (3059-3060, emphasis added), or a huge hind’s hide to be 
sewed well, as the others were. Both the audience and Felice know about the disguises, yet 
the queen dresses herself in a hind’s skin and goes “out to þe bestes” (3062) and hides 
under a bush “til sche wist what þei were, ȝif þei wold speke” (3063) — until she knew 
what they were [and] if they would speak. Despite her dream, the counsel of her advisor, 
and the lovers’ “paramoures wordes” (2987), Felice still goes to surveil these bestes until 
she can determine “what þei were” (3063) by their speech. Her own deerskin disguise 
seems an unnecessary caution, as Felice ought to know “what þei were” already. Instead, 
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Felice cannot treat the lovers as human but sees them first and foremost as deer, to the point 
that she later skins the lovers from their deer hides, as we shall see shortly.  
The poem invites the perception of an elision of human/nonhuman animal 
identities. Beyond the dressing in the hides, the narrator refers to the lovers themselves 
both by name and by animal monikers. The text behaves in the same fashion with the 
werewolf Alphouns, whom it consistently calls best or werwolf even after revealing 
Alphouns’ identity as the lost Spanish heir. Alphouns’s physical wolf form supersedes any 
knowledge of his humanity, and the text maintains a focus on his lupine shape for as long 
as he inhabits it. By contrast, the romance cannot seem to decide what to call the lovers, 
human or nonhuman animal. It refers to the pair as both, initially referring to them in their 
disguises as “William and þe mayde, þat were white beres” (1764). Afterwards, the text 
begins to alternate its referents: it refers to the lovers as beres as many times as human 
monikers: indeed, the narrative calls the lovers by name and names them as beres fifteen 
times each whilst they are in their bearskins.78 When identifying who speaks to whom, the 
text calls the lovers by name an additional fifteen times while in the bearskins, but here, 
the use of their names serves a more narrative function by clarifying which of these two 
beres speaks.79 The poem, it seems, presents the lovers as ambiguously specied on a textual 
level as it freely and almost interchangeably names them by both human and nonhuman 
terms. 
And yet, the text ups the ante when the lovers acquire their deerskins. When their 
disguises are discovered and the skins become useless, the lovers take to carrying rather 
than wearing them: they venture forth “cloþed in here cloþes [...] / wiþ hem boþe bere-
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felles þei bere in here armes, / so loþe hem was þo to lese or leve hem bihinde” (2428–
2431), or clothed in their clothes ... they were so loath to lose or leave the bearskins behind 
they both bore them in their arms. The skins’ have lost their function as a disguise, yet the 
lovers are still “so loþe” (2431) to abandon them that they instead carry them like cloaks 
“in here armes” (2430). Here, again, the text insists on their clothing — they go “cloþed in 
here cloþes” (2428) — and this emphasis seems strange considering the text’s insistence 
that they had never taken their garments off beneath the skins. At this point, the text also 
increases the frequency with which it refers to them by name, doing so almost exclusively 
now that they no longer wear the bearskins: it calls them by name or a human referent 
roughly eleven times and distinguishes who speaks an additional seven times. Outside of 
the characters’ speech, the text does not refer to the lovers in any nonhuman animal terms. 
Without the hides obscuring their clothing, the lovers seem to temporarily return to their 
humanity: they are not shamelessly ‘naked’ atop their garments anymore, but their fine 
clothing safely obscures their inner, human skin. Their interlayers of clothing and hide 
spare them from shame, as they always in some way cover themselves and never actually 
go naked. And yet, those same layers and lack of shame also mark the lovers as always 
already human (with fine clothes beneath animal skins) and nonhuman animal (with naked 
hides atop). The hides of bear/deer skin and human skin sandwich the lovers’ clothing, and 
in doing so simultaneously conceal and integrate the clothing into the layers of flesh both 
naked and obscured. As the text subsumes the hides into the category of clothing, so too 
does it insist that they remain skin: the hides act not only as an effective disguise but also 
a source of anxiety that necessitates repeated assurances that the lovers remain clothed 
 142 
between their skins. The romance obscures and even blends the categories of skin and 
clothing, much like it does the categories of human/nonhuman animals within its narrative. 
However, the text reinstates the nonhuman animal referents when the lovers dress 
in the deerskins, favoring hart and hinde over William and Meliors outside of clarifying 
speakers: while the narrator names the lovers only thirteen times when indicating who 
speaks in conversation, the text refers to the lovers by name or human terms only fourteen 
times in this section, and it refers to them as deer or even bestes over thirty times while 
they wear the deerskins, not counting references to them as deer in Queen Felice’s dream 
sequence or her subsequent conversations with her priest, which would constitute an 
additional twelve such referents.80 Of the section’s fourteen human referents, fully half 
refer to the lovers prior to or outside their disguises, such as in a narrative retelling or in 
reference to family lineage. In this deerskin section, the text’s use of traditionally 
nonhuman animal referents for the lovers increases over 54% from the previous bearskin 
episode and, if we discount the human referents regarding William’s lineage, its use of 
human referents drops roughly 46%. The poem’s very text seems to render William and 
Meliors more generally animal while in their deerskins, with only limited reference to their 
human species.  
Nonetheless, those limited references tell us something about the romance’s 
conception of the human. Nearly three-quarters of the text’s human referents in this section 
specifically tie the lovers to human practices. Of that, 30% refer to William’s lineage, yet 
when the poem reminds its audience of William’s familial ties to Palerne, it does so by 
pausing its narration of the group’s entry into the region (2623-2636). Tellingly, the text 
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introduces this interlude with mixed species signifiers, noting that “al was William landes, 
[...] / he þat þere was an hert” (2623-2624) — or all were William’s lands, he who was a 
deer there — before moving through William’s lineage to his mother’s current predicament 
with the Spanish siege. The text also briefly relates the reaches of William’s ancestral land 
as it stood under the deceased King Ebrouns, “Williams fader” (2629), but it reiterates, too, 
that William travels through Palerne “as an hert” (2629) in the same line. On the one hand, 
the text attempts to disconnect William from his disguise in order to discuss his royal 
lineage and clarify his human claims to the land he has entered. On the other hand, the text 
cannot disconnect him from it entirely as it insists twice that he returns to Palerne as “an 
hert.” The text thus locates William in his royal line and immediately identifies him as a 
deer in those very lands he may rule by (human) birthright, imbricating William’s 
aristocratic bloodline and his nonhuman animal disguise-cum-identity and presenting him 
as both the deer-and-son of King Ebrouns and the deer-and-heir to Palerne itself.  
The majority of the text’s human referents in this section — another 48% — 
distinguish the lovers’ conversations. The text could feasibly differentiate between the 
lovers more clearly with hart and hinde than it could with beres in the previous episode, 
and yet it still almost always relies upon their human monikers to do so. When the lovers 
are engaging in the recognizably human act of speaking and conversing, the text insists on 
identifying the lovers by name. However, the poem does even this inconsistently: for 
example, during William’s and Meliors’ escape from the ship (2774-2809), the text begins 
to confuse its own referents as it relates how “þe hert” carried “þe hinde” to safety before 
checking her for injuries — utilizing nonhuman animal monikers while William performs 
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such human feats. The romance even calls them deer while they speak and breaks its own 
pattern of human referents during human practices: “Þan saide þe hert to þe hinde hendly 
and faire” (2785), or then the hart lovingly and courteously said to the hind. William 
laments Meliors’s injury, and “seide Meliors þanne” for him not to grieve so (2792). The 
text invites ambiguity, abandoning the pattern it had maintained throughout the disguising 
sequences as a hert speaks to a hinde, and Meliors responds. If medieval thought defines 
humans as being rational — and further qualified by their bodies and their “human 
speech”81 — then this scene undermines those supposedly defining traits. The romance 
plays with the contemporary definition of the human as it mixes its referents and, 
consequently, implicates the nonhuman animal as potentially participatory in distinctly 
human practices.  
William of Palerne’s vacillating referents serve to textually illustrate the efficacy 
of the lovers’ disguises but bears the consequence of demonstrating the ease with which 
species definitions overlap in the general category of animal. Romance asks its audiences 
to suspend disbelief and play along with the text, and such an audience would not likely 
protest the romance’s calling the lovers deer or bears so long as the narrative itself remained 
clear. The audience accepts the text’s choice to call the lovers hart/hinde or beres and, on 
some level, accepts the lovers as such. The switching of referents exhibits on a textual level 
the ambiguity of species categories exhibited within the narrative.  
Yet, when the text can close this ambiguity when William’s and Meliors remove 
their hides after following Queen Felice to the castle, the lovers do not (or cannot?) simply 
take off their deerskins. While the text carefully articulates how the lovers fasten the 
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deerskins on like clothing, much as they did the bearskins earlier, William and Meliors 
cannot so easily remove this second set of hides. Instead, when Queen Felice takes the 
lovers into her chambers, she must skin the hides from their bodies: “þe quen kauȝt a knif, 
and komli hireselve / William and his worþi fere swiftli unlaced / out of þe hidous hidus” 
(3199-3201). Using a sharp “knif,” Felice quickly cuts away or “unlace[s]” the lovers from 
their now “hidous hidus,” or hideous hides. The use of the term unlaced here evokes the 
powerful unmaking moment from the ritual of the hunt that is so important in Sir Gawain 
and the Green Knight, as I discussed in the second chapter of this dissertation.82 Despite 
their ability to remove and carry the bear-hides as so much clothing, the lovers cannot 
remove this latest disguise. Instead, even though the text glosses over the initial skinning 
of the deer to retrieve the hides, it here touches upon hunting ritual — mainly its set code 
of terminology. William and Meliors thus join Sir Gawain in the category of skinned 
human animal. The lovers, as with others’ perceptions of them throughout the romance, 
have become inextricable from the animal skins they wear, inscribed into deer as though 
the hides were their own skin, and they cannot return to humanity of their own power: they 
must be flayed like hunted deer, peeling back their second skins to restore their original 
identities.  
Nonetheless, this skinning sequence seems insufficient to fully restore the lovers to 
humanity. Felice, like Braunde for Alphouns after her, must also bathe and clothe the pair. 
Queen Felice provides the lovers with “tvo baþes” (3297) in which they “dede hem baþe 
boþe tvo wel faire” (3206), or two baths in which they bathed both of the two quite 
courteously or properly. Afterwards, she has the lovers “greiþed [...] gaili” (3207), or 
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dressed happily.83 The text abbreviates the lovers’ transition from skinned to bathed human 
animals in comparison to Alphouns’s bathing and dressing: Felice skins, bathes, and 
dresses the lovers in 8 lines of verse, while the werewolf’s own restoration later in the 
narrative takes nearly 55 lines. The other parallels apply here, too: they wear their bear and 
deer hides without shame, but after washing away the nonhuman residue, they must 
participate in human social practices and wear their clothing and not flesh as their 
outermost layer to avoid shame at their nakedness.  
But here we also see something a little different. The text notes that the lovers are 
“cloþed worþli” (3202) and “greiþed [...] gaili” (3207), clothed honorably and dressed 
happily, respectively, but it does not insist on the merþe of the process as it had with the 
bearskins (1726) and the gamliche or gailiche dressing in the deerskins (2591). The 
playfulness of disguising oneself as another species has vanished, but the text nevertheless 
draws a parallel between William’s and Meliors’s fine garments and their previous 
disguises. Clothed appropriately for their stations, the lovers make the fairest couple that 
“alle men upon mold miȝt sen” (3203). The parallel phrasing, that all men of the world can 
see or perceive, aligns William’s and Meliors’s supposed restoration with their initial 
disguising. Just as they could be seen as naught but bears or deer, now bathed and clothed 
once more in human garments, they can be perceived as nothing but a “faire coupel” 
(3203). The text implies that their human clothes function in the same identity-altering 
capacity as the bear and deer hides, the romance rooting the definition of humanity in 
costume. While contemporary thought emphasizes rationality as the defining human trait, 
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William of Palerne suggests that superficial trappings and rituals mark its figures as human 
or nonhuman animal.  
Nor does the text limit the implication to the lovers alone. William of Palerne just 
as carefully notes that Felice also sews herself “in an huge hindes hide, as þe oþer were” 
(3061), or in a large hind’s skin as the others (the lovers) were, and that, further, she dresses 
“wel to riȝtes / hendli in þat hindeskyn, as swich bestes were” (3066-3067), or in every 
respect as handsomely in that hind-skin as such beasts were. Queen Felice’s disguise 
echoes the lovers’ in its efficacy in replicating the semblance of a real deer, and her 
facsimile of animality fools even the lovers. Meliors comments how strange that a “huge 
hinde” (3112) sleeps so near to them and unafraid of them (3113-3114), and William 
responds, ironically, that it has no reason to be afraid, because it knows “we ben riȝt swiche 
as itselve, / for we be so sotiliche besewed in þise hides” (3116-3117), or we are precisely 
the same as itself, for we are so skillfully sewn in these hides. But, William adds, if it knew 
“whiche bestes we were” (3118), or what beasts we were, the deer would flee them in fear. 
William and the narrator both refer to the disguised Queen Felice as an actual deer, and yet 
the text makes multiple self-conscious references to the lovers’ own disguises: Meliors, 
dressed as a deer, reacts with awe at this “huge hinde” that rests so peacefully near them 
(3112); William observes that their disguises are so cleverly executed as to fool even a deer 
(3117), whom the audience knows is herself sewn into a deerskin just like the lovers (3061); 
William speaks both more accurately than he knows (he says this deer knows he and 
Meliors are the same as itself [3116]) and also more erroneously than he realizes (he states 
that the deer would flee if it knew which beasts he and Meliors were [3118]). The text thus 
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playfully invites its audience in on the joke: the audience knows that both the lovers and 
Felice have disguised themselves, and that Felice herself knows as well. When Felice 
finally speaks and admits she knows them (“‘I wot wel what ȝe ar and whennes ȝe come’” 
[3122], or I know well what you are and whence you come), Meliors “wex neȝh mad for 
fere” (3125), or grew near mad for fear, in an echo of the Greek man and ship boy earlier 
in the romance. She even tosses William’s own words back at him when he demands she 
answer him, her response an ironic ‘“I am swiche a best as ȝe ben’” (3133), or I am such 
or the same beast as you are. As Queen Felice returns to the castle with the lovers in tow, 
the text subsumes her with them into the nonhuman such that it refers to them all as “þre 
bestes [...] / so hidous in þo hides, as þei hertes were” (3176-3177), or three beasts, so 
hideous in those hides as if they were deer.84 Felice even fools her maid, who knows about 
and even helps with the queen’s disguise (3071) but who nonetheless panics when she sees 
their approach: the maid grows mad with fear in a very familiar formulation — “sche wex 
wod of hire wit” (3178, emphasis added). In line with the rest of this self-referential scene, 
Queen Felice chastises the maid and reminds her that she knows well the queen “was tiffed 
in atir” (3183) all along — an echo of Meliors herself, who “in þat tyr was tiffed” (1725), 
or in that attire was dressed. The text redeploys familiar phrasing and ironic turnabouts to 
depict Queen Felice’s short stint as a hinde as an almost parodic replication of the 
romance’s narrative thus far. That Guillaume de Palerne curtails several of these 
expansions, such as the scene with Felice’s maid, indicates that the Middle English 
translator consciously incorporated this humorous addition.85 Playfully, the text implicates 
Felice in its questioning of human definitions and broadens its demonstration of said 
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definitions’ ambiguity to include other characters. The romance exposes its minor figures 
as well as its major players to the vulnerability of species categories: Felice does not have 
Alisaundrine or Alphouns to guide her disguise as the lovers do, and yet her deerskin 
successfully fools them in their own game.  
The lovers reveal the ambiguity between the false-binary categories of human vs 
animal: they put on their disguises and become the animals in whose skins they hide 
beneath even as they retain distinctly human traits and behaviors. The romance thus 
playfully tacks back and forth between human and nonhuman animal identities and 
presents the lovers as bear and deer as easily as it does man and woman. Even clothed and 
bipedal, the lovers cannot escape the overlap in animal definitions — of the bear, the deer, 
themselves. Nor does their knowledge of this ambiguity make them exceptional, as Felice 
comedically reproduces their deerskin adventure in brief. We may conclude that the text 
invites its audience to view the definition of human as requiring performance: the process 
of costuming and acting serves to produce identity, both human and nonhuman animal, 
more clearly than hierarchized categories. The text breaks down the differences between 
the two to better highlight the similarities and emphasize the human’s own place on the 
animal spectrum.  
 
William the Werewolf: The Shield as Animal Signifier 
William, despite his return to humanity, does not escape further animalization. His 
selection of a shield, and the heraldic and totemic identification it announces, also creates 
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a confusion of human/nonhuman status: William essentially becomes a wild beast in 
human form, in a neat reversal of Alphouns’s rational animal in nonhuman form.  
When he agrees to fight off Queen Felice’s Spanish besiegers, William declines all 
offered arms but for one:  
[................] a god schel of gold graiþed clene, 
and wel and faire wiþinne a werwolf depeynted, 
þat be hidous and huge, to have alle his riȝtes, 
of þe covenablest colour to knowe in þe feld. (3216–3219) 
 
William requests a bright, golden shield with a “hidous and huge” (3218) werewolf painted 
on it. But he does not stop there: William goes on to explain that he wants the design to be 
painted “wel and faire” (3217) in the most suitable color to identify it “in þe feld” (3219) 
— in the battlefield but also against the shield’s background86 — and the werewolf to “have 
alle his riȝtes” (3218), or have all his rights — ‘accuracy,’ ‘rightful possessions.’87 The text 
emphasizes the design atop the shield as more important than the shield itself, and it focuses 
on William’s preoccupation with the accuracy and clarity of the werewolf painting. 
William himself claims that, beyond this shield, he “coveyte[s] nouȝt elles” (3215) and that 
“oþer armes al my lif atteli never have” (3220): William denounces any additional armor, 
saying he desires no other arms and, further, does not intend to possess any other arms but 
the shield he has here requested. The text’s specific description of this shield seems 
significant, especially considering the poem’s lack of an extensive arming scene and 
William’s refusal here to accept any other arms. The werewolf shield is also unique to the 
Middle English romance, as the French Guillaume de Palerne’s shield bears only a simple 
wolf.88 While the Middle English text frequently deviates from its French source, such a 
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minor detail seems odd to alter. The specific implications of a werewolf, then, are important 
to William of Palerne’s rendering of its titular knight’s heraldic symbol. The shield’s 
description constitutes the longest passage focused on armor that the romance provides, 
and the poem’s attention remains exclusively on the shield itself. Even Queen Felice’s 
initial question — “‘what signe is þe levest / to have schape in þi scheld to schene armes?’” 
(3213–3214) — asks what symbol William wants on his shield and not about the arms 
themselves. The poem does not depict armor itself, more than the process of dressing in or 
removing it, as relevant in the narrative or even to its knights. The only other piece of 
knightly equipment the poem lingers on is not an item of arms at all, but William’s horse: 
“þe sturnest stede in hire stabul teiȝed /þat ever man upon molde miȝt of heren, / and 
doutiest to alle dedes þat any horse do schuld” (3226-3228). Even this first description of 
the horse — the most formidable in her stable ever known to man and the best at all equine 
feats — encompasses more lines than any of the disarming or arming scenes in the 
romance, which, again, never take more than a single line apiece. The full sequence of the 
horse’s introduction takes roughly 35 lines as the steed, formerly King Ebrouns’s (Queen 
Felice’s deceased husband and William’s father), has something of a backstory all his own 
(3225-3260).89 The text places more emphasis on William’s werewolf-painted shield than 
any of the other arms he must take up to defend Palerne, and its attention to William’s 
horse indicates that these nonhuman animal components of his chivalric array are more 
significant than the array itself. As a consequence, the text seems to highlight William’s 
identification with the werewolf, and its violent reputation, as the significant aspect of his 
shield.  
 152 
While one can interpret William’s request as intending to align himself with one 
specific and nontraditional werewolf — namely, Alphouns — the text does not reinforce 
that implication. And though it is possible that the werewolf on William’s shield represents 
his helpful friend Alphouns, William does not ask for a witty or hendy werewolf, but one 
“hidous and huge” and rather unlike the companion who guided the lovers for so long. It 
would seem that William wishes to evoke the general werewolf’s ferocious and violent 
traits with this heraldic symbol. The decision makes sense: the frightening savagery of the 
werewolf would better suit the battlefield than Alphouns’s cleverness.  
William’s decision also fits the popular custom in fourteenth-century England for 
knights “to adopt freely chosen personal badges.”90 Heraldry was of great importance in 
the fourteenth century, boasting nonhuman animal symbols replete with meaning, and for 
a particular creature to appear on one’s shield or crest functioned as “sign and warrant to 
the world” that that knight and/or his family were known for possessing or displaying the 
same corresponding traits of said creature, whether in fame or infamy.91 Therefore, 
William’s choosing of the werewolf, “hidous and huge” (3218), directly aligns his own 
identity with that of the creature — in this case the aggressive and wild werewolf. And 
indeed, William’s shield frequently identifies him in battle. His enemies know and 
recognize him by the werewolf he bears, and the Spanish forces frequently point him out 
accordingly. They know him as the knight who “‘bereth in his blasoun of a brit hewe / a 
wel huge werwolf wonderli depeinted’” (3572–3573); “‘he it is þat þe werwolf weldes in 
his scheld’” (3752); “‘he þat þe wolf weldes in his scheld’” (3832): the Spanish see William 
as the knight bearing a huge werewolf painted on his bright standard or the one who wields 
 153 
the werewolf on his shield. This method of recognition is typical for battling knights — 
thus the use of standards and coded arms to begin with — and so it is only expected that, 
through the symbol on his shield, William identifies himself with the ravenous, beastly 
werewolf of tradition. William, in fact, weldes the werewolf on his shield — he ‘wields,’ 
‘takes power in,’ and/or ‘commands’ the werewolf as a weapon all its own.92 William’s 
use of the werewolf here makes the werewolf appear less a heraldic symbol and more a 
totemic object: as Annabel Wharton (re)defines it, a totem is an object of this world 
(nonhuman animal or crafted) that both empowers its user with the earthly powers it 
represents and identifies its user as part of a group or community.93 William’s shield 
certainly functions as a totem: it empowers William with the ferocity of the werewolf 
painted upon it, and it identifies William to others. As often happened with knights and 
heraldry in general, William elects a nonhuman entity based on what he finds desirous or 
what corresponds to his own traits, to augment his identity.94 Heraldic totems are 
metaphors, visual declarations of equivalence in one’s very identity. And William’s 
wielding or taking power in his suggests that he sees and/or seeks the werewolf in himself, 
to deploy its ferocity and violence in battle. 
And William succeeds in his endeavor almost too well. As the King of Spain 
laments his losses, he calls William a murderer of men and a devil wreaking destruction: 
“‘[he] haþ murþered mi men and swiche harm wrouȝt!’” he exclaims, “‘[he] is sum devel 
degised þat doþ al þis harm!’” (3883, 3888). The Spanish king not only declares that 
William has wrought great harm to and even murdered his forces but he also claims that 
he must be a disguised devil to inflict such harm. While this sort of exclamation occurs 
 154 
somewhat regularly in romance contexts, the King of Spain’s word choice still bears 
interesting implications here. Slain forces are only to be expected in a melee, and yet the 
king claims that the devel degised has murþered his men. This evocation of disguise — 
already a recurring motif in William of Palerne — invites the audience to read William as 
a man disguised as a werewolf, or even, by extension of the romance’s recurrent 
interweaving of transformation and costume, as a human transformed into the murderous 
devil that werewolves were known to be. The King of Spain goes on to say that he wishes 
to hunt William down as fiercely as he would a werewolf and has, already, unleashed a 
multitude of hounds upon him: “‘I wold him hunte as hard as ever hounde in erthe / honted 
eny werwolf! But wel he is ware / þat I so many hondes have on him uncoupled’” (3835–
3837). The King of Spain utilizes simile in the first portion of this passage — he would 
hunt William as vigorously as a werewolf — setting this analogy in the realm of figurative 
language. Yet the text immediately inscribes this simile into reality with the very next line: 
the Spanish King notes that he has already released a great many hounds upon William. 
While the king’s reference to his knights as hounds stands as figurative in nature, the 
continuation of the image from simile to analogy serves to create a more concrete 
correlation. This transition, too, from simile to literal usage recalls Salisbury’s observations 
on the transition from similes to metaphors as blurring and narrowing the divide between 
women and nonhuman animals from the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries.95  
Here, the shift in William’s depiction from simile to metaphor, from wielding the 
werewolf to being like the werewolf to being the werewolf, correspondingly shifts the 
knight himself from being like a nonhuman animal to being that animal. In this sense, the 
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romance depicts William as a real werewolf and, once again, as an animal to be hunted. 
The King of Spain elides William’s humanity into animality and recasts him as prey to be 
chased by his (equally animal) honde knights. The shield William carries formulates his 
identity in battle as some type of animal as thoroughly as Alphouns’s werewolf flesh did 
his own, and it transforms William from rational human to ravenous beast. His werewolf-
painted shield renders William not as worthy, knightly opponent but a threatening, 
ravening predator. William’s human shape alone cannot quantify him as human: William 
becomes a creature to be hunted down, a nonhuman animal in human form that must be 
chased to ground and slaughtered. Despite his covering of armor and his human shape, the 
werewolf seeps into William’s human identity beyond even his heraldic signifier. 
Why does William choose the werewolf, with its heinous reputation, to represent 
himself? Knights battling fiercely as other animals recur as a trope in the literary epic and, 
often, in medieval romance. William of Palerne and its French predecessor Guillaume de 
Palerne both utilize this trope, though Leslie Sconduto argues that the latter employs them 
as a tool for Guillaume’s “figurative metamorphosis [...] from knight to beast.”96 Guillaume 
de Palerne is also much more violent and bloody than its later Middle English sibling, as 
Renée Ward observes.97 This twelfth-century version describes Guillaume as rather 
“demonic,” and Ward notes the descriptions of Guillaume possessing dragon-red eyes and 
the aggression of a boar — a more negatively perceived animal — as the “poet reinforces 
[...] dehumanizations” of the titular knight.98 In contrast, Ward continues, the poet of 
William of Palerne shifts those negative animal descriptors to William’s enemies, referring 
to him instead as “freke” (human, person), and his nonhuman animal associations are with 
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noble creatures — the noble ferocity of the lion, for example. Ward describes the Middle 
English William as separated from humanity, but not removed from it as Guillaume seems 
in the French version.99 William of Palerne displaces the violence and bloody deaths of its 
battles onto nonhuman objects — weapons, armor, horses — whereas Guillaume de 
Palerne does not shy from vivid descriptions of corpses and evisceration. Ward argues that 
this hyper-violent, animalistic rendering of Guillaume blurs the “species boundaries” of 
the French poem, with Alphouns even having to “tame” the infant Guillaume at the poem’s 
start.100 Ward concludes, then, that the Middle English romance perceives Alphouns as less 
of a threat than in Guillaume, as William’s taking of the werewolf symbol for his shield 
creates a symbiotic identity between them, and so renders William himself as less violent 
and demonic.101 However, William is still very violent in the Middle English romance. 
After all, while werewolves are known to be savage, their reputation is more that of 
uncontrollable berserker than chivalric knight, and William knowingly aligned himself 
with this beast. Perhaps he is not as explicitly bloodthirsty as Guillaume, but William 
nonetheless earns himself the monikers of “devel” and “werwolf”, a “murþer[er]” of men. 
The poem may not show us the gore-slicked corpses of William’s foes, but it leaves little 
doubt of William’s body count all the same. Even though these negative signifiers come 
from his enemies, they are still telling: the Spanish forces would not be so distressed if 
William were not aggressively and steadily killing them — he does not merely slay them, 
but he murders them (3883). The conflicts seem less a battle than a wholesale slaughter. 
Even if Guillaume de Palerne dehumanizes and bloodies Guillaume more, he is no less 
wildly violent than his Middle English counterpart in William of Palerne, where William 
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freely participates in the aggressive savagery of his heraldic animal. 
If we read Alphouns as tied to William’s violence, then the “sanitization” of the 
tale serves less as a general reduction of the violence and more a further displacement of 
it. In this reading, we would say that the romance balances the potential threats of Alphouns 
and William between them: William is still a “frek” (3614), still human, but he is also 
nonetheless a dangerous animal to be hunted down. At the same time, Alphouns the 
werewolf seems more human, less monstrous, than William becomes in these battles. 
During the breaks in the siege battles, Alphouns repeatedly leaps into court to bow, salute, 
kiss feet, and generally behave as a visiting nobleman (which, as a prince, he rather is) 
before he quickly departs again. Alphouns’s behavior at Felice’s court is arguably the more 
human of the two — Alphouns does not hide his humanity with false-ferocity but displays 
his “mannes munde” (4123) beneath the furry performances. And yet in this same episode, 
William acts his most animalistic: he fights as viciously as any werewolf such that his 
desperate opponents cannot see him as anything but a murdering beast. The poem mixes 
the human and nonhuman animal demarcations between the two men, from Alphouns in 
his wolf shape and human mind to William’s werewolf ferocity in human form. The 
romance does not allow us to forget that both men are human by the defining traits thereof 
but nonetheless insists on their animality. Just as Alphouns presents a human animal, so 
too does William breach the divide between species to break down the human 




The various transformative figures in William of Palerne reveal an ambiguity in 
species definitions. The romance capitalizes on its generic conventions — fantasy and 
magic, humor and playful encounters — to re-incorporate the human into the animal. It 
continuously throws into question the definition and perception of the human and leaves it 
vulnerable to transformation with and through external perception. This text ultimately 
exposes an anxiety of species definition — its permeability, malleability, and vulnerability 
— within its romantic space of play. The figures in this text perform their animal/Other 
identities in humorous sequences that underscore the performativity of their humanity. The 
text’s interplay of human and nonhuman animals fashions leaks between those categories, 
such that its characters are never purely one or the Other. Alisaundrine’s gender-bending 
disguise; Alphouns’s physical transformation into a wolf and subsequent restoration to 
human form; the lovers’ sequence of hides sewn on and cut away; William’s shield-driven 
reputation: the romance presents indistinct and overlapping categories of species as it 
identifies its figures alternatively as human and nonhuman animal.  
The shape of a creature does not necessarily define its species, William of Palerne 
insists, and no matter what skin one wears, one is wrapped in an animal’s hide. Even in 
bipedal form, exhibiting the supposedly exclusively-human rational mind, or engaging in 
human practices, the text does not consistently recognize the figure’s humanity. Woman, 
wolf, bear, deer, man — these identities cannot be so easily allocated to the false 
oppositional categories of “human” and “animal” and nor can those categories be 
adequately defined or qualified without further questioning their very qualifications. 
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Instead, the poem implies, the Great Chain’s hierarchy of animal difference bears also a 
double-edge in its implication of multitudinous similarities. Neither the romance nor the 
characters reinforce/s a defining divide between human and nonhuman animal, instead 
embracing the play of difference and, by extension, similarity between species.  
William of Palerne, however, deconstructs the signifiers of ‘man’ and exposes their 
inability to properly define or signify the human and, in doing so, also breaks down the 
binary opposition of human/nonhuman animal. The human and other animals are not 
opposites but, as the poem intimates, sit juxtaposed upon the spectrum of animality. Like 
Bevis of Hampton and Sir Gawain and the Green Knight examined in the previous chapters, 
William of Palerne illustrates a definition of humanity that is not so much tiered above 
nonhuman animals as it is potentially lateral to them. The poem questions and undermines 
the contemporary definition of human as exceptional and, in its place, invites the human to 
embrace its own place alongside the other animals.  
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“wilde bestes” (2846) before the siege “it al destruyt” (2847), or destroyed it all. That the lovers do not sneak 
into the besieged city to find their hideaway but simply find the park already “destruyt” by the siege, implies 
that they lie beyond the walls and within range of the Spanish forces. Felice can watch them only because 
their hiding place lies “under þe paleys” (2845) and “under a coynte crag, fast bi þe quenes chaumber” (2850) 
— beneath the palace and under a beautiful rock projection, near the queen’s chamber. To reach them, Felice 
departs and returns “prively” or stealthily through a “prive posterne” (3068, 3174), a secret back or side 
entrance. The text suggests that the lovers hide beyond the protective city walls, and so Felice’s expedition 
to fetch them becomes a rather risky undertaking and her deerskin disguise functions more as stealth than 
folkloric leftover. 
78 I coded the data into several categories split among three sections: the lovers in their bearskins (172-2421), 
excepting Alisaundrine’s dressing them in such (1704-1761) and an interlude wherein the Roman emperor 
interrogates Alisaundrine and confers with the Greek emperor (1930-2143); the interim between the lovers’ 
removing the bearskins and acquiring the deerskins (2422-2589); and the lovers in their deerskin disguises 
(2590-3201). I split the categories themselves into primary referent used (name; human terms such as 
lemman, mayde, kniȝt,etc.; beres; herte and/or hinde; and nonhuman animal terms, mainly bestes) and their 
contexts of use (in characters’ speech or dreams; identifying who speaks to whom; in reference to the skins 
or the disguises, and by the text itself). Please consider my numbers here as close estimates, as error in 
counting may have occurred. 
79 For more arguments concerning the Middle English translator’s flexibility with the lovers’ referents, see 
Tibbals, “Elements of Magic,” 358, and Houwen, “‘Breme Beres’ and ‘Hende Hertes,’” 227.  
80 Nearly half of the poem’s references to the lovers as bestes include an adjectival qualification such as 
swete, leve, semli, worþ, or buxom — sweet, beloved, handsome, worthy, or gracious. The text’s referring to 
the lovers as buxom bestes (2720, 2854) draws a direct parallel to Alphouns, whom Meliors herself calls “our 
buxom best” at least once (3085). 
81 Salisbury, The Beast Within, 146. 
82 Marvin, “Blood, Law, and Venery,” 141; MED, s.v. “unlāsen (v.).” See this dissertation’s previous chapter. 
83 MED, s.v. “gailī (adv.).” 
84 To be fair to the maid, however, William’s and Meliors’ deerskins have greatly weathered and are likely 
quite “hidous”: “Þe hote sunne hade so hard þe hides stived” (3033), or the hot sun had so hard stiffened the 
hides that, as mentioned earlier, the queen could see the clothing beneath (3033-3035). While some editors 
have glossed stiven as ‘sun-cracked’, the term typically means ‘to stiffen’ or to ‘become rigid,’ ‘harden’; 
MED, s.v. “stīven (v.(1)).” Approaching “þroli” (3176) or frighteningly in their unnaturally rigid and 
potentially cracking skins, the lovers no doubt look rather monstrous despite how the text and its characters 
treat them as convincingly portraying deer.  
85 Houwen, “‘Breme Beres’ and ‘Hende Hertes,’” 237. 
86 MED, s.v. “fẹ̄ld (n.).” 
87 Ibid., “right (n.).” 
88 Renee Ward, “Politics of Translation Sanitizing Violence in William of Palerne,” Studies in Philology 112, 
no. 3 (2015): 477-479, 480-481.  
89 In fact, the current state of King Ebrouns’s horse is almost precisely the same as Bevis of Hampton’s 
Arondel, discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation: both steeds refuse to allow anyone but their masters 
(or their issue) to ride them, must be chained up and fed by intricate means to keep distance between them 
and the grooms, burst free from their chains upon perceiving their master to cavort and neigh in celebration, 
and imbue it the titular hero an overwhelming desire to possess them. See also The Romance of Sir Beues of 
Hamtoun, edited by Eugen Kölbing (London: Kegan Paul, Trench Trübner & Co., 1885-94), 1525-1534, 
2027-2030, 2157-2178. The recurring pattern of this sequence across romances of the fourteenth century 
(specifically romances with twelfth-century French or Anglo-Norman extants) seems to indicate that even as 
these texts approach the matter of the rational nonhuman animal in different manners, they share this moment 
of agreement. The bonds between a horse and his knight betray a level of traditionally human thought and 
affect in a distinctly nonhuman physical animal. 
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Journal of English and Germanic Philology 27, no. 1 (1928): 8.  
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93 Annabel Wharton, “Icon, Idol, Totem, and Fetish,” in Icon and Word: The Power of Images in Byzantium, 
ed. by Antony Eastmond and Liz James (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2003), 7. 
94 Moreover, this totemic use of heraldry can be read as undermining human exceptionalism through 
transhumanism, which advocates the modification of human through technical and biological means to 
transcend the human entirely. See McNamee and Edwards, “Transhumanism,” 513-514. 
95 Salisbury, The Beast Within, 137. 
96 Guillaume de Palerne, 64n31. 
97 Renée Ward, “Politics of Translation,” 469-489. From this point, mentions of Guillaume refer to the main 
character of the French Guillaume de Palerne, while “William” continues to refer to that of the Middle 
English William of Palerne. 
98 Ibid., 477, 478. 
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Conclusion: The Medieval Animal as Theoretical Prototype 
 
 
So in peace our task we ply,  
Pangur Bán, my cat, and I;  
In our arts we find our bliss,  
I have mine and he has his. 




It is an important and popular fact that things are not 
always what they seem. For instance, on the planet 
Earth, man had always assumed that he was more 
intelligent than dolphins because he had achieved so 
much — the wheel, New York, wars and so on — 
while all the dolphins had ever done was muck about 
in the water having a good time. But conversely, the 
dolphins had always believed that they were far more 
intelligent than man — for precisely the same 
reasons. 







Medieval romance often questioned and played with contemporary conceptions of 
the human and nonhuman animal, and its generic conventions of magic and humor enabled 
the literature to push at these definitions in a way that few other genres safely could.3 The 
fourteenth-century in particular was a site of geocultural exploration, as Middle English 
romances expanded, revised, and refocused their translations of their twelfth-century 
Anglo-Norman and French predecessors.  
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Nonhuman animals are not only rational in Bevis of Hampton, but also have 
intrinsic value and, the poem suggests, possibly even a soul. The horse Arondel 
reciprocates an affective bond with Bevis and the two participate in a chivalric partnership 
that the Middle English seems emphatically to depict. While Arondel remains in a constant 
state of becoming-hero, the horse’s perpetual potential in that becoming activates the 
invitation to pray for an equine soul that, while never fully enabled, the text nonetheless 
never withdraws.  
While lacking a specific French or Anglo-Norman extant source, Sir Gawain and 
the Green Knight plays upon and adapts the long-standing French romance tradition. In 
this poem, the human can be hunted as any other animal, and the framework of the hunt 
structures the romance and the figures therein: they engage with and participate in this 
overarching frame of the hunt, which acts not as metaphor but as primary interpretive lens 
for Gawain’s courtly trials in the bedroom and at the Green Chapel and, by extension, 
Morgan Le Faye’s test of the Round Table. Within this frame, Gawain’s scarred neck and 
the green girdle, which he takes as symbols of chivalric failure, function instead as symbols 
of his skinned hide that he has redefined in order to try to articulate his traumatic encounter 
at the Green Chapel.  
Human skinning becomes a recurring image in William of Palerne, as the romance 
renders human and nonhuman categories nearly indistinct. Instead, the characters freely 
perform the nonhuman and vacillate between human and nonhuman identities: 
performance and perception obscure species until, identities transformed, the disguised 
figures cannot extricate themselves from their nonhuman states without engaging in human 
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practices — and yet even here, the human remains animal. The ease with which one animal 
becomes another, and the difficulty of removing the human from the animal category, 
exposes the always already differing and deferred distinctions between the human and 
nonhuman animal.  
These romances suggest that, while the twelfth century boasts a turning point in 
contemporary cultural thinking on nonhuman animals — saints’ lives in particular, as Joyce 
Salisbury concludes, render the nonhuman as possessing some intrinsic value and a rich 
emotional existence independent of human projection4 — the fourteenth-century romance 
hosts a full and considered exploration of the rational nonhuman, one that warrants further 
research. However, the implications of this project, as I mentioned in my introduction, 
reach beyond just these three texts and, even, beyond the fourteenth century. I hope that 
this dissertation may open further avenues for new pedagogical approaches to and/or 
different lenses through which to interpret medieval texts and that this project may offer 
new contexts for theoretical applications. Here in my conclusion, having presented my 
evidence and argument, I explore those statements in more depth.  
For one, this dissertation gestures toward an overall trend in medieval romance: the 
Middle English tradition seems more concerned with portraying the definitions of human 
and nonhuman animal as less separate or hierarchized than the Anglo-Norman or French 
traditions. This project may spark a review of the primary literature through the lens of 
reparative ecocriticism. Take, for example, Gawain and Gringalet: this chivalric pair 
appears across multiple texts in the Arthurian tradition, in romances across Europe 
throughout the Middle Ages from Gawain’s first appearance with Gringalet in the eleventh-
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century How Culhwch Won Olwen.5 While we can read at least a one-sided affective bond 
between the two in L’atre Périlleux6 and the potential for nonhuman animal 
communication in Livre de Arture7 — both thirteenth-century French romances — the most 
telling passages come from the German romances. In the Middle English, Gawain stops 
mid-battle to weep and lament over his slayn steed in the fifteenth-century The Awntrys off 
Arthur (541ff.).8 In fourteenth-century Middle Dutch romances, Gringalet recognizes 
Gawain’s voice and breaks free from a would-be thief in Walewein ende Keye (768ff.)9 and 
Gawain displays an intense emotional investment in Gringalet that is endearingly 
reciprocated by Gringalet in the Roman van Moriaen.10 While the French/Norman tradition 
does, to some degree, participate in questioning the human/nonhuman definitions of 
Aquinas and the Great Chain, it is not to the same degree as the more Germanic traditions. 
Perhaps this is due to a geographical, cultural, or even proto-national conception of 
identity: Middle Dutch and Middle English romances produce cultural identity through and 
with nonhuman animal relationships and definitions. Or, at least, the Middle English 
romance tradition is more concerned with these questions of rationality and 
human/nonhuman relationships, as their poets expanded or elaborated on the narratives so 
as to better play on the always differing and always deferring distinctions between the 
human and other animals.  
In discussing that play of human/nonhuman animal definitions, my dissertation 
implicates the ecocritical in the affective experience. If witnesses can experience shared 
emotions with nonhuman animals or even fictional representations of affect, then audiences 
of these romances can, in theory, share in the affect of the nonhuman animals therein. In 
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Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, for example, audiences read in precise detail not only 
the hunting and skinning of game animals but also Gawain’s own hunt and pseudo-
skinning. While Gawain fills the role of hunted human, the romance’s audience fills the 
role of witness: it sees and, to some degree, shares in the experiences related in the 
romance. Audiences can be the hunters or the hunted or even both — the audience, in 
relating to the romance’s main character and his struggles, may enter into a shared affective 
state and themselves experience some of Gawain’s trauma. The Round Table similarly 
experiences Gawain’s trauma when the latter relates his tale to his fellow Arthurian 
knights, but Gawain’s brethren misunderstand the trauma — they fail to enter a state of 
shared emotions with Gawain. However, the audience remains privy to the full tale in all 
details and are not constrained by Gawain’s biased retelling. The audience can, as Gawain 
did, become a hunted and skinned animal by participating in the romance as witnesses and 
through identification with narrative content.  
I hope that my dissertation’s use of affect theory encourages others to reassess how 
scholars in the medieval period might have applied it. Primarily, scholars of medieval 
literature focus on affect theory as the study of emotions and write frequently about the 
“history” of emotion and affect in penitential literature, though some, like Barbara 
Rosenwein, have meta-analyzed how scholars utilize affect theory and proposed 
methodologies therefor.11 This dissertation seeks to utilize affect theory’s robust toolset 
beyond the study or history of emotions and to urge scholars of medieval literature to 
explore other affective lenses and the interpretive alternatives they offer.  
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Nonetheless, while this dissertation’s use of affect theory seeks to apply a less 
emotion-focused lens, its recourse to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s becomings raises 
a few questions of its own. Of most interest to my project, however, is the question of ‘Can 
nonhuman animals enter states of becoming?’ To enter a state of becoming requires one to 
imitate or perform with “with enough feeling, with necessity and composition” to project 
that which is imitated.12 Of course, we must question if other animals possess sufficient 
awareness of themselves and the world to formulate a concept of both their own 
consciousness and the world independent of that self-recognition. We know, for example, 
that we can train other animals to mimic human behaviors — we can teach a bear to dance, 
a dog to shake hands, a seal to wave, etc. — but are these nonhuman animals aware of their 
performance and their place within it? Are they capable of imbuing their performance with 
feeling, necessity, and composition so as to project the human? Higher nonhuman primates 
can learn to and successfully communicate with humans through visual languages,13 but 
can we say their imitation enters them into a state of becoming-human? 
My research implies that the answer might be yes, at least for nonhuman animals 
in medieval romance’s realm of fantasy and magic where, as shown in this project, the 
nonhuman can be read as rational. In this genre’s space of play, a horse or a lion or a wolf, 
as rational animals, can sufficiently imitate human practices — can perform with feeling, 
necessity, composition — so as to enter a state of becoming-human. We read of Ywain’s 
lion in Ywain and Gawain attempting to throw himself on a sword out of suicidal grief, and 
the text gives us no doubt about whether this nonhuman animal possesses enough self-
awareness to perform such human acts.14 States of becoming, after all, never enter into the 
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realm of become, but instead remain in a perpetual state of process. The nonhuman animals 
do not become human but are capable of entering that middle state of potential. Even if we 
argue that the nonhuman animal is not sufficiently self-aware to consciously enter a state 
of becoming, they can, still, project a human from the perspective of the witness — who 
is, in this case, the reader or audience of romance. A human audience can see and perceive 
a becoming-humanness from another animal: we see Koko the gorilla perform a series of 
hand-signs with her handler and we perceive her as not-ape and not-human — she is an 
ape gesturing beyond her species toward the human even while she never stops being ape 
and never becomes human. We do not necessarily argue whether or how much Koko 
understands the hand-signs as language because we perceive the gorilla’s performance of 
communication as genuine, as having feeling and necessity and composition. Nonhuman 
animals, then, can enter states of becoming through their own self-aware imitation of 
human behaviors and/or through the perception of their performance’s witnesses. 
While becomings may not be limited to human animals alone, my project suggests 
that humans use nonhuman animals as another sort of becoming: heraldic devices, often 
reliant on nonhuman animals or objects in their design, follows a totemic system of 
representation and empowerment that, in turn, pushes its wielder into a sort of becoming. 
I mention this potential intersection between the two identification systems in my 
discussion of William’s werewolf shield in the third chapter’s analysis of William of 
Palerne. Considering the definition of totems as provided by Annabel Wharton,15 the key 
features and functions of totems fit well with those of heraldic devices, especially in 
romance depictions. Arguably, heraldic devices imbue users with power even outside of 
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the magical conventions of romance, as bearing the symbol of one’s reputation can effect 
affective reactions in both the symbol-bearing knight and his opponent. Both perceive the 
heraldic symbol and respond accordingly: the former may experience a boost in morale or 
a heightened psychological state by carrying the heraldic symbol — perhaps like a sports 
team reaffirming their prowess and “getting pumped up” before a game, as they seek to 
inhabit the traits of their team mascot and enter a mild state of becoming — while the latter 
may experience dread, fear, or lowered morale — not unlike the oppressive “watched” 
feeling certain portraits can give viewers or the uneasiness someone with severe allergies 
feels when they see the yellow-black shape of a bee.16 And so, in a psychological sense, 
heraldic symbols can empower their bearers with their represented traits.  
However, scholars have historically approached totems in what we may now 
identify as a problematic, Eurocentric manner, and consequently sociologists and 
folklorists consistently categorized totemic systems as primitive or Other.17 To find totemic 
structures in the heraldic system may, from that perspective, degentrify a significant and 
long-standing aristocratic tradition. At the very least, the similar — even near identical — 
traits of the two systems suggest that the regulated and heavily classed nature of heraldic 
devices finds its roots in a common human practice.  
However, while totemic and heraldic systems boast a long history of use and study, 
my dissertation may bear implications for newer fields of study: in my introduction, I stated 
that this research can be applied to forward-looking fields like transhumanism. 
Transhumanism bases itself on human modification, typically through technical, 
cybernetic, medical, and/or biological means, to transcend human limitations and, further, 
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the human itself. While the movement raises some concerning questions — mainly, 
opponents ask how we will know that the transhuman, after sufficient modification, can 
still be considered “human” or if the very definition of human will need to be modified and 
what that means for unmodified humans, etc. — most can argue that transhumans already 
exist via prosthetic limbs, implants, medications, and even performance-enhancing drugs 
of all kinds, from caffeine to steroids.18 
Of note here, transhumanism also asserts that this modification can also be gained 
through “the power of other animals,” and several of the literary figures examined in this 
dissertation could, by that paradigm, represent a medieval transhumanism.19 Primarily, I 
briefly identified the werewolf Alphouns and the knight William of William of Palerne as 
potential medieval transhumans in the third chapter of this project: both characters find 
themselves enhanced beyond the human by nonhuman means — Alphouns with his wolf 
body and William with his totemic werewolf shield. Both defy human limitations with 
these added biological and technical modifications to their capabilities, such that Alphouns 
and William can, by the definition of transhumanism, represent literary prototypes for more 
modern fields of human enhancement.  
We can read heraldry itself, with its totemic imbuing of power, as a system of 
transhumanistic enhancement, and, moreover, the chivalric unit of knight-and-horse as a 
transhuman conglomerate. While some scholars have read the passionate bond between 
knight and horse as creating a singular posthuman identity of the chivalric unit, a la Jeffrey 
Jerome Cohen,20 that single unit can be recast as a transhuman identity: not only does this 
definition of “human” depend upon and incorporate nonhuman components, but these 
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components — i.e., the horse — act as biological modifications that push the human knight 
beyond human limitations. Horses lend knights their strength and speed, and if we read the 
two creatures as forming Cohen’s single identity, then that human becomes a different type 
of animal altogether: the knight transcends his human boundaries to become something 
more, or even something better, than the unmodified human. Considering, too, knights use 
horses to physically and symbolically elevate themselves above the lower classes,21 the 
horse both metaphorically and literally raises knights above unhorsed/unmodified humans. 
Transhumanism, at least in its core concepts, may not be so young a movement, and we 
can trace its shape in the medieval chivalric system as well as in the literary human animal.  
While the concept of the human animal is hardly a new one, this dissertation 
suggests that the definition of the human as an exceptional, rational animal did not go 
unquestioned in medieval romance. The genre’s space of play enabled romance to explore 
and even undermine the distinctions between human and nonhuman animals, and the 
literary medieval animal, fraught with implications for the human animal and the rational 
nonhuman, functions as a pre-modern interpretive model of self-conception: geo-cultural 
or even proto-national identity-building, human-becoming-prey and nonhuman-becoming-
human, totemic underpinnings that merge self- and heraldic-recognition, and even 
transhumanist modification through composite human/nonhuman units. Medieval 
literature, particularly medieval romance, revises the paradigm of the rational animal in 
such a way as to undermine its presumption of human exceptionalism and reinscribe the 
human into the category of animal.  
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